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Abstract 
The six German political foundations, backed by substantial public funds, 
have several hundreds of foreign offices around the globe and more than 
2000 staff members. As specific manifestations of the German political 
landscape, the Stiftungen are affiliated to the German political parties at the 
German Bundestag.  
This thesis researches the international activity of the German political 
foundations and their position within international relations theory. It 
juxtaposes the rationalists and constructivists approaches on the state and 
non-state relationship and the possible impact of transnational actors. After 
having identified the German political foundations as transnational actors, a 
model of public diplomacy is used to systematically study the foundations’ 
transnational interaction processes. The model integrates different public 
diplomacy approaches and is based on the assumption of public diplomacy as 
a diplomatic process in a network environment, where transnational actors 
and states are equally important and where values and ideas are emphasised. 
At the same time, it considers propaganda activity, a criticism sometimes 
voiced by foreign governments with regard to the foundations’ undertakings. 
The foundations’ democracy assistance as well as their conflict management 
ambitions are explored, as collaborative or catalytic public diplomacy forms. 
In two case studies, one on the Rule of law program of the Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung in Southeast Europe and another on the activities of the 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Southern Thailand, the strategies of ideational 
diffusion processes and networking, the soft power resources and social 
relationship building of the political foundations are investigated. 
This theoretically informed empirical study aims at first contributing to the 
object of the German political foundations’ international undertakings which 
has been subject to little research so far. Second, it connects IR theory on 
transnational actors as well as the literature on public diplomacy to these 
activities. Finally, the thesis identifies the Stiftungen as reproducers of the 
German civilian power identity by implementing abroad major parts of 
German policy.  
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“Penser ne suffit pas, il faut penser à quelque chose.” 
 
(Jules Renard) 
 
 
“So steht es denn da, unser Werk, so steinern und fremd, so eigenmächtig, so 
ein für allemal. Es sieht dich an, ohne zu nicken, ohne zu lächeln, so, als 
hätte man sich nie gekannt; ohne zu danken und ohne zu verzeihen. 
Nachdem man es lange betrachtet und auch die ersten Schrecken 
überwunden hat, sagt man sogar: Es ist nicht schlecht, man kann nicht sagen, 
es ist schlecht! Es erinnert an dieses und jenes, was uns im Entwerfen, da es 
noch ein Einfall war, erfreut und beglückt hat.” 
(Max Frisch, Bin oder Die Reise nach Peking) 
 
 
1 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
In 2012 German political foundations received state subsidies totalling of 
434 million Euros, a web of 340 foreign offices spanned around the globe 
and they had around 2000 staff members. Affiliated to the political parties at 
the German Bundestag they offer considerable educational, advisory and 
exchange programs in Germany and abroad. They are provided with 
substantial public funds and situated in a grey area between public and 
private, offering freedom and room for manoeuvre. Abroad they are 
assumed to accompany and relieve German foreign policy.1 Their distinctive 
political and legal organisation has even been imitated by other countries, 
such as France, India and Turkey as well as on European level.2 However, 
research on German political foundations has been astonishingly limited.  
1.1. Research object 
The research project aims at analysing the German political foundations’ 
role in international relations. In investigating the practice of their 
international activity, the foundations’ uniqueness as players of global 
presence and their influential character can be understood. The term 
“German political foundations” (Politische Stiftungen or Parteistiftungen) is 
drawn up of six German organisations: 
 
- Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES);  
- Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS);  
- Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (FNS);  
- Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (HSS);  
- Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (HBS) and  
- Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung (RLS).3  
 
The choice of name indicates their political party affiliation at a Federal 
level. The FES is closely linked to the Social Democratic Party (SPD) but 
                                                 
1
 Pogorelskaja (2009a) p. 7. 
2
 Woyke (2011) p. 431; Baddenhausen/Grey (2007). 
3
 For their internet representation (in English, if available) see: 
FES at: http://www.fes.de/de/; KAS at: http://www.kas.de/wf/en/; FNS at:  
https://www.freiheit.org/content/stiftung; HSS at: http://www.hss.de/english.html; HBS at: 
https://www.boell.de/en; RLS at: http://www.rosalux.de/english/foundation.html.    
2 
also affiliated with the German trade union confederation (Deutscher 
Gerwerkschaftsbund).4 The KAS was formed as a close associate of the 
conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU). The smaller FNS is close 
to the liberal Free Democratic Party (F.D.P.). The Bavarian HSS is linked to 
the right-wing Christian Social Union (CSU). The HBS is affiliated to the 
Green Party (Bündnis90/Die Grünen), while the RLS is connected to the 
left-wing DieLinke, formerly the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) 
which succeeded the German Democratic Republic (GDR).5  
The political aims and objectives of the German political foundations circle 
around the strengthening of democracy, the support of civil political 
commitment, dialogue and cooperation among different socio-political 
stakeholders as well as research and knowledge transfer.6 Despite the 
democratic consensus, each foundation is committed to a certain normative 
background that determines activities in Germany and abroad. The FES is 
engaged in social democracy, freedom, justice and solidarity. It promotes 
political participation, social cohesion and promotes a fair social and 
economic order and furthers political dialogue with trade unions.7 The KAS 
takes as a basis a Christian conception of human being created by God in its 
equality, diversity and imperfection. It promotes liberal democracy, social 
market economics and strengthening of the value consensus. It commits 
itself to liberty, justice and solidarity.8 The FNS is committed to liberalism 
and wants to encourage the principle of freedom in human dignity in all 
aspects of society.9 The HBS feels bound to ecology, sustainability, 
democracy, human rights, self-determination and justice. It has a special 
focus on gender equality, minority rights and active peace policy.10 The 
RLS considers itself as part of democratic socialism focused on critical 
thinking and political alternatives.11 The HSS more broadly feels bound to 
                                                 
4
 Mair (2000) p. 129 fn. 5. 
5
 Party affilated political foundations exist also in the Land level. 
6
 Cf. FES/KAS/FNS/HSS/HBS (1998). 
7
 FES at: https://www.fes.de/de/?id=232.    
8
 KAS at: http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.4972/.  
9
 FNS at: https://www.freiheit.org/content/50-jahre-stiftung.  
10
 HBS at: https://www.boell.de/de/navigation/ueber-uns-519.html.  
11
 RLS at: http://www.rosalux.de/stiftung.html.  
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democracy, peace and development emphasising Christianity and historical 
roots.12 
The scope of the foundations’ domestic and international activities is 
enormous. Originally, the German political foundations’ activities 
concerned political or civic education in Germany.13 In the first study of the 
German political foundations in 1976 Watson gave a short introduction to 
the German political foundations in a report published by the Anglo-
American Foundation. He described the original intention of the 
establishment of the Stiftungen to encourage democratic structures in post-
war Germany against the background of the National Socialist era.14 
Nowadays, political education is still the core of the Stiftungens’ domestic 
activity. It includes the maintenance of educational institutions offering 
seminars, workshops and discussions. The KAS, for instance, has an 
educational institution (Bildungsforum) in every Federal country.15 Its 
activities address citizens interested in politics, and subjects range from 
fundamental issues concerning democracy, to international-relations and 
day-to-day politics.16 Other domestic activities concern the award of prizes, 
mainly dedicated to writers and journalists, the organisation of exhibitions 
to further art and culture, as well as dialogue forums on emerging policy 
issues between political and economic stakeholders and those from civil 
society.17 Moreover, the foundations give educational grants to gifted 
German and foreign students. Graduate and post-graduate programs support 
all fields of studies. They contain financial support but also regular seminars 
and advice services.18 The KAS, for example, annually gives around 3500 
grants to students.19 In 2014 the FES supported around 2.800 young people 
                                                 
12
 HSS at: http://www.hss.de/stiftung.html.  
13
 For studies on the foundations’ civic education see Hellwig (1998); Langguth (1993) and 
Vieregge (1977b). Leuthold (2000) dealt with the civic education of the HBS. Pechtl (1996) 
analysed the foundations’ educational opportunities in the Länder of Brandenburg and 
Bavaria.  
14
 The report also considered the establishment of British political foundations according to 
the German model (Watson [1976] p. 18).  
15
 KAS annual report 2013 p. 99.  
16
 FES/KAS/FNS/HSS/HBS (1998).  
17
 FES/KAS/FNS/HSS/HBS (1998); KAS annual report 2014 p. 85.  
18
 Interview 18. 
19
 KAS annual report 2014 p. 87.  
4 
with scholarships (of which 320 abroad).20 Scholars are not necessarily 
political adherents of the donor body.21 However, the list is long of 
prominent German politicians having been supported by a political 
foundation in former times.22 Moreover, every political foundation does 
research in the fields of politics and social science. The research activity is 
often carried out in collaboration with external research institutes. In 
addition, the foundations organise specialists’ conferences and discussion 
groups as well as lectures, and constantly publish books, articles and 
reports. Historical research is done with the help of the foundations’ own 
archives, libraries and documentation facilities.23 The FES, for example, 
maintains a specialised library with 1.000.000 volumes on labour 
movement.24  
Nearly three quarters of the expenditure of the German political foundations 
is devoted to projects in foreign countries.25 The international activities 
started in the 1960s. They have continuously adapted to the international 
political developments and geo-political focal points. The two major 
cornerstones of the foundations’ international activities are work in the 
development and transition countries and their dialogue-based undertakings 
in the EU countries and in North America. The first activities aim at 
“implementing humanitarian projects and programs and assisting the 
establishment of free democratic and constitutional-based structures in being 
committed to human and civil rights”.26 They are mainly part of the German 
bilateral development policy. According to the Ministry of Development 
and Cooperation (BMZ), it “involves strengthening the key institutions in a 
democratic social order, such as parliaments, political parties and an 
independent judiciary, as well as promoting good governance and 
                                                 
20
 FES annual report 2014 p. 62. 
21
 Interview 18; differently Pinto-Duschnisky (1991a) p. 204. 
22
 KAS former scholarship holders are, for instance, Uwe Barschel (Prime Minister for 
Hesse, 1982-1987), Thomas de Maizière (Federal Interior Minister) and Christian Wulff 
(Federal President, 2010-2012). 
23
 FES/KAS/FNS/HSS/HBS (1998). 
24
 FES annual report 2014 p. 64. 
25
 See 1.8.3. 
26
 FES/KAS/FNS/HSS/HBS (1998). 
5 
opportunities for civil society participation”.27 Projects and activities are 
generally implemented together with partner organisations on site. In 
Europe the foundations focus specifically on “the European unification 
process and international understanding through information and 
international meetings”.28 In the industrialised countries the Stiftungen are 
mainly active with the interlinking of transatlantic and European elites.29 In 
2013 the Stiftungen had offices all over the world. The KAS maintained 69 
offices abroad, the FES had 107 offices, the FNS 33, the HBS 30, the HSS 
57 and the RLS had 16 international offices.30 Recent works on the 
Stiftungen assume that their activities nowadays circle around promoting 
approximation ambition in the Southeast European countries to the EU, the 
management of crises, and dealing with the danger of states’ fragility and 
terrorism.31 Systematic analysis of most of these aspects is missing, 
however. Moreover, considerations which take into account the respective 
foreign and development political concepts of the German government are 
almost non-existent.32 This is necessary, however, in order to understand the 
relationship between the foundations and the state as well as their extensive 
public funding. 
The research project concentrates on the activities of the German political 
foundations in developing and transition countries where the major part of 
their international activity takes place. It will connect transnational and 
constructivist-inspired international relations’ (IR) theory to these 
undertakings by looking at the process of public diplomacy which includes 
democracy assistance and the newer conflict management. This will help to 
position the Stiftungen in international relations as either independent 
political actors or instruments of state power. It will also offer some 
explanation on what the foundations change and why they are supported by 
massive funds. Finally, this research project is neither financially supported 
                                                 
27
 BMZ at: 
http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/approaches/bilateral_development_cooperation/players
/political_foundations/index.html. 
28
 FES/KAS/FNS/HSS/HBS (1998). 
29
 Bartsch (2007) p. 280; see Renvert (2014) on the transatlantic activities. 
30
 See Ch. 5 fn. 167 on the sources. 
31
 Bartsch (2007) p. 289. 
32
 Exceptionally see Pogorelskaja (1997). 
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by one of the German political foundations nor has it been suggested by 
them. 
1.2. Theory 
The research is informed by several theoretical assumptions which will be 
outlined and systematised in detail in the following chapters.  
International relations can no longer be defined as only covering relations 
between states. The dominant rationalist approaches of neorealism and 
neoliberalism discuss, whether transnational actors matter. Both see the state 
at the centre of their analysis, though. Constructivist theory, however, best 
explains the importance of transnational actors in international relations, as 
it concentrates on transnational interaction processes among different actors. 
Rather than debating whether transnational actors matter, constructivism 
does not assume that one type of actor is more important than the other.33 In 
looking at social interaction, ideational diffusion processes and perceptions, 
constructivist thinking can help uncover important issue neglected by 
neorealism and neoliberalism. It focuses more directly on the question of the 
international role of political foundations maintaining links with the German 
government, the political party landscape as well as politicians and civil 
societies abroad. However, the German political foundations cannot be 
easily identified among the transnational actors, since due to their public 
funding the organisational characteristics of private and public are blurred. 
There have also been attempts to describe the activity of German political 
foundations as “movement on the threshold between governments and civil 
society”.34 Although we expect that the German political foundations can 
operate as transnational actors, it will finally depend on whether the 
foundations are state-controlled or active on behalf of the German 
government. 
With the help of an integrated model on public diplomacy, transnational 
activities can be studied systematically. The model includes constructivist-
led considerations on transnational interactions in the international sphere 
                                                 
33
 Chandler (2005) p. 154; Hartmann (2001) p. 68; Risse (2002) p. 259. 
34
 Bartsch (1998); Czempiel (1993). 
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which are not guided by state-centrism. The diplomatic process can be 
conceived without bias as taking place in a network environment, 
comprising various actors and different resources. In this way, we regard 
public diplomacy as an important - if not as the main - transnational 
interaction process. We do not assume that diplomacy is a formalised 
negation process only. Rather, transnational interactions take place in a less 
structured environment. The foundations’ international activities are 
incidentally perceived as diplomatic undertakings. Systematic analysis is 
missing, however. We expect that most of what the Stiftungen do 
internationally can in fact be understood as public diplomacy. We also 
expect that the German political foundations as important parts of the 
domestic political culture in Germany35 mainly diffuse those values which 
correspond to the narratives of official policy. This correspondence, still, 
might not keep the Stiftungen from being transnational actors with 
independent power resources, including access to foreign figures, 
information channels and knowledge resources.  
Democracy assistance and conflict management have been identified as 
different modes of how public diplomacy can be practiced. Increasingly, 
they are fields where transnational actors find their niche. Although some 
literature on the German political foundations considers their support of 
democracy, it has never been connected to a diplomatic activity nor to the 
literature on transnational actors. As regards conflict management, the 
literature has almost completely ignored the undertakings of the German 
political foundations. We assume that the Stiftungen are predominantly 
active as transnational actors in democracy assistance as well as in conflict 
management. 
1.3. Research questions 
I am mainly interested in the following central question: 
What role do the German political foundations have in international 
relations? Are rationalists correct in saying that states are the key 
international actors, or can it be demonstrated, as constructivists argue, that 
                                                 
35
 Bartsch (2007) p. 280. 
8 
through the interaction with many different actors, the German political 
foundations as transnational actors have a significant impact? If the latter is 
the case, what is the reason for their substantial public funding? 
Several sub-questions are necessary in order to address the central 
questions. They can be grouped into three areas: 
(1) Public diplomats? 
To what extent can German political foundations be considered as public 
diplomats? Are they independent generators of public diplomacy or do they 
work on behalf of the German government? Does their work substitute, 
supplement or conflict with traditional diplomacy? Who benefits and who 
loses from these activities? Do the foundations have advantages (e.g. 
resources) in comparison to other diplomatic actors? Are transnational 
networks established? If yes, who controls them? 
(2) Democracy assistants?  
What makes the German political foundations democracy assistants? Do 
they follow a developmental or a political conception of democracy 
assistance? What ideas are diffused and are they different from those of 
official German policy? What do the foundations change? Are prerequisites 
established by the foundation for German companies? 
(3) Conflict management? 
Is conflict management implemented by the Stiftungen? If yes, what ideas 
are diffused and are they different from those of official German policy? 
What do the foundations change? Are prerequisites established by the 
foundation for German companies? 
This study does not include recommendations for action for the German 
political foundations. Their activities were analysed and assessed to the 
established systematisations. 
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1.4. State of research 
The academic focal points of the few existing pieces of literature on the 
German political foundations changed over the decades and adjusted to 
political realities. While in the first publications 40 years ago, academic 
authors concentrated more on the organisation of the Stiftungen in itself, 
subsequentially researchers and also the Stiftungen in their publications gave 
further attention to the foundations’ activities and their effects abroad. The 
literary process can therefore be described as from the inside out. Literature 
published from the 1970s to the 1980s discussed organisational matters of 
the Stiftungen concerning the foundations’ party affiliation and financial 
matters, while the foundations’ international activity remained in the 
background.36 The literature written in the 1980s and 1990s showed 
increased interest in the foundations’ international activities. Authors agreed 
that the German foundations were highly political organisations.37 From the 
1990s onwards, literature became more complex and less descriptive. We 
can identify four major themes treated in the literature: Firstly, the 
publications considered development policy governed by the literature on 
democracy assistance. Case studies happened to be carried out in the 
transforming countries of the Eastern Bloc whereas before they had focused 
more on Latin America and Africa.38 Secondly, literature treated foreign 
policy on a national and European level.39 A third body of literature 
considered the foundations’ adaptations to globalisation processes.40 Finally, 
scholars looked at domestic themes, such as legal and financial conditions 
as well as civic education.41 The foundations’ descriptions of themselves 
published over the decades represent a literature type of their own. Despite 
advertising character, they show improved self-reflection in recent times 
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 See Vieregge (1977a), (1977c), (1980); Papst (1982). 
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offering an additional source for researchers.42 Present day academics, 
however, face the problem of sparse literature. Despite an increase in 
publications in the last years the amount of monographs is limited. Recent 
works often tend to throw in keywords like “diplomacy” of the foundations 
or their “conflict prevention” without taking the time or having the 
possibility for a thorough analysis. As far as the research questions are 
concerned, the respective chapters review the literature in more detail.  
1.5. Case selection and methodology 
The research project was conducted as a case study design. It is based on 
qualitative research methods, as some deeper understanding on the social 
phenomenon and the socially constructed nature of reality is intended with 
priority to perceptions, meaning and ideas.43 Quantitative research could not 
offer these insights. Moreover, I made use of systematisations deriving from 
the respective bodies of literature to operationalise the processes of public 
diplomacy, democracy assistance and conflict management. I carried out a 
collective case study, where several cases were examined mainly to 
investigate some general phenomenon.44 The cases of the two major party-
affiliated political foundations, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and the 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung were used. Both are comparable as regards size, 
funding and staff members. They work in a wide international sphere and 
were able to offer enough relevant data to answer the research questions. 
With regards to the KAS, I considered their democracy assistance activities 
in the Southeast European countries focusing especially on EU accession of 
these countries, while for the FES, I looked at conflict management in 
Southern Thailand. Although different in their focus, both fields of activities 
are assumed to be part of public diplomacy allowing some generalisation on 
their transnational interaction. Taking into account the foundations’ 
normative backgrounds, variations could be stressed. The cases were not 
chosen on structural similarities of the involved countries/regions. The 
                                                 
42
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region of Southeast Europe offered an interesting case on how democracy 
assistance is carried out in the European context. Conflict management was 
particularly apt to be studied in Thailand, since interviews could be taken in 
the relatively safe environments of Bangkok and Chang Mai. Moreover, the 
field of the foundations’ conflict management, relatively new in the 
foundations’ activity portfolio, did not offer too many cases to be studied, as 
activities with an exclusive focus on conflicts rarely take place.   
Data was collected by multiple methods, which included the appraisal of the 
existing academic literature, official documents, archival material and those 
published by the German political foundations as well as in-depth 
interviews.   
Method 1: Analysis of academic, official, archival and other material 
Various textual data was examined. The sparse academic literature, mostly 
published in German, was investigated and served as a starting point. 
However, studies connected neither public diplomacy nor transnational 
activity to the German political foundations. An exception as regards the 
latter is Pascher’s doctoral thesis of 2002 analysing the foundations’ 
adaptation to globalisation processes. She deals with the loss of state 
sovereignty, governance processes and the growing international influence 
of non-state actors and investigated the relations of the FES to the UN in the 
1990s.45 Furthermore, I took into account the political foundations’ annual 
reports, evaluations and other material published by the Stiftungen.46 The 
foundations made several unpublished internal documents available to me. 
Also information on the foundations’ internet representations was taken into 
consideration. In contrast to earlier works, which had almost completely 
relied on secondary literature as primary literature was missing,47 the 
material available from the German political foundations was sufficient. 
Still, details on funding of single projects or (complete) evaluations of 
activities were veiled from public. Moreover, various official documents 
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 Pascher (2002). 
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 The foundations’ annual reports were inspected ever since the first report, as far as they 
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from the German Bundestag and relevant material from the Federal Foreign 
Office (AA), the Ministry for Cooperation and Development (BMZ) as well 
as other ministries were investigated. This was important, since the latter are 
the main financial backer of the political foundations’ international activity. 
Their political concepts as regards the areas studied (public diplomacy, 
democracy assistance and conflict management) as well as the regions and 
countries studied (Southeast Europe and Thailand) were explored. In 2014 I 
spent several days at the political archives of the AA and the German 
Bundestag to identify official primary sources and data on the beginnings of 
the foundations’ international undertakings. The material which is under a 
vesting period of 30 years due to its confidentiality, offered insights on the 
initial intention for the foundations’ public funding and the foundations’ 
relations to public bodies. In this context, the intensive efforts of the 
archives’ staff members to make specific relevant material available, needs 
to be highlighted. Finally, media and press coverage in Germany and abroad 
was analysed as well as the wealth of relevant information available on the 
internet.48 
Method 2: In-depth interviews and others 
The highly qualitative nature of interviews was used to overcome the hurdle 
of the sparse literature. Moreover, the individual beliefs of the Stiftungens’ 
staff members as well as the values they attach to their activities were 
important for this work. Between 2009 and 2015 I carried out several in-
depth and semi-structured expert interviews in Berlin, Bangkok and Chang 
Mai which took between 2 to 3.5 hours. I used an open-ended questionnaire 
which allowed deviation from the questions posed and to respond flexibly to 
the topics raised during the interview. In addition, I also used unstructured 
interviews in the form of conversations where two or three questions were 
posed more generally. They lasted around 1 to 2 hours and were conducted 
at the beginning of the research project. The interviews were taken in person 
and either recorded using an audiotape recorder or notes were taken during 
the interview. Both types of interviews were transcribed afterwards. One 
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interview was conducted as a telephone interview and another as written 
interview. The interviewees were foundations’ staff members in the German 
headquarters including members of the executive boards, department heads, 
heads of divisions and foundations’ representatives in the chosen countries. 
Also persons from the foreign ministry, experts who had cooperated with 
the foundations as well as scholarship receivers were involved. The 
interviewees were given the opportunity to stay anonymous due to the 
sensitivity of the information provided. An interview’s code number is 
mentioned in the footnote of the texts in order to create transparency. The 
interview transcripts can be made available to the reviewers of this project if 
desired. The possibility of interviewing foundations’ partner organisations 
on site was not given to me, as travelling to them was either not possible 
due to the security situation (Thailand) or a language barrier existed. In light 
of the research question, these interviews, however, were not particular 
suitable on producing relevant data. I tried to use triangulation entailing 
multiple methods and different sources to ensure credibility and the 
accuracy of my interpretations.49 In the Southeast European case study, I 
referred to an extensive evaluation of the KAS’s activities, which had been 
carried out by an external evaluator in 2013. In the Thailand case study, I 
had interviews with the staff members from all active foundations as well as 
other persons more directly involved in the activities of the FES, in order 
consider other opinions.50 However, the special role of the foundations’ 
representatives in the context of the undertakings on site should not be 
underestimated. They are very much in control of information on the work. 
We will discuss the representatives’ role later on.51 The cooperation of the 
interviewees was very positive as was the amount of time and effort spend 
responding to interview questions, establishing further contacts and 
providing additional material even beyond the interview situation. As part of 
the data analysis I used coding, whereby I connected the responses to the 
theoretical models and systematisations developed in this study.52 During 
the research project I was given the opportunity to participate in discussions 
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14 
and conferences organised by the foundations. Systematic observation was 
not carried out, since limited knowledge was expected to be gained from it 
for the answering of the research questions. Nonetheless, it helped to 
understand more broadly the environment in which the foundations 
operated. Furthermore, I could make some observations on the relations 
between the foundations and the members of parliament/government as well 
as the embassies, when working as a research assistant at the Protocol of the 
German Bundestag between 2007 and 2009, and as an intern at the German 
embassy in Nepal in 2005. I could draw upon these experiences in the 
research project. 
1.6. Organisation of the chapters and specific interest in knowledge 
The study consists of nine chapters. After having defined the study’s overall 
theoretical frame and methodology of this study, I specify some 
characteristics of the German political foundations. They are important for 
general understanding and analysis.  
In chapter 2 and chapter 3 we consider the theoretical background of this 
study. Chapter 2 offers definitions and concepts of transnational actors, their 
activities and impact by referring to IR theory. Chapter 3 focuses on the 
concepts of public diplomacy which can be understood as a transnational 
interaction process in a network environment. It is particularly apt to 
integrate the main thoughts on transnational relations, as outlined before. It 
connects the different approaches into an integrated model of public 
diplomacy which serves as a framework to study the activities of the 
German political foundations in the chapters that follow. Chapter 3 also 
introduces briefly public diplomacy as practiced by the Federal Foreign 
Office in order to make some claims on the possible involvement of the 
German political foundations later on.  
Chapter 4 applies the integrated public diplomacy model to the international 
activities of the German political foundations. It estimates whether the 
German political foundations are transnational actors and puts a special 
focus on the network environment in which transnational activity takes 
place while focusing on parts of the research sub-questions (1). 
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In chapter 5 and 6 the study looks at democracy assistance and conflict 
management of the German political foundations. Both are forms which 
have been identified as how public diplomacy can be practically conducted 
by transnational actors. Since the public diplomacy literature remains rather 
vague on both concepts, the chapters start with systematisations of the 
concepts. They then briefly introduce the German official ambitions in the 
fields, before reviewing the existing literature on the German political 
foundations and subsume their activities more generally under the 
systematisation. Finally, differences and commonalities as regards the 
official ambitions in the fields are indentified. These chapters concentrate on 
the research sub-questions (2) and (3) respectively. 
Chapter 7 and chapter 8 consider the two cases of the KAS’s democracy 
assistance in Southeast Europe as well as the FES’s conflict management in 
Southern Thailand and connect them to the integrated model of diplomacy. 
German official ideas and narratives are also considered. Specifically, we 
look at what values are diffused within the established network 
environment. Both chapters finally try to make some claims on the political 
impact of the foundations addressing all sub-questions. 
The final chapter links the main findings to the central research question on 
the role of the German political foundations in international relations. It 
discusses whether state-centric assumptions of rationalists are right in that 
the German political foundations are sheer instruments of state power or 
whether constructivists are correct in assuming that the Stiftungen as 
transnational actors have their independent position and “reason for being” 
in the international environment. It also tries to explain the tremendous 
public funding of the Stiftungen.  
Overall, the research provides a much needed analysis of the international 
activity of the German political foundation and its uniqueness. The literature 
relating to the phenomenon of political foundations - especially published 
over the last 10 years – is sparse. There is little German literature and even 
less foreign literature available. The literature published recently, consists of 
articles and very few monographs.  
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1.7. Use of language 
The notion of the “developing country” is used in this study by referring 
collectively to those countries whose economic-technical and social 
standard of living is low in comparison to industrialised countries. However, 
I am aware that the notion as well as the synonymous term of “third world” 
is problematic due to the historical connotation. The definition dates back to 
the 1950s and, from the perspective of industrialised countries, refers 
predominantly to post-colonial regions. Development was linked here with 
the understanding of a capitalist economic model akin to that of the USA 
and contrasted to socialism.53 Despite the doubtfulness of the term we use 
the notion of developing countries as many other academics have done 
before. An in-depth and critical discussion on this matter would lead away 
from the original research question. Furthermore, we use the term 
“international” not as referring to state-to-state interactions between 
sovereign states only but from its original understanding of inter (between) 
national (nations). This can include interactions beyond the national boarder 
of public, societal and economic actors among others. By “global” we refer 
to trans-border interactions which can take place in the entire world 
system.54  
1.8. Characteristics of the German political foundations 
The following section introduces some characteristics of the Stiftungen 
which are important for the overall understanding of the research object and 
the following chapters.  
1.8.1. Origins  
The beginnings of the German political foundations’ activities, domestic 
activities then only, date back to 1925.55 Founded by members of the social 
democratic parties the oldest of the political foundations is the Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung. Friedrich Ebert (1871-1925) a saddler from Heidelberg 
became member of the German Reichstag for the Social Democratic Party 
in 1912. After the revolution of 1918 he was one of the new government’s 
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chairmen and became the first German head of state democratically elected 
in 1919. Ebert himself had proposed the establishment of a foundation 
aiming at political education and international understanding. The 
foundation’s funds came from funereal donations following his death.56 
Before the FES was banned by the Nazis in 1933, it had provided almost 
300 bursaries for talented young people. The creation of political 
foundations after World War Two happened mainly for historical reasons 
and aimed at strengthening the German democracy, since the experience of 
the Weimar Republic’s democratic destructiveness finally led to the 
criminal dictatorship of National Socialism.57 In 1947, the FES was re-
established and later compensated for the confiscation of its assets by the 
Nazi regime. The FES served as a model for the Friedrich-Naumann-
Stiftung which was founded in 1957. Friedrich Naumann (1860-1919) a 
protestant theologian was elected member of the German Reichstag in 1907. 
Re-elected in 1919 he became chairman of the German Democratic Party 
(DDP) which he co-founded. Naumann elaborated the part on fundamental 
rights and duties of the constitution of Weimar Republic. He is considered 
as the founder of modern liberalism.58 The creation of the FNS was 
instigated by the then Federal President Theodor Heuss. He considered the 
establishment of the FNS as a support for the F.D.P in crisis at that time.59 
Supporters of the ruling Christian Democratic Party (CDU) soon set up a 
counterpart to the FES.60 The KAS, initially a society for Christian 
democratic education established in 1956 emanated from a political 
association, the Politische Akademie Eichholz e.V. and the “Institute for 
international solidarity”. It changed its name to Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 
in 1964.61 The lawyer Konrad Adenauer (1876-1967) was elected Lord 
Mayer of Cologne in 1917. When the Nazis came to power in 1933 he was 
replaced. In connection with the assassination attempt on Hitler in 1944 he 
was held prisoner by the Gestapo. After being Chairman of the Rhineland 
CDU, Chairman of the British Zone’s CDU (1946) and President of the 
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Parliamentary Council (1948), Adenauer was elected Federal Chancellor 
(1949-1963). He assumed, in addition, the office of the foreign minister 
(1951-1955).62 The Bavarian Hans-Seidel-Stiftung was created in 1967. 
Hanns Seidel (1901-1961) studied law and economics. One of the founding 
fathers of the Bavarian Christian Social Union, he became Minister of state 
for Economics in Bavaria (1947-1954), Party Chairman of the CSU (1955-
1961) and Bavarian Prime Minister (1957-1960).63 In 1988 the 
Stiftungsverband Regenbogen, an association of several foundations 
(Buntstift e.V., FrauenAnstiftung e.V. and Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung e.V.) 
affiliated to the Greens, was set up. Each foundation had its own field of 
activity until they fused to become the new Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung in 
1997.64 Heinrich Böll (1917-1985) published novels, short stories, radio 
dramas and (television) plays and worked as a translator from 1947 
onwards. He was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1972.65 The 
youngest of the German poltical foundations is the Rosa-Luxemburg-
Stiftung. Founded as Verein Gesellschaftsanalyse und Politische Bildung 
e.V. in 1990, it became the RLS in 1999. Rosa Luxemburg (1871-1919), a 
Polish Jew and participant in the Russian Revolution of 1905, was one of 
the founders of the Social Democratic Party in the joint kingdom of Poland 
and Lithuania, one of the most important representatives of the German 
Social Democratic Party’s (SPD) left wing next to Karl Liebknecht, and 
later co-founder of the German Communist Party (KPD). In 1919 
Luxemburg and Liebknecht were murdered possibly by extremists of the 
Freikorps.66 
The attempt to create a political foundation affiliated to the right-wing 
poltical party “Die Republikaner” was abolished in 1995. The German 
administrative court mainly substantiated its decision against the set up of 
the Franz-Schönhuber-Stiftung by declaring it a “danger for public 
welfare”.67 However, in 1996, the Gottlieb-Fichte-Stiftung was created. 
Still, it is different from the other political foundations since it is not close to 
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a political party of a “permanent and significant political mainstream”. 
Given that it does not receive public funding, it could only develop activities 
on a small scale. 68 According to press reports, in 2005 also the National 
Democratic Party (NPD) also failed to establish a party-affiliated foundation 
on the Land level in memory of Walter Bachmann, a former volunteer at the 
Waffen SS.69 Currently, the organisation operates in Saxony under the name 
“Bildungswerk für Heimat und Nationale Indentität e.V.” observed by the 
Saxon office for protection of the constitution.70  
1.8.2. Legal classification and organisational structure 
The German political foundations carry the term “foundation” (Stiftung). In 
most cases, however, this is legally incorrect as the Stiftungen hold the form 
of a registered society (eingetragener Verein: e.V.). Only the FNS is indeed 
a “foundation under private law” (§ 1 charter of the FNS) making applicable 
§§ 80ff. BGB71 and the corresponding law. Foundations are institutions that 
are set up by the founder himself.72 They are supposed to constantly serve 
the specific and fixed object of the foundation with the help of the trust 
fund. Since 2002 foundations need to be recognised officially.73 In 
compliance with §§ 54ff. BGB the other five political foundations are non-
profit registered societies. When legally registered (§ 21 BGB) the freedom 
of association (Article 9 German Basic Law) is applicable to them. For these 
political foundations the term “foundation” is misleading. Although the law 
still allows to them to carry the term as part of the society’s name, the name 
affix e.V. has to be borne permanently (i.e. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 
e.V.).74 Some authors assume that the Stiftungen decided to become a 
registered society as it is less bureaucratic compared to being an actual 
foundation.75 We will return to other explanations later on. After the 
movement of the German Bundestag from Bonn to Berlin in 1999 the 
German political foundations set up headquarters in Berlin. Additionally, 
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the FES, the KAS and the HSS kept their respective offices in Bonn, St. 
Augustin and Munich. Furthermore, all political foundations maintain 
offices abroad. The five political foundations organised as registered 
societies have a similar administrative structure consisting of a board of 
members (Mitgliederversammlung) and an executive board (Vorstand) 
elected by its members. The FNS, in contrast to the 
Mitgliederverstammlung, has a board of trustees (Kuratorium). The FES and 
the KAS both have a Kuratorium as well, including stakeholders from 
society, politics and culture to advise the Vorstand in important matters. 
Compared to the Kuratorium of the FNS, however, it is legally 
insignificant.76 Within the political foundations’ different boards, the 
composition of members is very much affected by the foundations’ party 
affiliation. Members of the foundations are parliamentarians of the German 
Bundestag, the German federal countries’ parliaments or the European 
parliament as well as former members of the government and functionaries 
of political parties.77 The executive board of the KAS, for instance, has 
prominent members like the Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel, the 
President of the German Bundestag Norbert Lammert and the President of 
the European Parliament Hans-Gert Pöttering.78 The foundations generally 
have divisions of political education, research, international cooperation and 
administration including finances and human resources subsections. Other 
sections, such as archives, libraries, and political consultancy as well as the 
communication and press offices are either integrated into these divisions or 
independent divisions. In 2014, the Stiftungen had around 2200 staff 
members in total of which 15% worked abroad.79  
1.8.3. Sources of finance 
The German political foundations obtain significant public funds which 
come mainly from the Bund (around 95%) but also from the Länder and 
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international organisations.80 The federal funds can be divided into three 
types: Projektmittel (project funds) the foundations receive for special 
projects for which they need to apply. Other organisations, such as NGOs 
active with projects in developing countries, obtain such funds as well. 
Project funds come from the Foreign Office (AA), the ministry for 
development and cooperation (BMZ) and other ministries. The AA funds 
social policy measures in North America, Europe81 and other industrial 
countries as well as the provision of scholarships to foreign students82 while 
the BMZ finances measures important to development.83 The means of the 
BMZ are higher than those of the AA. In 2014 the ratio between AA 
funding was 6% (AA) to 94% (BMZ).84 The second type of funding is 
Globalmittel the Stiftungen receive from the interior ministry for their 
statutory aims, such as educational measures, research projects, archival 
activities as well as personnel and administration expenses.85 Approximately 
a quater of their funding is given to the foundations via Globalmittel. A 
third minor group of funds from the ministry of interior, the 
Bauglobalmittel, is received by the foundations for investments.86 The 
distribution of funds among the foundations follows a quota. It is politically 
negotiated, defined by the Budget Committee and fixed by the statuary 
budget law following the proportion of the political parties in the 
parliament.87 In 2015 the following quota existed: the FES received 30,29%, 
the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 29,57%, the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung 
10,21%, the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung 10,51%, and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung 
9,71%. The Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung received 9,71%. Apart from public 
funding the foundations have some limited income from donations, 
attendance fees, fund raising, fixed assets and inheritances.88  
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In the 1990s the German political foundations endured significant budget 
cuts.89 However, in the last years funding was considerably increased.90 In 
2012 the Stiftungen received around 328.4 Mio. Euro Projektmittel, 98 Mio. 
Euro Globalmittel and 7.7 Mio. Euro Bauglobalmittel. This was an increase 
of public funding by 35% compared to 2003.91 
1.8.4. The political party links 
A pivotal point in the discussion on German political foundations remains 
their party affiliation and independence from their “parent” party. The legal 
literature in particular adds to the debate. The conceptual diversity of 
whether the German organisations should be called “political foundations” 
(politische Stiftungen), “party-affiliated foundations” (parteinahe 
Stiftungen) or “party foundations” (Parteistiftungen) already shows the 
complexity of the subject and the positioning of the author. Overseen by the 
Federal Constitutional Court, the issue is passionately debated to this day. 
The political parties act (Gesetz über die politischen Parteien) of 1997 (last 
amended 2011) governs the relationship between the Stiftung and the 
political party as follows: the chairman and the treasurer of a party are not 
allowed to exercise comparable functions in the political foundation (§ 11) 
and political parties are not allowed to receive donations from political 
foundations (§ 25). Still, the crux of the discussion is the public funding of 
the foundations via budget funds (Globalmittel). Historically, the public 
financial support of the Stiftungen results from a ruling of the German 
constitutional court in 1966.92 The court concluded that public subsidies for 
political parties for “civic education” were unlawful. By 1967, the federal 
budget had already assigned the amount of 9 million Deutsche Mark of 
Globalmittel to the political foundations, thus bypassing the limitations on 
state aid to parties resulting from the ruling.93 The HSS was established 
specially for the purpose of receiving these subsidies.94 In 1986, the 
constitutional court finally had to decide about the legitimacy of the 
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foundations’ public financing.95 The process was initiated by the Green 
Party at that point still without a foundation counterpart. The party 
considered the Stiftungens’ public funding via Globalmittel as hidden party 
financing. However, the court upheld the constitutionality of the funding on 
the grounds that the political foundations were “independent enough from 
their affiliated party in matters of organisation and personnel”.96 The 
judgement became henceforth the “Magna Carta” for the political 
foundations’ financing.97 In 1992 the discussion resumed when the 
constitutional court overruled its previous decision on political party 
financing. Political parties were again allowed to receive public funding for 
the whole scope of their duties, even for “civic education”.98 Since that time, 
critics agree that the foundations’ funding should be integrated into the 
funding of political parties. They campaign for transparently standardising 
and regulating the amount and kind of foundations’ public funding. 
Initiatives and draft laws have, however, not yet been successful.99 The 
question in dispute remains how to define the relation of the political 
foundations to their parent parties. In 1996, the political foundations (excect 
for the RLS) made a joint declaration on their public funding outlining their 
public benefit, and the fact that they publicise their use of funds (in the form 
of annual reports). They were not obliged to do this.100  
Lawyers discuss whether the political foundations are (part of) political 
parties. Some authors assume that the political foundations are parties and 
Article 21 GG (German Constitution) is applied to them.101 Article 21 GG 
defines that that “(1) political parties shall participate in the formation of the 
political will of the people. They may be freely established. Their internal 
organization must conform to democratic principles. They must publicly 
account for their assets and for the sources and use of their funds”. Others 
claim that the Stiftungen have rights and duties of Article 21 GG but they do 
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not count as parties.102 A third group sees only the foundations’ funds as 
equivalent to party funds but does not consider the foundations as parties or 
parts of them.103 According to Born, Article 21 GG is not applicable to the 
Stiftungen.104 However, the discussion does not clarify the actual 
relationship between both organisations. From the perspective of activities, 
it is wrong to qualify the main activities of the political foundations as 
exclusively party activities. According to Pinto-Duschinsky, the 
“foundations and parties are distinguished by the fact that much of their 
work is different, though often complementary”.105 However, it is the effect 
of the foundations’ party links that the parent party can benefit from the 
activities.106 The foundations are central carriers of the political education 
for political parties but are autonomous concerning the planning and the 
carrying out of the events.107 The consulting the foundations offer to the 
parent party, shows a strong connection between both organisations and the 
foundations are often considered as a testing ground for new ideas. 
However, their recommendations are often ignored by politicians.108 The 
foundations’ research and the maintaining of archives are of public as well 
as party interest.109 Furthermore, strong personnel links exist between the 
political parties and the Stiftungen, as already outlined.110 The constitutional 
court’s ruling in 1986 did not change this. Thunert estimates that important 
posts at the foundations are often given to “deserving but retired or even 
failed politicians.”111 Although the foundation is “headed by senior party 
figures” it exchanges relatively few staff with the party.112 Party aims and 
those fixed in the foundations’ charters often vary.113 Moreover, the ruling 
of the constitutional court in 1986 inhibited financial contributions from the 
foundations to the parties.114 Both financing operations are strictly 
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separated. Nonetheless, an indirect influence of the party on the financing of 
the Stiftungen exists through the members of parliament as the 
parliamentarians decide on the amount of the foundations’ budget funds.  
In summary, the Stiftungen have a dilemma: On the one hand, they have to 
be legally independent from the parent parties in order to receive public 
funding, according to the constitutional court. On the other hand, the 
foundations have to be close to a political party to secure their public 
funding.115 In consequence, the foundations can be considered a 
governmental and party “hybrid” of “relative autonomy”.116 Some assume 
that the foundations are active in the “pre-political” sphere not involved in 
political competition and winning elections.117 However, the funding of the 
Stiftungen depends indirectly on the success of the political party owing to 
the distribution quota. Whether they are indeed only active in pre-politics 
will be analysed in detail in the following chapters. Certainly, the Stiftungen 
have long ago acquired a right to exist which is not based on the efforts of 
the affiliated party.118 
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Chapter 2 – Transnational actors in IR theory  
The following chapter will offer a theoretical framework for explaining the 
role of the German political foundations in international relations (IR). For 
this purpose transnational actors will be conceptualised first. Furthermore, 
the theory of constructivism and the rationalist theoretical approaches of 
neorealism and neoliberalism will be juxtaposed. Their views on the 
significance of transnational actors in IR will be outlined. It will be shown 
how they explain the occurrence and importance of transnational actors in 
the international system, whereby the explanatory strength of the 
constructivist will be considered. In order to understand what these actors 
characterise and what they actually do, it will be referred to constructivist 
inspired existing analysis on the role of transnational actors in the last 
section. Since constructivism highlights transnational interaction and 
communication processes while taking network environments into 
consideration, it can help explaining comprehensively the position in IR of 
transnational actors and the German political foundations alike.  
2.1. Defining transnational actors  
Defining transnational relations is relatively easy. Still, defining 
transnational actors presents us with a challenge. Numerous types of actors 
are included whose definitions partly overlap. This study follows Risse-
Kappen in defining transnational relations as “regular interactions across 
national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not 
operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental 
organisation”.1 The definition builds upon but slightly modifies the 
definitions of Kaiser and Keohane/Nye. Kaiser stresses the existence of 
transnational societies as a condition for transnational politics which he 
defines as those political processes between national governments and/or 
between transnational societies and governments, which result from 
interactions within transnational societies. Transnational societies develop 
through interaction between different societies in specific areas.2 According 
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to Keohane and Nye transnational relations are “contacts, coalitions, and 
interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central 
foreign policy organs of government.”3 Transnational interactions are “the 
movement of tangible and intangible items across state boundaries when at 
least one actor is not an agent of a government or an intergovernmental 
organisation.” These items can be, for instance, money, information or 
people4 but also political ideas and policy proposals.5 Transnational 
interactions are distinguished from interstate interactions, or in other words, 
traditional diplomacy, which are started off and maintained by governments 
including interaction in intergovernmental organisations. Transnational 
interaction, by contrast, “may involve governments but it may not involve 
only governments.” It is therefore necessary that a non-state actor is 
involved in this process and plays an important role. In their work, Nye and 
Keohane concentrate on the activities of transnational organisations, such as 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), transnational companies and 
international trade unions.6 Transnational relations also include “the 
activities of transnational organisations, except within their home states, 
even when some of their activities may not directly involve movements 
across state boundaries and my not therefore, be transnational interactions as 
defined above.”7 Proceeding from the transnational actors’ standpoint 
transnational interaction can arise with foreign governments, foreign 
societies and intergovernmental organisations whereas vis-à-vis its home 
state the actor is connected by domestic politics.8 Risse-Kappen’s definition 
leaves out the extension of Keohane and Nye to include indirect movements 
across state boundaries. Although it is possible that foreign actors can 
operate abroad from their home base and not necessarily cross state 
boundaries, it is still beneficial to think of transnational actors to directly 
engage over their own national border and to narrow the definition in favour 
of precision. Otherwise the definition embraces virtually even those 
interactions with marginal international contexts. Risse-Kappen also 
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restricts transnational relations to “regular interaction”. This can include 
coalition building and contacts, if subsumable under the term of interaction, 
but simple encounters alone are not sufficient. Since we look at relations, it 
is important to consider more frequent interaction. 
There is not much unity in the definition of non-state actors and how it 
relates to the definition of transnational actors. Both terms are often used 
alternatively or transnational to avoid implying that states are more 
important than other actors.9 Others bring into play “transnational non-state 
actors”.10 According to Risse-Kappen, transnational actors are either “non-
state agents” or “actors which do not operate on behalf of government or an 
intergovernmental organisation”.11 Consequently, the notion excludes IGOs 
and governments whereas it covers transnational companies (TNCs), 
multinational companies (MNCs), non-legitimate groups and liberation 
movements as well as (international) NGOs. Risse-Kappen’s definition also 
comprises transgovernmental actors as long as they are independent enough 
from the national government’s policy.12 Reinalda further unravels the 
distinction and differentiates between transnational and international actors. 
The latter are INGOs, internationally active national NGOs, MNCs, 
governments and IGOs which do not pursue national views and try to 
influence processes on the international level.13 Apart from that and the 
inclusion of NGO variants, Reinalda’s definition of transnational actors is 
consistent with that of Risse-Kappen. Reinalda views non-state actors as the 
sum of transnational and international actors, excluding only governments 
and transgovernmental actors.14 His differentiation between transnational 
actors and international actors, however, seems problematic since the 
criteria rather refer to the actor’s role. In practice, it will be difficult to 
differentiate between the actor’s national and international position which 
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likely overlaps. The actor even might have a mixed role varying from case 
to case. The term transnational actor makes clear that it includes activities 
across national boundaries and contains an element of movement. This 
characteristic cannot be derived from the notion of non-state actor which 
instead sets the actor in reference to another actor (i.e. the state).   
Similar to non-state actors, NGOs are not defined consistently. Even the 
United Nations (UN) providing for NGOs to be accredited for consultative 
reasons (Art. 71 UN Charta) does not define the term. Some requirements 
can be derived from UN Resolution 1996/31: NGOs are not formed by a 
government or an intergovernmental agreement and operate on the basis of 
their own constitutional arrangements.15 The UN also accepts that various 
NGOs have both non-governmental and governmental members, “provided 
that such membership does not interfere with the free expression of views of 
the organisation”.16 NGOs are domestic actors. They become transnational 
actors when they operate across national boundaries. An INGO is 
established when various NGOs from three or more countries establish an 
international non-governmental organisation.17 NGOs are furthermore 
expected to be independent societal actors originating from the private 
sector because they are primarily financed by donations and membership 
contributions.18 Increasingly, NGOs have become heterogeneous and the 
premise “non-governmental” has been watered-down. Reinalda contradicts 
the above definition as he considers NGO variants that act on behalf of a 
government as transnational actors. For state-sponsored NGOs the term 
“QUANGO” was coined. It refers to a “quasi NGO” i.e. an independent 
actor receiving the majority of their resources from public bodies and which 
therefore cannot be clearly assigned to the state or the private sector.19 
Moreover, despite its formal independence it is often assumed to undertakes 
activities on behalf of a government as it is supposed to fulfill duties which 
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are in fact those of the government.20 Glagow and Schimank look at 
QUANGOs from an administrative sciences’ perspective involving in their 
consideration the original motivation for the organisation’s establishment. 
According to them, both NGOs and QUANGOs accomplish “public” tasks. 
But in contrast to the NGO’s private origin, the QUANGO is an attempt of 
the public administration to perform public duties in a non-sovereign form.21 
State-sponsored NGOs are therefore not necessarily QUANGOs and, might 
the amount be little, can be relative autonomous from the funding 
governments.22 Their relations with funding governments can be further 
defined according to the distribution of resources. The relation is stable 
when the resources are balanced, labile when the state’s resources outweigh 
or formal when the resources of the organisation prevail.23 Glagow and 
Schimank consider information, finances and legitimate power as resources 
crucial for political decisions and their implementation.24 For formally 
independent NGOs which are financially dependent on state funds the term 
GONGOs (governmental-non-governmental organisations) has been 
coined.25 In the consequence of these considerations, QUANGOs should not 
be considered as transnational actors while for other forms of publicly 
funded organisations the dependency needs to be analysed on a case-to-case 
basis. The equivalent term for QUANGO in the German foreign political 
context is Mittlerorganisation,26 which can also be translated as “mediating 
organisation”. The German Mittlerorganisationen aim at deepening bilateral 
relations with other countries through civil activities, events and 
publications. They impact on relevant elites and establish contacts with 
similar organisations abroad. Reasons for the activity can either be the 
importance of the bilateral relations with the specific country for Germany, 
the burdened relations with countries in the past or the future importance of 
the country due to political or economic reasons. Mittlerorganisationen can 
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complement German foreign affairs as they fulfil tasks official foreign 
policy is unable to.27 Most of the implementing agencies 
(Durchführungsorganisationen) of German development cooperation are 
QUANGOs.28 
Transnational actors can furthermore be distinguished according to their 
dimension. The first dimension concerns the structure according to which 
the transnational actor is part of a formal organisation or is loosely 
connected to others in the form of networks. The second dimension relates 
to the motivation of the transnational actor, whether the actor is focused on 
its wellbeing or whether it promotes the common good which equates to the 
distinction between profit and not-for-profit actors.29 This is similar to 
Reinalda’s distinction between non-governmental public-interest-oriented 
“PINGOS” and non-governmental profit-oriented “BINGOS”.30 
2.2. Theoretical perspectives on transnational actors 
Explicit analytical work on transnational actors and relations started in the 
late 1960s although neither transnational relations nor theorising about 
transnational actors is new.31 The explosion in the number of NGOs over the 
past three decades, the end of the Cold War and globalisation processes 
have been catalysts for the interest in studying transnational actors.32 
However, theoretical considerations are still missing. Reasons for this are 
seen in political science and its traditional differentiation between a 
domestic and a foreign sphere. Domestic policy theories rarely take into 
account transnational political processes and activities by transnational 
actors, such as political parties, which are then threatened to fall into 
“conceptual no-man’s-land.” Foreign and international political literature, in 
turn, hardly ever deals with transnational actors, since scholars mainly 
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proceed from the assumption of a sovereign nation state as central actor in 
world politics and focus on the relations between governments. Although 
transnational activities challenge the latter assumption most of the 
international relations’ approaches have adopted this state-centrism.33   
In the following sections we will examine how the role of transnational 
actors in IR can be explained. For this purpose, the rationalist and 
constructivist thinking as the conventional IR traditions will be contrasted. 
This will help to understand what both theories hold with regards to 
interactions of transnational actors. The theories’ selection is oriented 
towards the major debates between neorealism and neoliberal 
institutionalism starting in the 1970s and between rationalism and 
constructivism in the 1990s. Although the constructivist framework has its 
explanatory strength borrowing from the rationalist approaches can be 
fruitful. The considerations will be added by transnationalist thoughts as 
they put prominently to the centre cross-border relations between societies 
and states. Although it is not denied that other approaches, such as Marxist 
and critical theory could have added value for this work, the look is limited 
at the causal theories of the neo-neo synthesis and the constitutive 
constructivist approach to avoid an overload catch-all theoretical 
framework. While causal theories try to answer “why” questions and focus 
explanatorily on causal logic and the existence of laws, constitutive theories 
try to understand how structure forms social kinds by asking “how” 
questions. Constitutive theories provide explanations which are not 
necessarily causal34 and refuse laws in support of generalisations.35 
Normative theories which focus on the moral dimension of IR and address 
the ethical nature of relations between actors,36 are not considered. Still, 
some thoughts will be lend from Gramsci and Bourdieu in the following 
sections to establish a plausible and enriched framework.   
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2.2.1. Rationalist approaches 
Since the beginning of IR at the end of World War One and until the end of 
the Cold War, the research agenda was dominated by rationalist 
approaches.37 They assume the nation-state to be the key actor in 
international relations (IR) acting rationally in the pursuit of pre-given 
national interests. In application of methodological individualism, pre-given 
means that states’ interests are unaffected by interaction with others.38 
Rationalism is characterised by a number of disagreements regarding these 
interests’ nature and whether cooperation or conflict is the predominant 
mean of attaining them.39 In the third great debate dominating the academic 
scholarship in international relations since the 1970s, neo-realists focus on 
the limits of cooperation and the possibility of conflict among states 
whereas neoliberals concentrate on the possibilities for cooperation and the 
limits to conflict.40   
Neoliberalism (or neoliberal institutionalism) connects the theories of 
interdependence and institutionalism. Interdependence, a concept developed 
by Keohane and Nye, exists when one state depends on another in order to 
reach its goals. To avoid costly effects it needs to cooperate. Cooperation 
can be increased through and gains a permanent structure within institutions, 
such as international regimes and international organisations.41 
Interdependence and international regimes are believed to diminish 
insecurity (created by anarchy), the use of military force and power 
struggles.42 Neoliberalism drops the realists’ assumption of a power seeking 
state and assumes that states operate self-interested. In the consequence of 
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interdependence and cooperation, states are able to look for absolute gains 
i.e. mutual advantages from which everyone benefits instead of 
concentrating on the loss of power.43 According to Krasner’s foundational 
definition, international regimes are identified as “sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which 
actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”.44 
Rittberger and Zürn consider necessary some minimal level of effectiveness 
and durability to qualify as regime.45 Regimes allow interactions in issue-
areas and facilitate for actors to pursue their interests collectively.46 They 
are also assumed to foster peace and have a “civilizing effect” which 
improves conflict situations through confidence building.47 Regimes, 
although connected to them, are different from organisations. As institutions 
regimes are part of the social structure but, in contrast to organisations, they 
are not capable of acting. With a basis on functional institution theory, 
neoliberals assume that regimes perform functions useful to states helping 
them to maximise their gains: Depending on whether regimes are strong or 
weak they can implement precise rules and interpret them, collect 
information on the behaviour of regime members, make it available to the 
states and sanction violation of rules.48 Neoliberals take microeconomic and 
game theory to explain regime formation which, in short, starts from the 
premise of two actors having the possibility either to cooperate or to 
compete. States fail to cooperate (in regimes) when they imagine other 
members of the anarchic system to adopt a competitive strategy. Neoliberals 
therefore concentrate on aspects that will strengthen reciprocity among 
actors which furthers regime establishment and maintenance.49 Although 
neoliberals acknowledge that not only governments interact but also IOs, 
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transnational actors and individuals they see states in the centre while those 
other actors are mostly not treated as playing a significant role.50  
All forms of realism which has been the dominant theory of world politics 
since the beginning of IR theorising subscribe to statism as the state 
characterised by sovereignty is the only relevant actor in the international 
system.51 Due to the anarchic structure of the international system (viz. the 
absence of a central authority) states are interested in gaining or preserving 
power in order to maintain national sovereignty. Waltz’s neorealist theory 
developed in the 1970s emphasises the importance of structure of the 
international system as a primary determinant for states’ behaviour. 
Insecurity of the international system makes states to seek power in order to 
defend themselves.52 The power of one state is relative to the power of 
others, leading to competition where states try to gain more power than 
others.53 Power in the neorealist view is understood as capabilities i.e. 
economic and military strength, resources, size of population and territory 
among others.54 Hegemonic states are those with high concentration and 
wide diffusion of power.55 The distribution of power among states is the 
dominant explanatory factor for international cooperation.56 Neorealists 
rationalise the development of regimes with the interest of most powerful 
states since regimes depend on the power structure. Regimes are therefore 
epiphenomenal57 and internationally institutions “have mattered rather a 
little”.58 Neoliberals in contrast argue that regimes are able to create a stable 
international structure even in absence of hegemony since regimes often 
persisted when hegemony declined.59 They stress that regimes enable states 
to collaborate whereas neorealists believe that regimes allow states to 
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coordinate.60 Also neorealists look at game theory but highlight that actors 
follow a common strategy in order to avoid unwanted outcomes on both 
sides due to opposing strategies.61 Similar to institutions also transnational 
actors are marginalised as they are not part of the structure.62 Neorealists 
claim that US post-war foreign policy and US economic hegemony enabled 
the rise of MNCs and economic independence in the first place.63 Others 
stress the limitations of IOs and NGOs through their exploitation and 
instrumentalisation by states.64 While neoliberals rejected the neorealist 
assumption that states are the sole important actors on the international stage 
and added a focus on institutions they concede, even in regimes, that states 
are in fact the dominant actors.65 Both neorealists and neoliberals 
furthermore neglected the possibility that political activities may be shifting 
away from the state.66 In sum, neorealism and neoliberalism share several 
core assumptions about actors, values, issues, and power arrangements in 
the international system: (1) due to international anarchy, states have to 
pursue self-help strategies, limiting the nature of international cooperation 
and making the international sphere one of strategic interaction in which 
security concerns are paramount; (2) the interest of states as rational actors 
is to maximise their power and influence by pursuing their self-interest; (3) 
states are the key subjects in international relations.67  
What these theories lack is the possibility to explain the role of transnational 
actors in the international environment. As will be outlined in the following 
section, the constructivist approach challenges the core assumptions of the 
rationalist theory. In doing so, it takes convincingly into account how 
transnational actors affect the sphere across national boundaries. The 
constructivist approach will be enhanced further on by transnationalist 
considerations. Some assumptions of the neo-neo synthesis on states and 
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institutions will be applied to networks later on. It has been a recurring idea 
to combine some rationalist and constructivist explanations as both 
traditions have connecting points.68 In particular, it will be returned to the 
neorealist emphasis on power resources and the possibility of transnational 
actors being instrumentally used by states, and the neoliberal thoughts on 
regime functions. Chapter 3 considers furthermore the competitive and 
cooperative arrangements among different actors.  
2.2.2. The explanatory power of constructivism 
In the early 1990s constructivism developed as a reaction to the 
postpositivist debate in the 1980s and the failure of traditional international 
relations theory to predict or initially explain the end of the Cold War.69 
Constructivists challenge the assumptions of rationalism in arguing that the 
social world is constructed. They focus on the centrality of ideas, i.e. norms, 
values and knowledge, as well as discourses which form political identities 
and interests.70 In his famous article “Anarchy is what states make of it: the 
social construction of power politics” Wendt refers to Onuf who is usually 
credited with coining the term “constructivism” in 1989.71 Wendt’s basic 
assumption is that politicians interpret world affairs. These interpretations 
(i.e. constructs) begin to falter when the conditions change in which they 
had demonstrated validity. Wars, for instance, end with the revaluation of 
the world view. Constructivist theory points out to the variety of views and 
images of society, to tradition, religion and established social practices 
which can offer solutions to some puzzles regarding the differences of 
politics in Europe, North America, East-Asia and the Arab world.72 
According to Wendt, constructivism makes the following core claims related 
to the deviating rationalist views: “(1) states are the principal units of 
analysis for international political theory; (2) the key structures in the state 
system are intersubjective rather than material; and (3) state identities and 
interests are in important part constructed by these social structures rather 
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than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic 
politics“.73  
In responding to the first and second core assumption of rationalism 
constructivists argue that it is not the structure of anarchy creating the 
conditions of possibility and structural limitations for states and state 
interests. Rather, states reproduce anarchy by mutually constituting 
themselves as self-interested and power seeking.74 Rationalists follow 
rational choice theory in the focus on strategic interaction in which egoistic 
actors with given interests intent to maximise these interests and for this 
reason allow cooperation.75 The constructivist assumption is, instead, that 
actors are not uniform and not rational. They have particular identities 
which are characterised by cultural, social, political and material 
circumstances they are anchored to.76 State identities can be understood as 
“varying constructions of nation- and statehood” and are affected by 
international and domestic environments.77 According to Wendt, states do 
not have identities and perception of self and other, apart from or prior to 
interaction with others. Identities are the basis of interests and shape them.78 
Interests and identities are not pre-given or “exogenously constituted” 
outside of the international sphere. They are constructed endogenously 
through the process of international interaction. Intersubjective knowledge 
created through interaction constitutes the interest and identity of the subject 
rather than the subject itself or the structure.79 Knowledge as a causal idea 
shapes how social realty is interpreted and constructed.80 Intersubjective 
knowledge is the result of social acts of signalling, interpreting and 
responding within interaction. Intersubjectivity therefore develops through 
social communication.81 The continuing interaction between states builds 
agreement, regularity and misunderstanding and creates structure in 
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international relations.82 The structure manifests itself in norms which 
regulate states’ behaviour83 and in institutions which are stable sets of 
identities and interests.84 Other constructivist scholars consider norms of 
international society as defining the identities and interests of states instead 
of interaction.85 Norms are intersubjectively “shared expectations about 
appropriate behaviour hold by a community of actors”.86 In both strands, 
unlike in the rationalist view, interests are therefore not fixed but 
adaptable.87 The focus on interaction processes and norms allows 
constructivism to explain change, which the structural fixity of neorealism 
and neoliberalism does not.88 While scholars of the rationalist theories failed 
to predict or initially explain the end of the Cold War, constructivists 
emphasis the social dimensions of international relations: while the 
sovietisation of East and Central Europe after World War Two had 
established a permanent sense of threat and let to revival of the USA and the 
Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the socialist state 
system resulted in a reconstruction of the world’s image. In the Western 
perception the Soviet Union lost its threatening character.89 Whereas 
rationalists assume strategic security and peace as “high politics” questions 
connected to defence and sovereignty to be on the top of states’ agendas and 
“low” political economic and social issues as secondary,90 constructivists 
counter with the concept of issue saliency. What actors regard as important 
depends on the importance attached to values discussed in a political debate 
and the extent to which the actor expects to be affected by the outcome. 
Priorities therefore can vary from actor to actor and over time.91 Values are 
“elements of a shared symbolic system which serve as criteria or standard 
for selection on the alternatives of orientation which are intrinsically open in 
a situation”.92 Constructivists believe that it is not power which shape the 
behaviour of states but ideas that determine the meaning of power. Both 
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neorealism and –liberalism subscribe to materialism believing that the 
structure constraining behaviour is determined by material factors such as 
technology, military hardware and other resources which they view as 
power.93 Constructivism emphasis that ideas and communicative processes 
determine at first which material factors states perceive as important and 
how they impact the interests’ understanding.94 Ideas are “mental constructs 
held by individuals, set distinctive beliefs, principles, and attitudes that 
provide broad orientations for behaviour and policy”.95 One can differentiate 
between causal beliefs, such as knowledge and principled ideas, such as 
norms and political values.96 Power can therefore not only be understood in 
material terms but also in ideational.97 In contrast to rational actors 
following the logic of consequences, constructivists assume that actors 
behave according to the logic of appropriateness. Appropriateness in this 
view is seen as action that follows in a specific situation the rules, norms, 
social roles or the cultural values of that actor’s community.98 Ideas are 
therefore the key variables for constructivist to explain political behaviour.99 
Power in the constructivist view does not only concern to change other 
actors behaviour it also exists when knowledge and the construction of 
identities allocate capacities.100 With the power of social practice 
constructivists refer to the capacity to reproduce the intersubjective meaning 
constituting social structures and actors which can create predictability and 
diminish uncertainty among actors in a socially constructed community.101 
The ability of constructivism to grasp change becomes also clear when 
looking at the impact of institutions and transnational actors in the 
international system. The third core assumption of the rationalist approaches 
shows their state-centrism as state actors are the key ontological object and 
point of departure making it difficult to explain the presence and role of 
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transnational actors.102 Neoliberals see the impact of institutions on 
international relations in expanding gains through cooperation. Neorealists 
view such impact in terms of coordination. Constructivists believe, instead, 
that the institutions’ significance lies in the intensification of interaction.103 
Although granting that non-state actors are participants within regimes 
neoliberalism generally does not consider transnational actors as taking the 
lead or even establish such regimes.104 It is only logical that regimes cannot 
change identities and interests when both are assumed to be pre-given.105 
Constructivists emphasise ideas, arguments, problem perceptions and social 
identities of the involved actors for explaining regime creation.106 They 
stress that the composition of states’ identity also shapes regimes as being 
part of interstate normative structures.107 Regimes are believed to “embody 
a degree of collective identity.”108 Collective identity is understood as the 
“positive identification with the welfare of others, such that the other is seen 
as the cognitive extension of the self” leading to empathetic interdependence 
among actors as the foundations for collective interests.109 They are 
therefore assumed to be intersubjective.110 Regimes are social institution in 
which actors practice communication and argumentatively develop their 
interests oriented towards the principles and norms of the respective 
regime.111 Some variants of constructivism can still be conceived of as state-
centric.112 For Wendt, for instance, the state is the subject of analysis.113 
Others extend constructivist theory to give a prominent role to transnational 
agents highlighted in the concept of transnational or global relations114 as 
will be shown below. In Haufler’s study on private regimes defined as 
“integrated complex of formal and informal institutions that is a source of 
governance in an economic issue area as a whole”115 non-state actors are 
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key and states have a minor role in the establishment and maintenance of 
regimes. According to her, there is no reason for thinking that private actors 
are unable to establish principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures.116 From a functional theoretical point of view, private regimes 
have additional service provision function. Originally in the states’ 
responsibility the service was transferred to private organisations due to a 
lack of capacity or for reasons of efficiency.117 According to Willetts NGOs 
should be put in the centre of regime analysis as their “prime activity […] is 
the mobilization of support for values.”118 Others highlight the normative 
concerns when public functions are attributed to private actors due to the 
erosion of the public and private distinction.119 Haas argues that 
professional knowledge communities (epistemic communities) are able to 
develop and form regimes.120 An epistemic community is a “network of 
professionals with recognised expertise and competences in a particular 
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that 
domain or issue-area”. Experts having different academic backgrounds 
share “a set of normative and principled beliefs”, “causal beliefs, which are 
derived from their analysis of practices”, intersubjective “notions of 
validity” of knowledge and “a common policy enterprise” i.e. a common 
understanding of a problem and its solution.121 Changed understanding in 
the epistemic community can lead to regime reform.122 With the focus on 
epistemic communities Haas considers non-state actors as being important 
for learning processes in international institutions.123 According to 
Chandler, “the international sphere is no longer seen as one in which states 
project their national interests, instead the process is reversed – through 
participation in international and transnational relations the national 
interests of states are constituted and reconstituted”.124 In this context, Risse 
and Ropp highlight Western liberal values diffused by transnational actors 
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which partly influenced the Gorbachov leadership.125 Although 
constructivism assumes that, for the foreseeable future, the world will 
remain a world of states, it accepts that the international agenda has been 
transformed since the end of the Cold War and that non-state actors have 
become increasingly involved in policy-making at the state and inter-state 
level.126 Taking ideas at least as equal important as military or economic 
power, transnational actors can be influential through their “communicative 
capabilities”127 and “power of persuasion”.128 Both are connected to soft 
power and its key instrument of public diplomacy as will be introduced in 
chapter 3. Soft power is about the attraction of the way of life and the values 
of a society towards the rest of the world. 129 According to Nye, soft power 
is “(…) getting others to want what you want [and] might be called direct or 
co-optive power behavior. It is in contrast to the active command power 
behavior of getting others to do what you want. Co-optive power can rest on 
the attraction of one’s ideas or on the ability to set the political agenda in a 
way that shapes the preferences that others express”.130 Nye states that 
“NGOs and network organisations have soft-power resources and do not 
hesitate to use them”.131 Wallace notes that “intellectual soft power” can 
also be found when looking at the activities of U.S. think tanks.132 The 
framework where states and non-state actors communicatively interact is 
often referred to as global civil society.133 Global civil society can be termed 
as “the global process trough which individuals debate, influence and 
negotiate an ongoing social contract or a set of contracts with the centres of 
political or economical authority”134 and “through voluntary associations, 
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movements, parties, unions, the individual is able to act publicly”.135 Since 
public and private actors play an equal part constructivists do not 
concentrate on whether one is more important than the other. Rather they 
highlight that it does not make sense to consider the world of transnational 
actors as opposed to the world of states since transnational work often 
conforms to the interest of states and international organisations and both 
actor types reciprocally influence each other.136 As we have seen above, 
transnational actors can depend on state funding.137 International 
development and humanitarian assistance originates to a large extent from 
public sources. Transnational actors also often performed tasks that states 
and IOs could not or did not want to undertake. In foreign and humanitarian 
aid non-state actors often are subcontracted to offer assistance less 
bureaucratically and cost intensive as well as more flexibly. Transnational 
actors also supply monitoring and information to states.138 Constructivism 
allows focusing on the question of transnational actors as instruments of 
state power. This resembles neorealism in its marginalisation of 
transnational actors. However, in contrast to neorealism, it might be true for 
some cases but less so for others. Constructivism therefore allows moving 
beyond the question of whether the transnational actors matter. In the 
following section we will examine how constructivism can help to examine 
the role of transnational actors in international relations by looking at 
constructivist inspired models.  
2.3. Transnational-constructivist explanations for the role of 
transnational actors in international relations 
Theorising about transnational actors and their impact on world politics 
remains complicated. Transnational actors are rarely alike as they differ in 
structure, scope of activities and the issues they concentrate on.139 As a 
consequence, theoretical assumptions often lack generalisability since the 
scientific statements relate to certain types of actors and the findings cannot 
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be transferred to others.140 Constructivist-inspired research, however, was 
able to develop some explanations on the role of transnational actors in 
international relations.141  
When constructivism and non-state actors encountered after the end of the 
Cold War, transnationalism revived leading to an idealist-constructivist 
approach comprising a pluralist and a globalist strand.142 In an early 
pluralist work Risse-Kappen focuses on the institutional conditions for the 
impact of transnational actors on the behaviour of states. In his complex 
model, a combination of the domestic structure and the institutionalisation 
of the international environment, conditions the access and possible policy 
impact of transnational actors. In contrast, neorealism and 
neoinstitutionalism separate both structures of governance.143 He compares 
cases in which transnational coalitions and actors aim at influencing state 
behaviour in the foreign policy arena. Risse-Kappen argues that the impact 
of transnational actors and coalitions on state policies is likely to vary 
according to the institutional structure. He first considers the differences in 
domestic structure referring to the structure of the state (i.e. the political 
institutions, centralised vs. fragmented), the society (strong vs. weak) and 
the policy networks (consensual vs. polarised). The domestic structure 
determines the access of the transnational actors to domestic institutions and 
their policy impact in case of access which can vary from profound to 
unlikely. In state-controlled domestic structures the access is most difficult 
although the impact can be profound while in fragile domestic structures 
access is easy and impact unlikely.144 In a second step Risse-Kappen looks 
at the degrees of international institutionalisation, i.e. the extent to which the 
specific issue-area is regulated by bilateral agreements, multilateral regimes, 
and/or international organisations. Highly regulated and cooperative 
structures of international governance tend to legitimize transnational 
activities and to increase their access to the national polities as well as their 
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ability to form “winning coalitions” for policy change.145 In sum, domestic 
and international governance structures interact in conditioning the access to 
institutions and policy impact of transnational actors.146 Differences in 
domestic structures affect state autonomy “from below”, variations in 
international institutions can equally influence state capacities “from 
above”.147 While Risse-Kappen’s model is able to explain the structural 
conditions under which transnational actors can have a policy impact, it 
cannot explain how transnational actors work, i.e. how micro-mechanisms 
of persuasion and communication strategies influence outcomes or how 
ideas are diffused transnationally. In his summary and in later works Risse-
Kappen highlights that domestic and international structure determines not 
only the transnational actors’ impact on policies but also their 
characteristics, their strategies and tactics.148 However, his work does not 
systematically scrutinize transnational actors’ properties in terms of 
strategies or power resources.149 Furthermore, the model itself is not able to 
explain why different transnational actors in one country are not equally 
successful.150 It is also not the case that transnational activity only takes 
place in a more or less institutionalised international environment. Finally, 
what transnational actors actually do, remains nebulously. Notwithstanding 
these drawbacks, Risse-Kappen’s work renewed the interest in transnational 
actors and led to increased theorising on transnational actors’ impact.151 
For future research Risse-Kappen proposes network analysis to study the 
different interactions between transnational and state actors within 
international institutions.152 Drawing from his work in assuming that 
political contexts as “opportunity structures” need to be taken into account 
for the emergence and success of transnational advocacy networks, Keck 
and Sikkink focus on the impact of transnational actors through the so-called 
“boomerang effect” model analysing from an actor-centred view the 
ideational situation of domestic groups and how they influence the interests 
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of political decision makers.153 A boomerang pattern of influence exists 
when domestic groups in a repressive state bypass their government and 
directly search out international contacts. These contacts pressure their 
states or international organisations which again pressure the blocking state 
from outside to achieve the desired policy goal. The involved transnational 
actors are members in transnational advocacy networks (TAN)154 which can 
be defined as “actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound 
together by shared values, a common discourse, and a dense exchange of 
information and services”.155 In order to describe what the network does, 
Keck and Sikkink use the term “persuasion” which refers to several tactics of 
network members. These tactics are: (1) Information politics: This is the 
ability to quickly and credibly generate politically usable information and 
move it to where it will have the most impact; (2) symbolic politics, i.e. the 
ability to call upon symbols, actions, or stories that make sense of a situation 
for an audience that is frequently far away; (3) leverage politics refers to the 
strategic use of information in order to make more powerful states and IOs 
cut off military and financial assistance for the pressured state (material 
leverage) or when the activities of the pressured state are internationally 
scrutinised and a “mobilization of shame” takes place (moral leverage); and 
(4) accountability politics, i.e. to hold powerful actors to their previously 
stated policies and principles.156 Within this context, Keck and Sikkink 
highlight the competition between various problems, ideas and interests of 
domestic and political actors in interactions.157 The problem with the 
boomerang approach is that the process can only be successful when target 
states are “sensitive to leverage”.158 Dependency on economic or military 
assistance will not be found in the industrialised countries and moral 
leverage only will work when the practices of the target state vary from 
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those asserted.159 Chandler outlines that the reliance on state actors in the 
process could also be read as the states’ centrality and that power relations 
are downplayed.160 Notwithstanding, Keck and Sikkink established a sound 
explanation of transnational actors’ undertakings stressing the idea that 
interactions between different actors take place aside from states’ 
relations.161 Furthermore, they added networks as the source of new ideas to 
the concept of transnational politics. Network environments are of particular 
importance for the view presented here. We will return to this aspect further 
on.  
What is visible in the work of Keck and Sikkink can also be found in other 
pluralist perspectives stressing global civil society’s independence from the 
government and picturing non-state actors as the mouthpiece of the weak on 
the grassroots level where power emerges from the bottom up.162 Such 
positions are often characterised by optimism regarding the potential of 
global civil society assuming that states which were long in the centre of 
international relations are increasingly restricted by transnational actors and 
networks.163 Often global civil society is described as an emancipation 
possibility for humans and citizens.164 Others criticise that these standpoints 
repeat the moral claims of transnational actors rather than considering what 
actors actually do.165 Transnational actors are also not per se critical and 
have different views on political outcomes instead.166 The neomarxist 
approach of Gramsci makes the valid reproach that the pluralist conception 
on global civil society is overconfident. In Gramsci’s hegemonic model of 
civil society the state makes use of civil society, its organisations and 
networks to secure the states’ hegemonic project by diffusing a particular 
way of life through norms and values. It is more than sheer manipulations as 
a social consensus is created. In this case, civil society becomes part of an 
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extended state feigning openness.167 According to Cox it was US hegemony 
that made possible the rise of transnational relations after World War 
Two.168 These considerations resemble the state-centric claims of 
neorealists. Since transnational actors often depend on the funding of states 
or IOs which even set up their own NGOs to push through certain ideas or 
to access additional funding it does not make sense considering neither 
global civil society nor transnational actors as against the state world.169 
Private influence can at times be an “(inter)governmental political strategy” 
especially useful when interference should be avoided and an alternative to 
official political engagement is needed.170 As already outlined, a less 
anticipating model is necessary where states or non-state actors are not per 
se considered as taking the lead or are normatively heightened.  
Scholars increasingly look at communication practices of transnational 
actors (and others) and connect it to the constructivist emphasis on norms 
and values taking Risse-Kappen’s former suggestions into account to study 
these micro-mechanisms. Pluralist perspectives consider, for example, the 
lobbying activities of pressure groups vis-à-vis governments and 
propaganda in relation to the general public.171 Finnemore and Sikkink look 
in detail on the policy change through norms in their “norm life cycle”. 
They consider norm entrepreneurs supporting the development of new 
norms mainly through persuasion. Norm entrepreneurs are actors with an 
organizational platform: mainly NGOs, their networks or IOs. They pressure 
target states to adopt the new norm and monitor outcomes. When the norm 
reaches a critical mass of supporters (i.e. states) and a tipping point the norm 
cascades and achieves prevalent support within the population. This is when 
norm change happens. When the norm is no longer contested, it is 
internalized. At this stage professions and bureaucracy are the most 
important agents which “practice” the norm.172 On the basis of Finnemore 
and Sikkink’s work, Willetts suggest that NGOs as significant norm 
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entrepreneurs win support for values by persuasion through various linkages 
thereby exercising influence on global politics: (1) actor linkages i.e. linking 
the support to their UN status, whereby high status NGOs will receive more 
attention than low status NGOs;173 (2) linking goals to a value with 
widespread support, such as security, freedom and justice; (3) bargaining 
linkages by forming alliances with others which leads to change own value 
preferences in favour of those of other actors; (4) and finally functional 
linkages where NGOs emphasis positive effects of their goals independent 
from the policy process. Willetts assumes that NGOs have the strongest 
impact through value and functional linkages.174 Persuasion takes place in 
two steps: first, the salience of a policy issue needs to be enhanced and 
second, values need to be redefined.175 Risse considers the process of 
argumentation, deliberation and persuasion, which “constitute a distinct 
mode of social interaction to be differentiated from strategic bargaining and 
rule-guided behavior” as highlighted by rationalist scholars.176 He draws 
from Habermas’s theory of communicative action to conceptualise the logic 
of arguing and connects it to IR. Actors try to convince each other to change 
their causal or principled beliefs in order to reach a reasoned consensus 
about validity claiming.177 Arguing implies that actors try to challenge the 
validity claims inherent in any causal or normative statement and seek a 
communicative consensus about their understanding of the situation. The 
logic implies that participants in a discourse are open to be persuaded by the 
better argument. Arguing is therefore as goal oriented as strategic 
interaction but the goal is not to attain ones fixed preference but to seek a 
reasoned consensus.178 Arguing increases the influence of actors with less 
material power and successful arguing beats material bargaining power.179 
We will return to the aspect of communicative practice in chapter 3. 
The globalist strand of the idealist-constructivist approach lays emphasis on 
global processes taking place above the state in international organisations, 
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most considered the UN. Obviously, mixed pluralist-globalist positions exist 
as Willetts’s work shows. Globalists concentrate on global governance 
defined by “policy-making and -implementation in global politics systems 
through the collaboration of governments with actors from civil society and 
the private sector”.180 Transnational actors play important roles in this 
context. Their power results from several sources: the mobilization of 
individuals to raise awareness for certain issues,181 the ability to frame and 
define issues in order to exert pressure on political decision makers (IGOs 
and states), their specialist knowledge and expertise allowing them to 
support decision makers with accurate information and data and their 
personal commitment. Thereby, they are important for the drafting of 
political proposals and for the policy implementation monitored by them.182 
Others stress the activity of transnational actors as executing agents for the 
UN and the performance of public relations’ tasks on behalf of the UN.183 
Transnational actors are assumed to have decision-making authority in 
hybrid international organizations and transnational regimes.184 Hybrid 
organizations are joint organizations of governments or their agencies on the 
one hand and transnational actors on the other hand. Both groups are 
formally equal and have full rights in the policy making process and have 
usually the obligation to jointly fund activities.185 Global governance 
characterises different forms of political activity in diverse policy fields, 
whose needs stem from global issues which can only be targeted through the 
cooperation of different actors (state and non-state) as a global authority is 
missing. There are three types of global problems: first, transboundary or 
cross-border problems concerning for instance drug trafficking or pollution; 
second, common property problems referring, for example, to the oceans or 
Antarctica; and finally, simultaneous problems of states regarding the areas 
of education, health, welfare and other.186 Global governance perspectives in 
contrast to state-centric assumptions have the benefit of considering many 
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different actors. However, they do not look at their internal functioning.187 
Moreover, non-state actors are often viewed as sheer executive bodies of the 
UN implementing and enforcing global norms developed by the UN or in 
multilateral negotiations. Finally, as power affects states from above by 
norms or institutions188 the considered processes take place exclusively 
above the national state which reflects only some part of the activities of 
transnational actors. 
Both pluralists’ and globalists’ perspectives are focused on private actors’ 
participating in the international policy process and/or cooperation and 
steering performances that is political influence.189 This is problematic. 
Many transnational actors and networks aim at consciousness-raising 
instead of shaping policies directly. 190 In this context, Stone points out that 
“influence is a word that is itself open to a variety of interpretations”. She 
describes the tendency of some think tanks to also claim (non-existing) 
influence over policy in order to convince their decision-making targets, 
members or financial backer.191 Moreover, direct political impact of think 
tanks could not be found as one-to-one policy implementations of think tank 
policy ideas barely exist. 192 Also Chandler notes that it is rather difficult to 
first establish criteria for the policy-success measurement and trace back 
achievements to a particular factor (i.e. the transnational actors’ activities) 
alone.193 As for constructivist explanations in general, they are frequently 
criticised to concentrate far too often on the success stories of certain 
transnational actors’ activity by studying retrospectively specific policy 
adoption in order to demonstrate that transnational actors matter. Moreover, 
the problem of measuring the influence of transnational actors in certain 
cases is held to reveal that only their ideas are crucial for the result.194 
Evaluating effectiveness is methodological difficult because it needs to be 
imagined how the case might have differed under varying conditions.195 
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From this point of view it makes sense to study transnational actors simply 
because they exist. Whether they matter is irrelevant as it depends on the 
research question and how the assessment criterion of “importance” is 
defined.196  
Most transnational actors do not constantly operate as parts of formal 
international organisations or institutions. Rather they interact with others 
transnationally in policy networks.197 This refers to the dimension of 
transnational activity as introduced above.198 Similar to their considerations 
on institutions, constructivists highlight the development of intersubjective 
knowledge in terms of common understanding and shared identities in order 
to explain change through networks being part of global civil society.199 
Rather than seeing transnational actors as rule enforcers, their activities can 
be spontaneous and without planning them beforehand which makes it 
difficult to study single organisations at a time. Often they are not clearly 
bound entities.200 Still, there are several forms of networks which can be 
distinguished. We will look at their practice afterwards. 
2.3.1. Forms of networks 
Various international networks can be summarised under the umbrella term 
of transnational policy network.201 The already presented transnational 
advocacy networks (TAN) mainly contain different NGOs central in 
providing information and other actors, like media, churches and 
politicians.202 Transnational actors are active in both fields, they can try to 
impact domestic policies and internationally they are active with ideas.203 A 
particular problem is that Keck and Sikkink focus on campaigns204 when 
studying networks. They assume that bonding with members of the network 
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must be visible as each actor has a certain role within the campaign. 
However, networking occurs often among actors that do not have anything 
to do with each other. Partners might be hidden, manipulative or have 
contradictory strategies, opinions and values.205 Moreover, information is 
not the only possible resource that network members can exchange. A 
second type of transnational policy network is the transnational executive 
network.206 Sometimes termed as transgovernmental network, it contains 
government officials with a dual domestic and international function trying 
to tackle global issues through networking governments.207 They are of 
minor interest for this study as they cannot be subsumed under the definition 
of transnational interaction as applied here as these officials are active on 
behalf of a government. A third form of transnational policy network is the 
global knowledge network (KNET). It may “incorporate professional 
bodies, academic research groups and scientific communities that organise 
around a special subject matter or issue”. Also think tanks can operate in 
KNETs.208 Think tanks are “non-profit private and public organisations 
devoted to examining and analysing policy-relevant issues and producing 
research outputs in terms of publications, reports, lectures and workshops, in 
most cases targeted to identifiable audiences with the hope of influencing 
decision-making and public opinion”.209 Inclusion in KNETs rests upon 
professional and officially recognised expertise. The network intents to 
create, advance and share knowledge and at times to inform policy about 
this knowledge.210 In contrast to the other networks described above, 
networking itself is an essential goal and the proceeding is assumed to be 
disinterested. It takes place in the forms of research, study, publications, 
intellectual exchanges and international financing among others. Often 
KNETs can overlap with other network forms.211 KNETs can be analysed as 
epistemic communities, as outlines above, or discourse coalitions and 
communities. Experts i.e. consultants, NGO executives, scientists, members 
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of research institutes and think tanks are expected to give advice in the 
policy-making process. Some authors stress that their power stems from 
neutrality and impartiality based on their expertise.212 Conceptualising 
experts as “neutral” is difficult, however, as scientific knowledge is never 
free of value and may be even used instrumentally to convince others and 
legitimise certain actions.213 According to Haas, networks of scientists can 
produce usable knowledge contributing to social learning. The greater their 
autonomy from the political environment the more scientists are able to 
influence the respective policy.214 Usable knowledge encompasses “a 
substantive core that makes it useable for policy-makers” and an element 
that enables the transmission from the scientific community to the policy 
world.215 Sometimes experts are termed as transnational policy professionals 
being part of a transnational policy community whose status of being public 
or private is unclear as the experts or their networks can be contracted and 
funded by public bodies. His power is then assumed to stem from his semi-
official position, his information resources and international experience.216 
KNETs can also take the form of discourse coalition and communities 
“created by professionals through a boundary drawing discourse that defines 
who and what is to be considered inside and outside the community, 
establishing a distinction between professionals and non-professionals, and 
between good and bad professionals”.217 Symbols, language and policy 
narrative serve here as a source of power. Transnational identities, in 
contrast to national identities and views, are enhanced by international 
interactions.218 In the tradition of Foucault discursive practices are used to 
maintain and establish power relationships.219 In sum, TANs limit the look 
on advocacy actors provided with information resources while KNETs 
incorporate professionals having mainly knowledge resources. However, we 
expect that connecting links can be established between different types of 
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actors bringing various resources to the networking process. It is therefore 
useful not to narrow the network concept too much since otherwise linked 
actors and their resources cannot be identified. Rather, it should be looked at 
“all those actors that share a common partner” which includes normatively 
deviating and hidden partners.220 The forth form of a transnational policy 
network, the global public policy networks (GPPNs), is a quasi-public or 
semi-private mixed meta-network which can include other forms of 
networks221 and various public and private actors whose mix is determined 
by the specific policy issue.222 Generally it is trisectoral as it incorporates 
members of three types of transnational policy community: the 
“internationalised public sector official” such as judges, legislators or 
regulators, the “international civil servant” who is an employee of an 
international organisation as well as the “transnational policy professional” 
who can be, for instance, a consultant, a business leader, a scientific or think 
tank expert or a NGO executive. Actors cooperate due to a problem existing 
over cross-boarders enabling forms of “soft authority” in these networks. 
Being dependent on resources and bargaining is what characterise their 
interactions.223 GPPNs resemble tripartite global governance networks 
including state actors, firms and advocacy groups.224 Still, in the GPPN 
profit and not-for-profit actors belong to the same sector. The core feature of 
the GPPN is a public-private partnership225 which in its transnational form 
can be defined as “institutionalized cooperative relationships between public 
actors and private actors beyond the nation state for governance purposes” 
i.e. “the making and implementation of norms and rules for the provision of 
goods and services”.226 For such joint activity also the term multi-
stakeholder initiative was coined.227 In sum, GPPN and its variants have the 
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advantage to incorporate public and private actors without assuming that 
one is more important.  
In order to avoid a premature anticipation of a certain network character it is 
suggested to start from the lowest common denominator of a policy network 
definition: “a set of relatively stable relationships which are of non-
hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of actors, who share 
common interests with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to 
pursue these shared interests acknowledging that co-operation is the best 
way to achieve common goals”.228 As will be shown in the following 
chapter, this definition needs some adaptations with regards to homogeneity 
of interests, the assumed cooperation among network members and the 
relationships’ stability.229 
2.3.2. Towards the practice of transnational actors in networks 
The significance of networks is evaluated differently. Some scholars 
highlight that they help developing regimes and the effectiveness and 
efficiency of international cooperation: Costs are cut when NGOs 
participate in international conferences for countries which cannot afford to 
take part. Furthermore, the monitoring of international negotiations and rule 
compliance through network members. Moreover, networks are assumed to 
help decreasing the deficit of democracy in international cooperation 
through the creation of transparency of international processes and through 
the increased participation of actors other than state delegates.230 However, 
although networks open up policy-making to some stakeholders, they also 
exclude those not getting access to the network for multiple reasons. 
Networks like TNAs are permeable to social partaking while epistemic 
communities and GPPNs are more exclusive and restricted. Helping the 
democratic deficit in the global sphere therefore depends on the above 
inclusion.231 Transnationalists believe that density and symmetry of 
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transnational networks increase the possibility for peace and cooperation.232 
Through their configuration, networks have an independent impact on the 
power of network members and international policy results.233As already 
outlined, focusing on political outcomes is problematic rather the “building 
of international networks by NGOs themselves is an outcome and example 
of mattering.”234 In this way, it is the establishment and fostering of 
networks among a variety of actors which is an essential function of 
transnational actors.235 Although networking neither boosts political 
influence nor should it be confused with it,236 Stone points out that “the 
network [itself] is a site and form of power”.237 As already outlined, 
concentrating on policy results does not produce knowledge of the internal 
functioning of networks or networks parts. Hence, “organisational agency” 
needs to be taken into account.238 Moreover, possible informality of such 
interactions needs to be looked at which governance scholars barely analyse. 
In order to describe best the “intuitional reality” of transnational actors and 
their relevance to IR a more constructivist perspective needs to be taken 
which focuses on interaction processes in broad networks.239 
DeMars and Dijkzeul assume that NGOs engage in two simultaneous 
anchoring practices: first they claim to pursue a public purpose which 
generates bridging effects, namely between the division of the state and 
society as they are private actors with a public purpose.240 This anchoring 
practice leads to power dynamics which can have many different forms. It is 
not restricted to power from below or above and it considers that states may 
use the power resources of NGOs. Second, NGOs link with social and 
political partners in several countries. This generates again bridging effects. 
NGOs, for instance, cannot only mobilize the movement of information and 
norms but also those of material resources. Also this anchoring practice can 
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generate complex power relationships. In sum, DeMars and Dijkzeul 
suggest to pay more attention to the partner relationships and study NGOs in 
practice. Practice is viewed as a process which they term as “NGOing”.241 
On the basis of these considerations, it is suggested to concentrate on the 
networks’ operating which might have different forms and which can 
include various actors, especially public and private actors interacting 
transnationally through communication and the exchange of ideational but 
also material resources. This resource exchange can be traced back to the 
originally outlined movement of items which constitutes transnational 
interactions.  
Conclusion 
For neorealism the state theoretically remains most important. 
Neoliberalism accepts this view although taking into account the role of 
international institutions. Constructivist theory attaches importance to 
transnational actors in international relations as it concentrates on 
interaction process among different actors. It does not assume that one actor 
is more important than the other and focuses on ideational and other 
resources of these actors. In looking at networks and communication 
processes, constructivism is creating the opportunity to uncover important 
issues, neglected by neorealism and neoliberalism. It focuses more directly 
on the question of the role of the German political foundations in 
international relations maintaining links with the German government and 
political party landscape, as well as governments and civil societies abroad.  
So as to tackle the criticism that constructivists are too focused on success 
stories detailed process tracing can help. Instead of concentrating on policy 
implementation results, this study will focus on the process of 
communication and on how transnational interaction among actors takes 
place. The concept of public diplomacy will allow looking at these 
processes in a systematic manner. Diplomacy refers to a process of 
communication and negotiation between states and other international 
actors. Public diplomacy, in a constructivist manner, is about ideas and 
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values and can involve transnational actors.242 Introduced in the following 
chapter the concept will combine a network approach with communication 
practices and interactions among different actors. By this, it will be possible 
to study thoroughly the German foundations’ “power of persuasion” and to 
take into account the multiple communication tracks between them, their 
partners abroad as well as the German state. 
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Chapter 3 - Interactions in a networked environment: 
Public diplomacy 
In the last chapter the role of transnational actors in IR theory has been 
illuminated. The increasing conceptualising of these actors’ undertakings 
can also be recognized when looking at the literature on diplomacy. The 
recent transformation of diplomacy has lead to a shift away from state-
centred forms. Diplomacy has become a complex space incorporating 
different relationships and various actors. From a constructivist starting 
point which emphasises these interactions public diplomacy can be 
understood as networked process focusing on values and perceptions. It 
constitutes a framework for systematically analysing the German political 
foundations’ power and their position in the international political arena. 
Chapter 2 discussed different network images and the transnational actors’ 
political impact which is not necessarily a policy impact. Public diplomacy 
can be combined with these considerations and allows operationalising the 
described interaction process.  
The chapter starts with several diplomatic forms which might be relevant in 
the context of the German political foundations’ undertakings. The literature 
on public diplomacy will then be investigated by presenting the main 
approaches in detail. Subsequently, a closer look will be taken at the 
different concepts related to public diplomacy. The considerations will be 
summarised and integrated in a model which will serve as a framework for 
the analysis of the diplomatic activities of the Stiftungen in the next 
chapters. Finally, German public diplomacy as practised by the Federal 
Foreign Office will be outlined.  
3.1. Non-traditional diplomacy 
Traditional diplomacy has been increasingly challenged by recent 
developments in the international arena. Due to increasing direct contacts 
between political leaders on the international level the original role of 
diplomats has been reduced. Through modern forms of media and 
information technology, former diplomatic channels are circumvented. With 
regards to the changing matters of war, intra-state rather than inter-state 
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conflicts grew after the end of the Cold War delimiting traditional 
diplomacy. The future of the sovereign state is often called into question. 
Consequentially, this also concerns the workspace of traditional diplomacy 
as a state instrument. For this work, the subject of a changing international 
order due to the increasing number of different actors is most relevant.1 
Several forms of non-traditional diplomacy can involve transnational actors 
such as unofficial or informal, private, citizen, track two and public 
diplomacy. All these forms are distinct from track one or traditional 
diplomacy in which the main actors are always states or international 
organisations. Montville was first to define track-two-diplomacy as 
“unofficial informal interaction of members of adversary groups or nations 
that aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion and organize 
human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their 
conflicts.”2 Track two, second track and citizen diplomacy are often used 
interchangeably but the term citizen diplomacy is older. The combination of 
track one and track-two-diplomacy is called twin-track or two-track-
diplomacy.3 Multi-track-diplomacy is characterised by several different 
negation tracks involving transnational actors and private individuals.4 
Multi-track-diplomacy was applied at the end of the Kosovo war in 1999.5 
As track two is mainly limited to the aim of conflict resolution or 
confidence-building in conflict situations a wider approach will be 
necessary to analyse the whole spectrum of possible interactions. Informal 
or unofficial diplomacy is mostly used in differentiation to traditional 
diplomacy and involves a non-governmental actor. Parmar describes this 
type of diplomacy as a method of institutes of foreign affairs which 
“unofficially” discuss matters of their own governments with their overseas 
counterparts.6 Stone summarises by the term track two ambitions and its 
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variants.7 Although secrecy is an interesting aspect in this context the 
informality of this process does not help understanding the interaction. In 
returning to the consideration of chapter 2, the relationship between state 
actors and transnational actors is particularly important and whether the 
latter can be considered as independent diplomatic actors.    
Theoretical perspectives on diplomacy are connected to the increased 
conceptualising of transnational actors. While earlier works were state-
focused concentrating on interstate diplomacy and not conceding much 
importance to transnational actors in this process,8 globalist perspectives, 
upcoming in the 1980s, stress the growth of non-state diplomacy 
marginalising the state in the process. Post-globalist approaches look at the 
relationships between states and transnational actors and the specific roles 
and functions performed by both actors emphasising public diplomacy as a 
concept which is able to grasp these interactions.9 Public diplomacy is often 
associated with global civil society since public diplomacy aims at “building 
a public sphere in which diverse voices can be heard in spite of their various 
origins, distinct values, and often contradictory interests.”10 As already 
outlined in chapter 2, global civil society concepts often problematically 
present transnational actors as opposed to state actors. They also focus on 
global issues managed by new forms of governance and international 
processes. Betsill and Corell in their study on NGO diplomacy, for example, 
concentrate on international (environmental) negotiations. They highlight 
the similarities of diplomatic functions of non-state diplomats and state 
delegates and determine conditions under which NGOs influence the 
process and outcome of these negotiations.11 As already outlined, 
interactions can unlikely be limited those negotiations which are conducted 
above the nation state. Rather, public diplomacy will mostly take place in a 
less formalised process.  
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Values are key elements in public diplomacy and the primary currency of 
soft power.12 Some authors predict that diplomacy as a whole will 
increasingly be about ideas in the future.13 Others differentiate public 
diplomacy from traditional diplomacy in such a way that public diplomacy 
is about the building of relationships and dialogue with foreign audiences by 
concentrating on values while traditional diplomacy treats issues.14 
Although IR theories consider diplomacy as important, they rarely study the 
social process of relationship building. Constructivism, however, highlights 
norm and value diffusion through dialogue and persuasion, social 
interaction and perceptions.15 Public diplomacy therefore fits well with it. 
As we have seen, constructivism as a point of departure offers insights on 
how images are constructed and reproduced.16 Public diplomacy is “the 
projection in the international arena of the values and ideas of the public”.17 
The concept can be combined with transnational networks allowing 
transnational actors to become vital but not necessarily on states’ expenses. 
It offers a comprehensive analysis of transnational interactions. 
3.1.1. Public diplomacy: Different approaches and definitions 
Public diplomacy is often associated with many different activities, such as 
image cultivation, nation branding and propaganda. Although the interest on 
public diplomacy increased immensely after 9/11 it is not a new 
phenomenon and almost as old as diplomacy itself. The scientific discussion 
around the concept is very heterogeneous. Still, the basic distinction 
between conventional and public diplomacy is that the former concentrates 
on the official relationships between the representatives of states whereas 
the latter aims at foreign societies, such as non-official organisations and 
individuals.  
The different approaches and definitions to public diplomacy have various 
roots. Although they all stem from social sciences, contributions come from 
IR theory, communications and public relations. Often the approaches vary 
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according to process and actor level. Especially earlier concepts did not 
include transnational actors and considered states as the only actors 
pursuing public diplomacy. According to Tuch, for example, “public 
diplomacy is a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics 
in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, 
its institutions and cultures, as well as its national goals and current 
policies”.18 Even recent works, still, stick to state-centrism. In analysing the 
public diplomacy of the German embassies Ostrowski argues that public 
diplomacy can merely be generated by states and diplomats are per 
definition officials of the foreign ministry.19 Nye, in contrast, differentiates 
between three dimensions of public diplomacy whereby picking up Leonard 
and Smewing’s categorisation of “news management”, “strategic 
communication” and “relationship building”.20 Firstly, daily communication 
explains the context of domestic and foreign policy decisions to the foreign 
press. Secondly, strategic communication conveys a set of simple themes 
over a year involving political and advertising campaigns. Finally, long-
lasting relationships with key individuals abroad are developed through 
scholarships, exchanges, training, conferences and access to media 
channels.21 As generators of public diplomacy Nye assumes that non-state 
actors are at times involved in what he calls “indirect” public diplomacy as 
publics often view authority with scepticism. Governments therefore often 
efface and turn to widely trusted, even if hardly controllable private actors 
which are important communication channels.22 Also Manheim considers 
several forms of diplomacy. Traditional diplomacy would take place 
between governments and personal diplomacy between diplomats defined as 
officials of the foreign ministry. Public diplomacy either involves 
communication between governments and people of other countries or is 
conducted in the form of “people-to-people” communication where it is 
necessary that the state initiated the activity of the semi-official 
transnational actor.23 Similarly, Signitzer differentiates between hard public 
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diplomacy conducted in the short-term by foreign ministries focusing on 
political information and influencing foreign target groups via persuasion by 
daily or weekly newspapers, radio and television and soft public diplomacy 
carried out by culture departments and ministerial foreign sections 
sometimes outsourced to semi-autonomous organisations (British Council, 
German Goethe Institut). It concentrates on long-term cultural 
communication and aims at mutual understanding and a presentation of the 
population on a whole by films, exchanges and art exhibitions among 
others.24 Scott-Smith also treats this contracting out of activities by 
governments to the private sector when dealing with exchange programs. He 
points out that the communication channels are generally used to achieve 
some foreign political objective; hence, their establishment has a political 
intent which is either the promotion of mutual understanding or has a 
propagandistic and psychological warfare purpose. Mutual understanding 
aims at awareness and tolerance of other points of view leading to less 
conflict and contributing to the exchange of ideas and goods. Propaganda 
and political warfare refer to cultural-psychological characteristics and use 
the communication system of a target audience in order to reach an 
ideological, political or military goal. Scott-Smith regards the mutual 
understanding as “the public face” despite the continuous presence of 
propaganda and warfare which non-state actors help to make appear 
politically neutral.25 Simon observed that experts of epistemic communities 
are utilized by governments to deal with overly sensitive political issues in 
the context of track two.26 All these approaches include actors other than 
governments. However, they proceed from the assumption that actors are 
appointed by governments and used in order to conduct a “state’s” public 
diplomacy rather than pursuing their own independent strategy. This is 
similar to the rationalists’ belief assuming that states are the main driving 
forces in international processes using transnational actors for their 
purposes. Manipulation of transnational actors by states and utilizing them 
                                                 
24
 Signitzer (1995) p. 74. 
25
 Scott-Smith (2008) pp. 175ff. 
26
 Simon (2002) p. 168. 
 68 
as a cloak for their own activities furthermore fits with the outlined Neo-
Gramscian approach.27 
Melissen deviates from the assumption of the governments’ supremacy and 
introduces the term “new public diplomacy” referring to Sharp’s definition 
of public diplomacy as “the process by which direct relations with people in 
a country are pursued to advance the interests and extend the values of those 
being represented.”28 This wider definition of public diplomacy considers 
governmental activities but also those of transnational actors.29 Since 
diplomatic processes have changed, Melissen suggests a collaborative 
course of action in which various actors are necessary and is essential for a 
“democratisation of diplomacy”.30 New public diplomacy is therefore not a 
one or two way information flow but a process of engagement in which 
learning takes place. Concerning good practices Melissen advocates a model 
where public diplomacy is not too closely tied to the foreign policy of a 
country since it works best when it builds trust and is unbound to the short-
term moods of foreign policy.31 Critics stress that the theoretical aspects of 
new public diplomacy, such as networks and narratives, rather have 
translated into the official arguments to justify public diplomacy as practice 
of statecraft instead of transforming public diplomacy practice.32 Similar to 
Melissen, Gilboa takes a wider approach towards public diplomacy and the 
involved actors. He developed three conceptual models.33 The Basic Cold 
War model was originally applied by the two super powers during the Bloc 
confrontation in order to influence the other societies in the long run by 
international broadcasting. Today, it is applied in cases of autocratic 
regimes. In the Domestic Public Relations model a government makes use 
of external professionals in the target country, such as PR firms or lobbyists, 
in order to support its cause. This model also bases on scientific knowledge 
and methods of public opinion research for which Manheim has coined the 
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term “strategic diplomacy”.34 The Kuwaiti monarchs in exile, for example, 
hired a US PR firm during the second gulf war in order to receive support 
from the American public for the removal of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. 
The Non-state Transnational model looks at NGOs and other actors, like 
individuals pursuing public diplomacy using global news channels or media 
events to receive assistance for their matters. An opposition group in China, 
for instance, used this strategy to cultivate support for a pro-democratic 
campaign aiming at reforms of the Chinese government.35 This model has 
similarities with Keck and Sikkink’s transnational advocacy model as 
presented before.36 Non-state actors are not necessarily viewed as 
instruments for the state to conduct public diplomacy. Like Melissen’s 
model, it thus differs from the way Signitzer, Nye and Manheim see 
transnational actors in the process of public diplomacy. As Nye and 
Leonard, Gilboa picks up the dimensions of public diplomacy in terms of 
news management, strategic communication and relationship building. He 
links these elements to the involved actors. While news management is 
mainly led by governments, strategic communication is most effective when 
governments and nongovernmental agencies work together. Relationship 
building is best carried out by NGOs only as these actors are well suited to 
conduct long-term tasks.37  
For the implementation process of public diplomacy McClellan established 
a 5-phase-model starting with creating awareness in the target country for 
the interest of the advocate country via hard or soft public diplomacy. 
Secondly, a part of the population will gain interest in the subject and will 
build up knowledge through research and information events. Learning the 
language of the advocate country can be an essential element at this stage. 
Fourthly, these people can serve as disseminators in case the generated 
knowledge reflects their own interest or the interest of their country. Finally 
the target country might take the actions desired by the advocate country if 
the position is sufficiently popular in the target country. Public diplomacy is 
hence a “strategy of communications that is goal-oriented, focused on 
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results both short-term and long-term, and aimed at building a positive 
image of a country that will resonate in foreign public opinion.”38 These 
considerations resemble the norm diffusion model of Finnemore and 
Sikkink.39 
Cowan and Arsenault describe three layers of public diplomacy: 
monologue, dialogue and collaboration. Each mode has specific advantages 
for particular situations. Monologues in terms of one-way communication 
flows are often used for mass audiences in other countries. Although often 
treated with suspicion monologues are important at critical moments and for 
daily communicating about policy. The Berlin speech of John F. Kennedy in 
connection with the construction of the Berlin Wall ending with the words 
“Ich bin ein Berliner!” is an example for this layer. Dialogue defined as 
“myriad situations in which ideas and information are exchanged and 
communication is reciprocal and multidirectional” is at times more 
productive and helps improve relationships across social boundaries. 
Germany’s international broadcaster “Deutsche Welle”, for example, 
launched an initiative which included dialogic communications. The 
“Dialogue of Cultures” transmitted discussions by prominent thinkers in 
Germany and the Arab World.40 The third layer of public diplomacy 
concerns cross-national collaboration which is an “initiative ranging from 
short to long-term in which participants from different nations participate in 
a project together”. It includes dialogue but also contains a structure 
enabling lasting relationships. While collaboration is often praised as useful 
in conflict resolution, it is also beneficial for democracy building, for 
increased social and political trust and for bridging racial, ethical and 
political divides.41 Similarily, Riordan assumes that the new security agenda 
makes necessary a collaborative approach to foreign policy requiring 
dialogue-based public diplomacy by looking at international terrorism and 
nation-building. Moreover, he views collaboration as relevant in other cases 
of global problems which cannot be resolved by single countries and require 
different actors operating transnationally. While public diplomacy has 
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always been associated with selling policies, values and national images, 
Riordan assumes that public diplomacy will not just be “presentational”. 
Rather, it will become part of the policy making process. This claim derives 
from the finding that Western values and norms are not unproblematic. 
Often associated with US hegemony they are perceived as tools by the 
target audience to preserve Western political and economic dominance. 
Involved actors therefore need to enjoy access and credibility to solve 
problems. Riordan considers non-state actors playing a key role in this 
process as they, when perceived as distant from a government can be more 
effective. Furthermore, dialogue allows different ideas to be valid and 
engages at eye-level instead of imposing values and practices from the top-
down. A building block in Riordan’s approach to public diplomacy is 
networking as opposed to a hierarchical approach showing similarities to 
Hocking’s network approach as presented below. In assuming that 
collaboration in the practical manifestations of democracy assistance and 
conflict management is part of dialogue-based public diplomacy Riordan 
differs from Cowan and Arsenault, who differentiate between collaboration 
and dialogue. Although collaboration, in their view, includes dialogue, 
collaboration intends to establish long-lasting relationships. However, the 
definition of “long-lasting” is questionable and semantic as in most cases it 
will be difficult to anticipate how and if a relationship will develop. 
Dialogue with the one sided intention to avoid relationship building rather 
appears to be monologue then. Although in the future much of the 
diplomatic work will be done by non-state actors, Riordan expects 
traditional diplomats and governments to contribute to coordination and to a 
larger strategy. Moreover, governments could possibly offer financial and 
technical support. The diplomat posted in the specific country could provide 
expert knowledge on the country. He could also identify and facilitate 
opportunities representing a node in the established networks.42  
Cull’s approach treats the perceived proximity of the public diplomatic 
activity from the government and the credibility that can stem from it. Cull 
established a taxonomy of public diplomacy distinguishing five elements. 
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“Listening” which has always been part of traditional diplomacy and 
intelligence work refers to “an actor’s attempt to manage the international 
environment by collecting and collating data about publics and their 
opinions overseas and using the data to redirect its policy or its wider public 
diplomacy approach accordingly.” “Advocacy” is defined as “the attempt to 
manage the international environment by undertaking an international 
communication activity to actively promote a particular policy, idea, or the 
actor’s general interest in the minds of a foreign public.” “Cultural 
diplomacy” is regarded as an “actors attempt to manage the international 
environment through making its cultural resources and achievements known 
overseas and/or facilitating cultural transmission abroad.” Cull equates 
cultural diplomacy and cultural relations. “Exchange diplomacy” he defines 
as “an actors attempt to manage the international environment by sending its 
citizens overseas and reciprocally accepting citizens from overseas for a 
period of study and/or acculturation.” Finally, “international news 
broadcasting” is the “actor’s attempt to mange the international environment 
by using the technologies of radio, television, and the internet to engage 
with foreign publics.” It can overlap with the other public diplomacy 
elements. All types of public diplomacy have different time frames and 
information flows: Listing can be short- and long-term. The flow of 
information is inward to analysts and the policy processes. Advocacy is a 
short-term activity with an outward information flow. Cultural diplomacy 
has a long-term time frame and an outward information flow. Exchange 
diplomacy is practiced on a long-term basis. And the information flows 
inwardly and outwardly. Finally, international broadcasting has a medium-
term time frame and the information flows outwardly but from a news 
bureaucracy. Cull considers listening as the most important duty of a public 
diplomat with the new media facilitating these efforts.43 For the credibility 
of advocacy government proximity is suggested, whereas cultural 
diplomacy works better when perceived as distant.44 The state-centrism in 
Cull’s approach is problematic. However, similar to Riordan’s findings, it is 
interesting that perceived distance from a government can be helpful in 
certain cases. This implies from a governmental perspective that certain 
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activities could be “outsourced” to transnational actors in order to create a 
governmental distance. In Cross’s approach the credibility rather stems 
from whether the public diplomatic strategy is consistent with the identity of 
the sender. She defines the process of public diplomacy as “the 
communication of narratives that embody key norms about society”. 
Narratives, i.e. “stories of the temporal character of human experience” 
become legitimate when they stem from the identity of the people involved. 
As already outlined, identities are social constructs. They perform the 
important function of telling you and others who you are (or want to be).45 
Cross expects a “continuous feedback loop” between the external image and 
the identity. Public diplomacy is perceived as credible only when it mirrors 
the identity of the people it represents. Narratives shape these perceptions 
and convey norms reflecting greater values within society. Public diplomacy 
therefore is a diffusion process of norms by entrepreneurs (public 
diplomatic actors) to a foreign audience. These constructivist-lead 
considerations allow making some claims about the successfulness of public 
diplomacy strategies: if the external audience finds the norms appealing and 
understands the narrative it might act favourably with policies towards the 
public diplomacy generator.46 It will be necessary to determine whether 
transnational actors transmit their own values when generating public 
diplomacy or rather repeat the values and policy ideas of their home state. 
Hocking identifies several components offering a complex perspective on 
public diplomacy. 47 The first thread is democratic accountability in terms of 
believing in the necessity for direct public involvement in diplomacy. In line 
with this idea Castells assumes that states may also transfer power and 
resources to lower political levels and NGOs in order to further integrate 
civil society into the political process.48 The second component of public 
diplomacy can be associated with the claim for open diplomacy referring to 
the spanning of global networks, the expansion of social relations including 
financial markets and terrorist groups as well as the compression of time 
and space. The state-centred view of diplomacy is thus increasingly 
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challenged by forms of multilateral diplomacy involving state actors, 
international and NGOs among others.49 Others stress that this is not a 
recent trend. Melissen points out that already in 1917-1918 Wilson and 
Lenin were competing on what he calls “soft power level” before both their 
countries did the same in military and economic fields. “The battle of values 
and ideas that dominated international relations in the second half of the 
twenties century evolved into the competition in the sphere of hard power, 
and not vice versa.” During the Cold War the United States, the Soviet 
Union and the three European major powers pursued traditional diplomacy 
and public diplomacy on parallel tracks. However, due to the domination of 
international relations’ theory by realist thought in viewing international 
relations in terms of economic and military power, scholars have given, 
until recently, little attention to the systematic study of public diplomacy.50 
These considerations reflect the assumption of constructivism seeing ideas, 
if not as more important than certainly as equal to hard power. As per 
Hocking, a third piece in the public diplomacy debate is the growing impact 
of communication and information technology linked to foreign policy and 
diplomacy. These three threads are related and allow a redefinition of public 
diplomacy with respect to an “active role for publics rather than as passive 
objects of government foreign policy strategies.”51 The fourth thread in the 
public diplomacy debate is the impact of the media acting in a complex 
manner as agenda-setter in international politics and as gate-keeper 
determining and regulating flows of information to publics. The fifth thread 
concerns the possibility of states “rebranding” themselves in the global 
marketplace and the image of states in international politics. Regarding the 
matter of what is meant by “public” in public diplomacy, Hocking states that 
“contemporary analysis of public diplomacy rests on different perceptions 
of what constitutes the public and where it fits in diplomatic practice”. The 
public can be viewed as a target of influence and a generator of pressure. 
Moreover, public diplomacy can be increasingly defined as diplomacy by 
rather than of publics while others see the public as a consumer of 
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diplomacy referring to the twin forces of tourism and terrorism.52 Hocking 
refers to Nye’s soft power concept.53 While hard power refers to the threat 
or use of military force, soft power rests on the ability to shape the 
preferences of others.54 The sources of soft power are culture, values and 
policies. Mead added “sticky power” as the power of economic attraction, 
which can be referred to the economic well-being of the USA resulting from 
free trade and the Bretton Woods institutions.55 While some equate soft 
power with public diplomacy, Hocking suggests instead that there is a 
public diplomacy of hard, sticky and soft power.56 Some authors oppose 
this. In their view, public diplomacy in contrast to soft power intends a 
cultural dialogue between different social communities on the hope of 
shared meaning and understanding. Public diplomacy aims at 
communicating and listening while soft power convinces and declares.57 
This opinion ignores, however, that the involved actors might have differing 
intentions when pursuing public diplomacy. It also cannot explain for what 
purpose the sharing of meaning and understanding should happen and why 
it should always have an end in itself. These considerations can also be 
connected to whether public diplomacy is viewed in being in the national 
interest only or in the common interest.58 
Hocking sees “two worlds” of public diplomacy colliding or cooperating 
referring to a state-centred, hierarchical model and a network model. 
Although both models rest on arguments about the significance of soft 
power, they imply different understandings of soft power and its 
relationship to public diplomacy. The first model stresses the centrality of 
intergovernmental relations, in which foreign ministries act as gatekeeper, 
monitoring interactions between domestic and international policy 
environments and funnelling information between them by using top-down 
information flows. Particularly after “9/11” public diplomacy arrangements 
referred to this model including programs of foreign exchanges, and such to 
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improve public-private collaboration. However, this model rests on 
established realist considerations and “remains a technique for achieving 
policy objectives”. The application of the network imagery in the context of 
public diplomacy is relatively new.59 It overcomes the public-private 
distinction. Regarding both actors as equally important is a constructivists’ 
thought.60 Network perspectives recognise the usefulness of labour division 
between actors in specific policy settings and understand actor advantages.61 
We return to the basic network definition outlined in chapter 2 as “a set of 
relatively stable relationships which are of non-hierarchical and 
interdependent nature linking a variety of actors, who share common 
interests with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue these 
shared interests acknowledging that co-operation is the best way to achieve 
common goals.”62 Hocking refers to Reinicke’s concept of global public 
policy networks (GPPN) for describing the public-private relationship. 
Other network forms might be included in the GPPN.63 These 
“conglomerates” should be considered when analysing the network 
structures of public diplomacy. The outlined network definition needs some 
adaptation with regards to the network members’ cooperation, the assumed 
stability and the non-hierarchy of relationships. Hocking’s model does not 
per se support a “conflict stereotype” between state and non-state actors. 
The relationship among these actors is rather characterised by “co-opetition” 
describing the duality of competition and cooperation and originating from 
market economy.64 According to Esty and Geradin competition between 
governmental and NGOs takes place when the latter acts as intellectual 
competitor in the policy making process coming up with creative solutions 
and “selling” them to the public via the media. Transnational actors and 
governments cooperate, on the contrary, when transnational actors provide 
certain resources to governments contributing to the decision making 
process, such as information.65 The basic policy network definition 
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furthermore assumes a common interest among network members and 
relative stability. Some authors raise the possibility that networks do not 
need to be very constant and self-contained but rather diffuse with 
unplanned participations and activities.66 Networks can be specified 
according to the degree of governmental presence. Coleman and Perl 
differentiate between multilevel governance, intergovernmental 
negotiations, private regimes and “loose couplings”.67 The interaction 
between transnational and governmental actors decreases from type to type. 
In the loose couplings variant “the network often resembles an ‘issue 
network’ based on mutual interest in pooling knowledge and ideas rather 
than a highly developed sense of shared values.”68 Networks are also not 
necessarily uniform in perusing a certain objective and conflicts can occur 
among network members.69 Falkner analyses various public-private 
constellations and particularly the development of a corporist policy 
community at the European level.70 According to her, issue networks, policy 
communities and corporatist policy communities vary according to the 
degree of formal inclusion of the private actors into the policy making 
process. Issue networks are characterised as open for admitting new 
participants and permeable involving different types of private actors with 
competence in certain policy relevant questions whose integration into the 
policy making process is not fixed. Informal consultation among network 
actors takes place.71 This “permeability” and “fluidity” is what differentiates 
the activity environment of non-state actors from that of international 
organisations.72 While all network members might want to collaborate, they 
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might not share the reason for participating.73 In the issue network case, it is 
thus less a common objective that the network actors try to achieve. Rather, 
they profit from the network for different reasons. In issue networks 
politicians and officials are assumed to have low presence.74 This is 
problematic. The domination of NGOs jars with the assumption of an equal 
understanding of public and private actors assumed by constructivist 
thought. The resources brought by actors to the networking process might 
be ideational or material. They can vary according to the involved actor. 
While public actors are regarded to have authority over the implementation 
and enforcement of rules as well as the ability to generate financial 
resources, civil society actors have neither. Their most important resources 
are information on the international political situations in diverse problem 
areas, knowledge on reasons and solutions of such problems as well as 
recognised professional or moral authority reflecting in the credibility of 
their information.75 Post-Marxist add social and cultural resources. Bourdieu 
who coined the term “social capital” regards as resources education, being 
well connected with others and having a key role in a network.76 Others 
mention the access to information channels and being able to establish 
networks and relationships.77 Supply and demand of a resource result in 
different power relationships among actors.78 Economists stress that several 
conditions can lead to an actor’s competitive advantage or a key position in 
the network. The resource should be valuable, rare, and inimitable and 
cannot be substituted.79 This is the case in exchange networks but not all 
resources are exchangeable. In influence and communication networks 
power can result from the high number of relationships and the power of the 
connected actors as well as from the centrality and the prestige of the 
network member. Some network members might be unable to communicate 
directly ant others might control communication channels giving them 
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“bridging functions”. Although networks differ from hierarchical structures 
they might therefore not be hierarchy free.80  
For the operation in a network environment Hocking suggests a “multi-
stakeholder” diplomacy where state and non-state actors are brought 
together in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic processes and where non-
state actors are not viewed as consumers, as statist diplomatic models 
suggest, but as producers of diplomacy. In this context, the establishment of 
multidimensional networks are assumed containing multitudinous forms of 
actors and relationships in which “audience”, “collaborator” or network 
“participant” are rather fluid. These images can also include strong ties 
between governments and transnational actors.81 “Representational” 
difficulties can occur when governments have to decide with whom to 
engage in the diplomatic process. Moreover, traditional rules such as the 
principle of non-interference in internal affairs of the host country (Article 
41 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Article 2[7] UN 
Charter) can be in the way when it comes to public diplomacy strategies 
demanding relationships with foreign non-state actors.82 The process taken 
place within the networks Hocking describes as catalytic diplomacy.83 
Firstly, in cases of agenda setting, non-state-actors help states to frame the 
agenda and encourage their action by providing knowledge resources. 
Secondly, non-state actors support in international peace-building, peace 
maintenance and development-assistance activities as states delegate 
activities to them. And lastly, joint-management takes place between NGOs 
and governments when it comes to institution-building in developing 
countries.84 Modes two and three correspond with Cowan and Arsenault’s 
layers of the public diplomacy and Riordan’s model in terms of cross-
national collaboration in conflict management and the development of 
institutions.85  
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In sum, most of the approaches to public diplomacy presented above are 
consistent with each other as they shed light on different characteristics. 
Hence, they are able to be integrated in a model which will serve as a 
framework of analysis for the German political foundations’ transnational 
interaction in the following chapters.  
3.1.2. Related concepts to public diplomacy 
Often propaganda is defined in such way that public diplomacy is 
included.86 According to Manheim, strategic public diplomacy is “the 
practice of propaganda in the earliest sense of the term, but enlightened by 
half a century of empirical research into human motivation and 
behaviour”.87 Propaganda is seen as a one-way information flow generating 
publicity and different from two-way communication or the dissemination 
of information.88 It is also viewed as the reinforcement or change of public 
opinion, domestic or foreign. “White propaganda” showing openly the 
source is distinguished from “black propaganda” concealing the source. 
Whether propaganda is anti-diplomatic depends on its content.89 The 
political intention in public diplomacy is often assumed to be propaganda or 
psychological warfare. Propaganda as practiced by the USA within the 
context of World War Two identified opinion leaders as targets for 
information campaigns and disseminators of information.90 Others 
differentiate public diplomacy from propaganda as the first has a dialogue, 
liberal communication and listening element whereas the latter manipulates, 
lacks credibility and tends to close the audience’s perspectives. Both try to 
persuade the addressee.91 Although one might find that propaganda is 
different in its key features, it should be included in a model of public 
diplomacy. Certainly, propaganda has a manipulative connotation. It is less 
about informing truthfully than about the clever positioning of information. 
It has a pejorative character due to its monopolisation in dictatorships. Still, 
drawing a line between different forms of communication is problematic 
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and a broader concept of public diplomacy is more useful. Especially 
neutrality as a main criterion of demarcation is difficult to handle as it 
depends on the intention of the actor and on the perception of the addressee. 
Therefore, equating public diplomacy and propaganda is just as inadequate. 
Similar to traditional diplomacy having different characteristics, propaganda 
can be one of several public diplomacy components.   
Nation-branding and public diplomacy frequently overlap. Nation-branding 
mainly focuses on international marketing and is much more extensive than 
public diplomacy. It concentrates on the mobilisation of all of a nation’s 
forces in order to promote its image abroad and to project its identity. Thus, 
it is more holistic than public diplomacy which instead focuses on the 
promotion and maintenance of international relations.92 Nation-branding 
makes use of agenda setting theory originated in communication science by 
proactively influencing the media agenda using concepts like framing or 
priming.93 Branding and diplomacy are similar in terms of combining 
foreign policy goals with internal soft power strategies. Both focus on 
personal and institutional relationship building and dialogue with foreign 
audiences by concentrating on values while classic diplomacy gives 
attention to issues.94 Nation-branding mainly concentrates on economic 
goals, such as export promotion, foreign direct investments and tourism.95 
Reputation and image of a country Anholt measures annually in the Nation 
Brands Index.96 Branding has gained increasing significance on the national 
agendas.97 German variants in this field are the marketing campaigns 
“Deutschland – Land der Ideen” (“Germany – Country of ideas”) and “Du 
bist Deutschland” (“You are Germany“). Both started in the mid-2000s. 
The “Deutschland – Land der Ideen” offensive was originally initiated by 
the German government and the industry for the World Football 
Championship in Germany in 2006 and was later extended to a long-term 
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initiative in order to strengthen Germany as economic and research 
location.98  
Cultural diplomacy or cultural communication is a part of the public 
diplomacy spectrum.99 Cultural diplomacy is the “exchange of ideas, 
information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and the people 
to foster mutual understanding”.100 It has a long-term component not 
focused on the explanation of short-term policies.101 Its instruments are 
exchanges with writers and artists, the support of literary and scientific 
publications as well as the dissemination of music and art. During the Cold 
War cultural diplomacy was intensely practiced by the USA and Germany 
as a weapon against communist ideology.102  
Public diplomacy is often considered a foreign variant of public relations.103 
Although public diplomacy comprises much more aspects, public relations 
can be a component of it.104 From a PR prespective, Hunt and Grunig 
developed the press agentry/publicity model purposing propaganda and the 
public information model aiming at the dissemination of information. Both 
use one-way communication. The two-way asymmetric model focuses on 
scientific persuasion, while the two-way symmetric model purposes mutual 
understanding.105 In sum, they give impetus to the public diplomacy debate. 
The clear differentiation between the concepts is often difficult and it can 
only be estimated on a case by case basis.  
3.2. The integrated model of public diplomacy 
The presented approaches of public diplomacy and related concepts will 
now be integrated into one model of public diplomacy without repeating the 
single approaches in detail. The systematisation will serve as a framework 
for studying the international activities of the German political foundations 
in the following chapters.  
                                                 
98
 Körber (2009) p. 185; Karten (2008) p. 172. 
99
 Cull (2008); differently Stone (2011) p. 244. 
100
 Cummings (2003) p. 1.  
101
 Ostrowski (2010) p. 35. 
102
 Schneider (2007) pp. 157f. 
103
 Kunczik (1989) p. 169. 
104
 Gilboa (2008). 
105
 Hunt/Grunig (1994) p. 9. 
 83 
3.2.1. Generators  
In order to analyse the public diplomacy of the German political 
foundations, a model is necessary, which includes actors other than 
governments. Those models can therefore be dropped where governments 
are the only generators of diplomacy. This is the case when underlying the 
public diplomacy definition of Tuch, the basic cold war model and the 
domestic PR model of Gilboa as well as Hocking’s hierarchy model.106 A 
constructivist starting point allows taking an unbiased look at the interaction 
of states and transnational actors by not assuming that one actor is more 
important than the other. Moreover, it acknowledges an independent policy 
making by transnational actors but also the exploitation of these 
organisations for states’ purposes. In several public diplomacy models 
governments use transnational actors as tools for their own policies.107 The 
government might even use rhetorically the contemporary narratives on the 
new public diplomacy to justify its strategic public diplomacy.108 It cannot 
be anticipated whether transnational public diplomacy is conducted for the 
state or whether transnational actors pursue their independent strategy as 
Melissen and Gilboa assume in their transnational public diplomacy 
model.109 As dependence of these actors might vary from case to case, 
Hocking’s network model where the roles of actors are not fixed is most 
appropriate to analyse the possible complexity of relationships among 
actors.110 
3.2.2. Types, dimension and layers  
Following Signitzer, public diplomacy can be divided into two types: hard 
public diplomacy conducted by governments and soft public diplomacy 
undertaken by non-state actors.111 The focus of this analysis will therefore 
be on the second type. Connecting theses types of diplomacy to Nye’s 
dimensions of daily communication, strategic communication and long-
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lasting relationships,112 daily communication which mainly concerns press 
work is part of hard public diplomacy. This also conforms to Gilboa’s 
framework of analysis which regards news management including advocacy 
and international broadcasting as closely linked to the practicing 
government. Strategic communication can be conducted by public and 
private actors whereas relationship-building is fostered by non-
governmental actors only.113 We therefore divide soft power public 
diplomacy into one-way communication and two-way communication. 
Others deny that one-way communication flows are part of public 
diplomacy.114 However, the wider approach taken in this study includes 
propaganda into the framework. Following Cowan and Arsenault’s, 
monologue can be part of the model but also two-way dialogic 
communication.115 Two-way communication can be asymmetric in the case 
of persuasion and symmetric in terms of collaboration and mutual 
understanding.116  
3.2.3. Addressees and networks 
The addressees of public diplomacy differ according to the involved public 
diplomacy instruments and belong to the general public, journalists and 
media as well as specific disseminators, i.e. stakeholders of political, 
economical, scientific, cultural or civil societal influence. Among them are 
business leaders, youth groups, students, artists and non-governmental 
organisations. They may also include official representatives of the target 
state, such as members of parliaments, regional and local authorities or 
municipal institutions. Target audiences of public diplomacy may vary 
according to the structure of the target country, the possibility to access 
specific groups, windows of opportunity as well as the intended objective of 
the generator. Hocking’s network model allows analysing the interchange 
between transnational and various public levels.117 It will be looked at 
whichever is more central or dominant in the public diplomacy process and 
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how resources are exchanged. Actor positions in the network, actor 
advantages as well as cooperation and competition among actors will be 
taken into account as far as data is available. Whether the connection 
between the actors is rather loose and resembles an “issue network” or is 
highly developed will be evaluated. 
 Type Generators Instrument/ 
Sample activity 
Information 
flow 
Dimension Scope Purpose 
Soft Public 
diplomacy 
Governmental 
and non-
governmental 
actors 
• Political 
campaigns 
• Advertising     
campaigns 
Monologue, 
one-way 
 
Strategic 
com-
munication, 
Propaganda 
Mid-term 
(between 
few weeks 
and few 
months) 
Proactive,  
dissemi-
nation of 
information 
Soft Public 
diplomacy 
Mainly non-
governmental 
actors  
• Scholarships 
• (Academic) 
Exchanges 
• Seminars 
• Conferences 
• Press Trips 
• Media 
Seminars 
• Cultural 
diplomacy 
• Think Tank 
events 
• Receptions  
Dialogue, 
two-way: 
asymmetric 
and 
symmetric 
 
Long-lasting 
relationships, 
Establish-
ment of 
networks 
Long-term 
(years) 
Building 
favourable 
relationships 
and 
collaboration 
 
 
Table 3.1: Integrated model of public diplomacy118  
 
3.2.4. Collaborative public diplomacy 
While the model so far focuses on public diplomacy in monologue and 
dialogue form, it is necessary to also look at the practical aspects of public 
diplomacy and how it can be undertaken. This is often termed as cross-
national collaboration. In contrast to Cowan and Arsenault’s assumption it is 
not a third form of public diplomacy however, but rather as Riordan points 
out part of dialogue-based public diplomacy. It can be especially found in 
projects of democracy building and conflict resolution and corresponds to 
the catalytic diplomatic activity described by Hocking.119  
The following section will introduce official German public diplomacy 
concentrating on the Federal Foreign Office, the Auswärtiges Amt (AA). It 
is the main state actors of German public diplomacy and operates alongside 
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the Stiftungen. It touches upon the question of who the originator of public 
diplomacy is and whether transnational actors are involved in the 
implementation of the public strategy. On this basis, we will analyse in the 
following chapter whether the German political foundations are involved in 
this strategy.  
3.3. German public diplomacy: The Federal Foreign Office 
German public diplomacy is regarded as less developed compared to the 
public diplomacy ambitions of other states. The historical burden of terms 
such as propaganda and marketing during the time of National Socialism are 
seen as reasons for the German reluctance.120 Notwithstanding, the Federal 
Republic was active in the field of public diplomacy from its establishment 
onwards. 
The German lack of approval in other Western countries after World War 
Two and the setup of politische Öffentlichkeitsarbeit (political public 
relations) the German variant of public diplomacy accompanied the federal 
foreign relations from the beginning in 1949.121 Government subsidised 
institutes were created with the intention to win back credibility and to re-
establish foreign contacts remaining the main objective of German foreign 
cultural policy until the 1960s. 122 From the late 1950s onwards, the AA 
integrated also the German political foundations as intermediary 
organisations for their foreign cultural policy.123 However, they never 
became proper mediating organisations (Mittlerorganisationen) as the 
official partner organisations for the AA in its implementation of cultural 
relations and education policy (Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolititk 
[AKBP]).124 The construct of the Mittlerorganisations stems from the idea 
that cultural policy should be decentralised and pluralistic.125 Among them 
are the Goethe-Institut, the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst 
(DAAD), the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung and the Institut für 
Auslandsbeziehungen. A successful example of exchange diplomacy is the 
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Franco-German rapprochement which started in 1945 with the exchange of 
school children, later included town twinning, student exchanges, the 
proliferation of the Goethe Institutes and the Instituts français and the 
launch of the Franco-German TV channel, ARTE (Association Relative à la 
Télévision Européenne).126 Another important element of German foreign 
cultural policy in the early times was the anti-communist activity against the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Soviet ideology.127 Nothing 
less than a public diplomacy campaign was the Hallstein Doctrine and its 
supporting information initiative. During the Cold War the two German 
states competed for recognition in countries around the world and where 
“preoccupied by their Cold War en miniature”.128 Developed as a West 
German foreign policy concept in 1955 the doctrine stated that the 
establishment of diplomatic relations of third countries with the GDR was 
seen as “unfriendly act”. Less a doctrine than a collection of emergency 
methods it included a wide variety of responses, such as economic sanctions 
and the termination of diplomatic relations. According to Bonn, the Federal 
Republic was the only legitimate representative of the German state as the 
GDR had no democratic legitimacy.129 It cannot be ruled out that German 
transnational actors where not only used to win back credibility but also to 
support the “cultural Cold War”. Partnerships between governments and the 
private sector focused against communism and private organisations helped 
to give the illusion of political neutrality.130 While in the 1950s West 
Germany had hold the better position by enjoying diplomatic relations with 
the main European Countries, East Germany had to be satisfied with the 
unofficial levels of diplomacy such as chambers of commences.131 At the 
end of the 1950s the competition for diplomatic contracts shifted towards 
the developing countries of which many became independent from the 
colonial powers at that time. A trigger was the economic and development 
aid promised by both states. Although charitable thoughts were motives for 
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the West Germany development aid, it was still used as a method to gain 
influence and friends due to the fear that population growth and poverty 
could promote communism.132 Still, the concept of giving aid attached less 
value to ideology at that time and did not ask for political benefits in return. 
The politicisation of development assistance finally took place in 1961 
shortly after the establishing conference of the non-aligned states in 
Yugoslavia. By cutting back development aid for states recognising the 
GDR, the Hallstein Doctrine was for the first time intensified.133 In 1961 the 
Federal Republic, moreover, established the Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation back then provided with little power compared to the AA and 
the Ministry of Economics. By 1964 the AA had devised a strategy to link 
development aid and the Hallstein Doctrine more effectively by not just 
threatening to break the diplomatic contact but by involving “flexible 
measures” to withhold aid. However, in the following time the doctrine was 
applied less and less. It came to an end by the late 1960s due to the 
hesitation to use it. After 1970 the Hallstein Doctrin was given up 
completely.134 
Against the background of “9/11”, the troubled relations with the Islamic 
world and the “War on Terror” as well as the downturn of foreign 
perceptions public diplomacy became more important in Germany and other 
countries in recent times.135 In 2000 ambassador Paschke inspected 14 
German embassies in Europe in order “to determine how the demands on 
our embassies in EU countries have changed“.136 The “Paschke Report” 
concludes that “embassies face new, additional challenges, particularly in 
the realm of public diplomacy” which targets foreign publics for explaining 
the German position in the European integration process and promoting 
Germany as an investment and business location. According to Paschke, 
public diplomacy was a number one priority and was “reaching out to 
people in the host country, actively communicating through ongoing 
dialogue with all sections of the informed public in order to generate interest 
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in and understanding for both our European and bilateral concerns”.137 From 
1998 onwards, the German government began to focus on the medial 
representation of Germany abroad which also concerned the AA’s role and 
the involvement of new media and the internet. As one of the ministry’s 
core tasks it stressed the shaping of public opinion concerning decision 
makers in politics, economy and civil society of partner countries as well as 
in international organisations. Also the Mittlerorganisationen should take 
part in this process. Media politics as part of AKBP aimed at the 
development of global networks and at the promotion of dialogue, exchange 
and cooperation. It also had the objective to prevent conflicts, promote 
democracy and free media.138  
From 2003 onwards the AA conducted a more systematic public diplomacy 
approach supported by several organisational modifications, such as the 
incorporation of the department of foreign press work into the AA as well as 
the establishment of a department for culture and communication mainly 
responsible for the German image cultivation abroad.139 Nowadays, the 
AA’s public diplomacy aims at “positioning Germany widely and as 
holistically as possible in the mind of the world population. A good image 
gives Germany political and economical (…) options. (…) To promote 
Germany means underlining important strengths without exaggeration and 
fraudulence. Hence, public diplomacy is only successful on a long term 
basis when it has authenticity and is convincing.”140 Next to the economic 
objectives, such as representing Germany as research and investment 
location and the promotion of German products, Germany should be 
presented as reliable partner. Moreover, values should be furthered such as 
democracy and freedom.141 The public diplomacy of the AA mainly 
addresses countries of strategic importance, not by the need for an image 
correction. Its geographic concentrations have changed over time. While in 
1980 Western Europe was the most important target region, the AA focused 
in the last decade on Middle-, East- and South Europe. China, India and 
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Japan and other strategic partners in Asia became new economical focal 
points. In the Arab and Islamic world the Foreign Office concentrated on 
political and cultural dialogue. Addressees of public diplomacy are foreign 
governments and diplomats and broad levels of foreign population such as 
journalists, scientists and other opinion leaders of civil society serving as 
disseminators. The main public diplomatic methods of the Auswärtiges Amt 
are political public relations, AKBP as well as location marketing and 
promotion of investment.142 Political public relations, contains the analysis 
of the German image abroad which subsequently finds its way into the 
media work of the AA’s headquarter and the missions abroad. This includes, 
among others, the provision of information on Germany via print 
publications or online as well as journalists’ exchange programmes.143 
AKBP focuses on imparting the German culture abroad and on promoting 
tolerance and democratic values as well as the prevention of conflict. This 
comprises activities such as international cultural dialogue, cultural 
exchange programs, and the promotion of the German language and of 
Germany as research location.144 German cultural policy concentrates hence 
on culture as an end in itself but also on the promotion of other policy areas 
and image cultivation. Some mediating organisations differentiate between 
the two fields. Their attitude towards public diplomacy is often not very 
positive.145 This might stem from the general idea that foreign cultural 
policy should rather be independent from authorities and distant from 
policy.146 The German government names five strategies of AKBP: a 
dialogue approach, cultural understanding and value orientation, target 
group orientation, networking and public-private partnerships.147 The AA 
but mainly the Federal Ministry for German Economic Affairs and Energy 
(BMWi) are active in location marketing and promotion of investment 
advertising Germany as a site for business. Germany Trade&Invest a 
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government initiative and private company deals with attracting foreign 
investors, marketing and communication.148  
In sum, despite its public diplomacy experience in the Cold War context, 
Germany is still a fairly new actor in this field and its ambitions are still 
relatively understudied.149 The AA’s rhetoric shows an explicit stance 
towards new public diplomacy emphasising network environments, 
dialogues and greater values which exceed mere interests. Still, the 
ambitions are also led by access to material resources and strategic 
importance. As Pamment outlines, Germany presents itself as a “benign 
mediator creating partnerships and dialogues in support of its policy 
goals.”150 A high amount of non-governmental actors is involved in the 
implementation of its public diplomacy. 
Conclusion 
Nowadays the general public as well as politicians are increasingly critical 
of hard power’s utility. The soft tackling of issues involving ideas has 
become more and more accepted and pushed forward. As Hocking states 
few actors nevertheless possess this power which makes others want what 
you want.151 Public diplomacy whose key elements are values is thus one of 
the central instruments of soft power.152 The concept offers a wider 
explanation of how diplomacy is undertaken in the 21st century. Still, little 
research has been conducted so far. Many empirical cases concentrate on 
the United States during the Cold War being therefore too one-sidedly 
focused and outdated. Research on actors other than governments has been 
even more limited.153 Taking a constructivist starting point helps focus on 
the public diplomacy as a process which includes various types of actors. 
We thereby return to what was originally defined as transnational 
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 Karten (2008) p. 183; for details see AA at: http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Aussenwirtschaft/InstrumenteAWI_node.html; BMWi at: 
http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Aussenwirtschaft/Aussenwirtschaftsfoerderung/institutio
nen-der-aussenwirtschaftsfoederung,did=190660.html. 
149
 For case studies see e.g. Pamment (2013); Ostrowski (2010); Zöllner (2008); Lange 
(2007); Gerz (2005). 
150
 Pamment (2013) p. 30. 
151
 Hocking (2007) p. 35. 
152
 Melissen (2007b) p. 4. 
153
 Gilboa (2008) p. 56. 
 92 
interaction. Operations can take place in a network environment whereto 
actors bring various resources. Public diplomatic undertakings can be value-
based and can include long-term relationship building, dialogue and 
collaboration. Constructivism allows here to consider ideational diffusion 
processes as the essence of public diplomacy. However, we do not assume 
that public diplomats only behave with integrity and further the common 
good. They might also be morally corrupt and manipulative in conducting 
questionable propaganda activities. 
The next chapter applies the integrated model of public diplomacy to the 
international undertakings of the German political foundations. It looks at 
the question of whether the Stiftungen can be considered as public diplomats 
by analysing their independence and activities abroad. In chapter 5 and 
chapter 6 we reflect on the foundations’ support in democracy and their 
conflict management as different modes how public diplomacy can be 
practiced correlating with the second and third mode of Hocking’s network 
model and Riordan’s findings on collaborative public diplomacy. Though 
core activities of the Stiftungen, they have never been analysed 
systematically in a public diplomatic context. The subsequent case studies 
connect these insights to concrete cases of democracy assistance of the KAS 
in Southeast Europe and conflict management of the FES in Southern 
Thailand. The diffused values and policy ideas of the Stiftungen will be 
related to the official German policy and its rhetoric shedding lights on 
ideational differences and accordance. 
 
 
Part II 
Public diplomacy and practice 
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Chapter 4 - The German political foundations:   
Public diplomats? 
In the past, academic literature occasionally has set the German political 
foundations’ undertakings in context within diplomatic activities. However, 
it remained very vague what form of diplomacy is conducted, how the 
Stiftungen undertake this activity or how it fits into the wider debate on 
public diplomacy. In being an under-theorised and disputed object in the IR 
discipline,1 diplomacy might as well have caused this lack of attention. Still, 
several different authors already suggested a closer look at the Stiftungens’ 
diplomatic activities assuming a broader notion of diplomacy involving 
states and transnational actors alike.  
In the following chapter the model of public diplomacy as presented before is 
applied to the foundations’ foreign activities.2 First, the chapter analyses 
whether the Stiftungen are indeed generators of public diplomacy or rather 
tools of the German state or other institutions. In a second step it is explored 
which public diplomatic instruments the German foundations make use of. 
Thirdly, in terms of a public diplomacy dimension, the chapter discusses 
possible propaganda activities and examines the foundations’ operation in a 
network environment. The chapter addresses sub-research question 1 and 
tries to analyse more generally the potential of the German political 
foundations as public diplomats. 
4.1. Generators 
Who generates public diplomacy is closely connected to the question of 
whether the foundations are transnational actors or whether they are active 
on behalf of the German state (i.e. the ministries and parliament) or the 
political parties. It also touches upon the issue of the foundations being 
integrated in the political sphere as instruments of German foreign policy.  
                                                 
1
 Jönsson (2002) p. 214. 
2
 See 3.2. 
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The literature often emphasises the autonomy of the German foundations 
from the state.3 Still, reasons for this assumption are rarely given. On the 
contrary, when the associated party is in government the foundations are 
often perceived erroneously as semi-official bodies by many outside 
observers.4 As we have seen above, the German political foundations are 
mainly state-sponsored.5 The possibility is likely that they implement only 
projects in the interests of the funder. In case of a direct control by means of 
binding specifications and monitoring, one can hardly speak of a particular 
Stiftungs’ public diplomacy. Rather, they would be tools or instruments of a 
state public diplomacy and could, moreover, not count as transnational 
actors. Subsuming the German political foundations under the transnational 
actors’ definition is difficult.6  Whereas their “regular interactions across 
national boundaries” are clearly visible, their relationship with the German 
government poses problems. The FES, the FNS, the HBS and the RLS were 
registered NGOs at the United Nations in 2014. To the first three the 
“Roster” category was granted in 1979 (FES), 1993 (FNS) and 2004 (HBS). 
The RLS received the special consultative status in 2013.7 The fact that 
government or political party members are often members at the affiliated 
Stiftung, does not contradict the UN’s NGO definition.8 While earlier works 
assumed that the foundations simply ranked among the NGOs,9 increasingly 
authors considered them as QUANGOs.10 As we have seen above this not 
only implies the dependence on state funds but also a heteronomous activity 
on behalf of the German government. Consequentially, the foundations were 
precluded from being transnational actors.11 Moreover, the affiliated political 
parties could exercise power over the Stiftungen. They are situated in the 
transition area between state and society and of great importance under 
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 E.g. Klevenhörster/van den Boom (2009) p. 61; Smith (2001) pp. 59f.; Nölke (2010) p. 
395. 
4
 Thunert (2004) p. 79. 
5
 See 1.8.3. 
6
 See 2.1. 
7
 UN (2014); the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) recognises three categories of 
NGOs: (1) general consultative status NGOs concerned with most of the Council’s work; 
(2) specialist NGOs concerned with a few fields and (3) “Roster” NGOs make occasional 
contributions to the Council (UN at: http://csonet.org/index.php?menu=30).   
8
 See 1.8.2., 2.1. 
9
 E.g. Krämer/Lehrke (1996) p. 114. 
10
 E.g. Schubert (2005) p. 802; Nuscheler (1993).  
11
 See 2.1. 
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German constitutional law.12 In case of their control a foundations’ public 
diplomacy “generatorship” would be inhibited. Both aspects need to be 
considered in the following subsection. 
4.1.1. The Ministry of Development and Cooperation (BMZ) 
For their foreign activity the German political foundations receive around 90 
percent of their international funding from the BMZ aiming at their projects 
in the developing countries.13 Still, the ministry’s possibility to approve the 
foundations’ activities is relatively limited. German development policy is 
implemented by different actors whose independence from the ministry 
varies tremendously. On the one hand, the German government initiates, 
funds and organises the development cooperation by making use of 
dependent implementing agencies (Durchführungsorganisationen) which 
belong to the QUANGOs.14 They are so-called verselbständigte 
Verwaltungseinheit meaning “administrative unit made independent” which 
enjoy limited independence as to human and material resources and decision-
making. The BMZ, however, has a conditioning control over the 
development political decision making of these organisations as it pre-selects 
the possible projects and can object to the final projects’ selection.15 Such 
organisations are among others the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the KfW Entwicklungsbank. On the other hand, 
development projects are initiated and organised by independent NGOs 
partly backed by BMZ’s funds. The latter includes the German political 
foundations, the church organisations as well as other NGOs.16 In contrast to 
the implementation organisations, the German political foundations were not 
created to take on governmental tasks initially. Even though the beginnings 
of the foundations’ international engagement partly coincided with the idea 
of the German government to support the foundations financially, their 
                                                 
12
 Rudizio (2006) p. 93; Krebs (2007) §108 Rn. 25. 
13
 See 1.8.3. 
14
 BMZ at: 
http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/approaches/bilateral_development_cooperation/players
/implementing_organisations/index.html; see also 5.1. 
15
 Glagow/Schimank (1983) p. 151. 
16
 BMZ (2013a); BMZ at: 
http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/approaches/bilateral_development_cooperation/players
/index.html; Glagow/Schimank (1983) p. 162. 
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international activities followed several years after their (re)establishment.17 
The international activities were initiated by political party members or, in 
case of the FES also by trade unions developing international relationships at 
that time.18 The BMZ has a selecting control over their projects: The 
organisation first chooses the possible projects which the ministry then can 
reject. However, the ministry is not able to determine contentwise binding 
requirements.19 During the implementation of projects the foundations write 
mid-year and annual reports to the BMZ.20 They are also supposed to 
constantly coordinate their activities abroad among each other and shall 
inform the BMZ of the results.21 As the ministry points out, the Stiftungen 
are not active on behalf of the German government but with the approval of 
the government. The foundations are also mostly independent from 
agreements resulting from bilateral development cooperation.22 Still, the 
autonomy of all organisations from the ministry depends, as Glagow and 
Schimank point out, on its demand of funding and their availability of other 
resources. The Stiftungen do not have sufficient self-funds and the ministry 
finances their projects almost completely. However, the BMZ does not check 
the political imperative of projects. It is only responsible for the pluralist 
distribution of funds among the foundations. The quota is determined by the 
German Bundestag.23 Each foundation has a certain amount of funding, 
literally on demand. In reality, the rejection of project proposals rarely 
happened in the history of the foundations’ international activity.24 Like the 
other independent NGOs receiving funding from the BMZ, the foundations 
are therefore relative autonomous. However, compared to the other NGOs 
the foundations are least dependent. Their relationship with the funding 
ministry is formal as the foundations do not have to negotiate their funding 
                                                 
17
 See 5.3.1. 
18
 E.g. for the FES see Von zur Mühlen (2007) pp. 48ff.; for the KAS see Beaugrand (2003) 
pp. 43f. 
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 BMZ (1973) p. 64; Glagow/Schimank (1983) pp. 152, 154f. 
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 Egger (2006) p. 63 fn. 173. 
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 BMZ (1973) p. 65; interview 3; critically Schürmann (1989) p. 55.  
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 BMZ (1973) p. 64; BMZ at: 
http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/wege/bilaterale_ez/akteure_ez/polstiftungen/index
.html?follow=adword. 
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 See 1.8.3.; Glagow/Schimank (1983) pp. 159, 161f., 174.  
24
 Egger (2007) p. 62 fn. 172 on lacking resources; Glagow/Schimank (1983) p. 162 on 
avoiding conflicts with the political parties. 
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with the BMZ. They decide how and where to be active.25 This formal 
independence permits to consider the foundations as GONGOs.26 Elsewhere 
the Stiftungen have been termed as “mediation-NGOs”. They acquire funds 
from the Northern donor and use them either for their own activity in 
cooperation with Southern NGOs or act as a donor in relation to the Southern 
NGOs.27 The term is misleading, however, as intermediary or mediation 
organisations are viewed as German Mittlerorganisations. 
4.1.2. The Federal Foreign Office (AA) 
In the last years the German political foundations received the remaining 10 
percent of their international funding from the AA for projects in the 
industrialised countries and scholarships to foreign students. In 2015 the ratio 
between AA and BMZ has slightly shifted in favour of the AA since it is also 
responsible for EU candidates.28  
The German political foundations are at times perceived as actors in German 
cultural relations and education policy (AKBP). As already outlined, the AA 
implements its AKBP with the help of Mittlerorganisations defined as 
QUANGOs.29 Some criterions of the Mittlerorganisations can also be 
assigned to the Stiftungen: They are not obliged to follow implementation 
instructions and their projects are evaluated and monitored.30 However, in 
contrast to the Mittlerorganisationen, the foundations are not bound by 
framework contracts and target agreements. Their independence in the 
projects’ implementation is greater although also the Mittlerorganisations 
are partly automomous.31 The German foundations are possibly not among 
the Mittlerorganisationen due to the understanding that cultural policy is 
rather non-political.32 This criterion does not apply to the Stiftungen. 
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 Glagow/Schimank (1983) pp. 161ff., 174.  
26
 See 2.1.; Reimann (2007) p. 93.  
27
 Fahrenhorst (2007) p. 72 fn. 
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 See 1.8.3.  
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 See 3.3. and 2.1. 
30
 Interview 7, 3; KAS at: http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.3712/; Egger (2007) p. 63 fn. 173; 
Bartsch (1998) p. 187. 
31
 AA (2011a) p. 19; Renvert (2011) p. 32; Schreiner (2008) p. 5. 
32
 Harnischfeger (2007) p. 719. 
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However, an “intermediary”-function in AKBP is conceded to the 
foundations and the AA views them as “partners”.33 
The AA also needs to agree to the projects authorised by the BMZ. The 
reason for the approval of the AA is rooted in the original issues of whether 
development aid was considered as part of foreign affairs.34 The foundations’ 
projects are examined regarding potential foreign political objections and 
overlapping with other German organisations’ projects. Since the beginning 
of the foundations’ international activities the AA established certain general 
rules in order to avoid that undertakings negatively affect the relations 
between Germany and the specific country. As a result, inner party debates 
of the specific affiliated German party are not supposed to be shifted abroad. 
Furthermore, the German foundations should not interfere abroad in political 
disputes on governmental power.35 These guidelines, however, leave enough 
room for the Stiftungen to plan and implement their projects independently 
from the AA. Objections to projects are rarely made.36 Despite regular 
meetings the coordination between the ministry and the Stiftungen is 
assumed to be not very formal.37  
Despite their independence it is sometimes attested to the foundations to be 
instruments in German foreign policy. In his speech on the FES’s 70th 
anniversary then German President Herzog noted that “the foundations’ 
commitment for the development of democratic and rule-of-law structures 
makes them one of the most effective and proven instruments of German 
foreign policy”.38 Nuschler considered the foundations as “diplomatic 
auxiliary forces” practicing a complementary “side foreign policy”.39 In 
several of her works, Pogorelskaja investigated the foundations’ actor and 
instrument characteristics. She checked activities of the KAS and HSS in 
CSI and the Baltic States against the AA’s concepts. According to her, the 
foundations contribute to the bilateral relations between Germany and the 
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 AA (2015) pp. 23, 164ff.; peripherally mentioning the foundations AA (2013) pp. 76, 88; 
see 4.2.3. 
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 AAPA B58-IIIB2 Bd. 304 7/03/1963. 
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 BMZ (1973) p. 69.; Bundeshaushaltsplan (2015) Kapitel 2302 Titel 68704. 
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 Bartsch (1998) p. 187. 
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 Interview 4; Pogorelskaja (2009a) p. 42. 
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 Herzog (1995) p. 324, author’s translation. 
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studied states and helped form new foreign political concepts.40 As 
instrument they were recognised because they complemented official foreign 
policy by pre-political activities.41 Some stress the realisation of long-term 
political goals where the foundations as instruments offer advantages.42 
While all these aspects might have an added value in the eyes of those 
conducting foreign policy they are, however, only helpful when the 
instrument can be controlled. Ultimately, also Pogorelskaja concedes that 
due to the impossibility to directly influence them the foundations are not 
instruments in a classic sense.43 To associate the foundations’ with 
“instruments” is therefore misleading. In fact, they offer different resources 
from which others profit which will be considered below.  
4.1.3. The German parliament, the political parties and others 
The German Bundestag controls the German political foundations as it is in 
charge to provide the public funding to the foundations, which is distributed 
to the foundations via the ministries afterwards. The Bundestag also fixes the 
funds’ allocation formula.44 However, it only determines the amount 
conceded to the foundations but do not specify requirements for their 
activities. The pluralism of the foundations’ affiliation to different political 
parties makes governmental control difficult. Still, it does not preclude from 
the possibility that the party exercises control over the affiliated foundation’s 
activities or that the foundation only implements what is in the interest of the 
party. Some authors assume that the Stiftungen are merely execution organs 
for a political party’s foreign policy.45 Since the foundations are important 
foreign political organisations for the political parties,46 it is likely, though 
impossible to prove that the foundation conducts certain activities in the 
service of the affiliated party. However, this does not occur through coercion 
and would contradict the ruling of the Constitutional Court terming the 
foundations’ independence and autonomy from the political parties.47 
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 Pogorelskaja (2002a) pp. 33f. 
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Exertion of influence rather takes place informally and particularly through 
the personnel intertwining between party and foundation.48 In this respect, 
Pinto-Duschinsky gave the glaring example of Chancellor Kohl and a CDU 
committee prohibiting a KAS publication which described emerging political 
groups in East Berlin in the early weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall.49 
Today, the informal interfering of the party seems to be rather restrained.50 
Also the party’s funding and that of the foundation are strictly separated.51 
Foundations’ projects and events are planned and carried out 
independently.52 Some authors assume that especially the foundations’ 
consulting activity prevents the foundations from becoming party 
instruments.53 This is convincing as the foundation, compared to the 
affiliated party, has an advantage in knowledge and expertise on international 
subjects. Therefore, it is more likely that the party has to trust the 
recommendations of the foundations than vice versa. Others assume that 
foreign topics are rather uninteresting in terms of influence exertion as these 
do not help the domestic influence of the political party.54 The prevailing 
ideational conformity of the foundation and the affiliated party in policy 
issues nonetheless remains but does not establish a link of control.55 
However, there are cases when the foundations’ political position and that of 
the party were different. In 1999 the then government GREEN party 
supported the military intervention in Kosovo while the HBS opposed it.56 In 
sum, the actual party’s power of control over the foundation’s foreign 
activities might be only slightly pronounced due to the personal ties. 
However, this does not rationalise to view the Stiftungen as simple party 
instruments.57 Rather the political party might profit from valuable 
foundation’s resources outside of the party’s sphere of influence. Finally, the 
                                                 
48
 See 1.8.2. 
49
 Pinto-Duschinky (1991b) p. 223. 
50
 Egger (2007) p. 68 fn. 191. 
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31.  
 102 
hybrid structure58 of the Stiftungen in having connecting points to the 
affiliated political parties makes them not only relative-autonomous from the 
public bodies but also, in reverse, from the political parties.  
There are several other means of control of the foundations’ activity. The 
funding ministries control whether the financial support complies with the 
purpose of funding. The tax office verifies the public utility of the 
foundations’ appropriations. Public utility, for example, is denied when 
foundations’ funds are transferred to a political party. A statutory auditor, as 
prescribed by the funding ministries, reviews and certifies the regulatory and 
economic efficiency of the used funding used.59 However, these means do 
not deprive the foundations of their independence. Even when public funding 
is missing the foundations are able to finance some projects on their own. 
This was the case of the FNS’s Tibet conference in Bonn in 1996, when 
funding was cut by the AA due to its supposed negative effects on the 
German Chinese relations. Ultimately, the FNS used other funding to hold 
the conference nonetheless.60   
In sum, the German political foundations are generally able to generate their 
own public diplomacy as they are relative autonomous from the state 
institutions as well as the affiliated political parties. They are NGOs with the 
particularity to be state-funded which allows terming them as GONGOs or as 
organisations “sui generis”.61 At the same time, they are different from 
QUANGOs as activity on behalf of the German government is missing. 
Since they regularly interact across the German national boarder, they belong 
to the transnational actors.  
4.2. Addressees and instruments 
Since 1962 the German political foundations’ international activity is 
generally organised as project work and in cooperation with partner 
organisations.62 The foundations deviate from this principle only for projects 
in the industrialised countries funded by the AA, when activities in the 
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transition or developing countries are just about to be developed, when 
possible partner organisations lack or when a specific development political 
mandate for their activity is missing (Regieprogramme).63 In 1973 the 
involved partners in the developing countries were, according to the German 
Bundestag, trade unions, cooperatives, political parties, youth organisations, 
farmers’ associations, journalists’ associations and public institutions, such 
as broadcasting corporations, universities, governments and international 
organisations. Targets of the foundations’ measures abroad were “political 
and social key groups”.64 The partner and target spectrum since then has 
hardly changed. Some new partner groups and individuals have been added, 
such as NGOs, think tanks and women’s groups, business leaders and junior 
executives.65 Partners and targets are not differentiated uniformly and often 
overlap.66 Partners termed as the “primary targets” pave the way for reaching 
a “secondary target audience”.67 While in the past most of the foundations 
primarily targeted social and political elites, increasingly actors of civil 
society became a new focal point since the 1990s.68 This shift coincided with 
growing use of funding from international organisations which possibly 
triggered the new primary target choice due to the organisations’ imposed 
project conditions.69 Today, the Stiftungen also increasingly target 
supranational and international organisations.70  
Disputed aspects of the foundations’ partner approach are the collaboration 
with political parties and high level politics as practised from the very 
beginning of the foundations’ international activities. In the 1970s and 1980s 
the Stiftungen conducted almost aggressively the promotion of affiliated 
political parties, especially in Spain, Portugal and Latin-America. Sometimes 
the German foundations supported even parties devoid of any affiliation.71 
Such activities have decreased since then. For the activities in Eastern 
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Europe in the 1990s the foundations targeted committees of the national 
parliaments and the respective fraction instead of the political party whose 
ideas did not match with the opinion of the respective foundation.72 They 
also seek proximity to other party affiliated organisations, such as the British 
Westminster foundation as well as the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty 
Democracy.73 However, political parties are still the key partners and targets 
for the majority of the German foundations and their “common 
denominator”.74 Although less practiced in the developing countries, the 
German political foundations try as well to cooperate with governments even 
in countries where civil society partners could be found. The collaboration is 
particularly close when a political party previously supported by a 
foundation comes into power. According to some authors, it is this desire to 
work with high level politicians differentiating the foundations from other 
non-state-organisations.75 In this respect, they resemble lobby organisations. 
Apart form that, each foundation has a certain partner focus according to its 
political background.76 The FES explicitly cooperates with trade unions, 
NGOs as well as academic and political consulting institutes.77 The KAS 
refers to young professionals, media and public administration.78 The FNS 
names regional networks, think tanks and NGOs.79 The HBS concentrates on 
NGOs, women’s organizations and other civil society actors, such as civil 
rights campaigners, the art scene and media.80 The RLS gives attention to 
trade unions, women’s organizations, social movements, research and 
educational institutions as well as international organizations,81 while the 
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HSS focuses on associations and public administrations.82 In the 
industrialised countries, the German political foundations do not apply the 
partner approach. Still, they remain focused on political, cultural as well as 
economic elites such as leaders of political parties, ministers, members of 
parliaments, economic decision makers, and important stakeholders from 
civil society, journalists and think tanks’ experts.83 The list of international 
partners, as outlined, is not exhaustive and depends, evidently, on the 
involved instrument.  
The German political foundations use several different medium- and long-
term public diplomacy instruments when being internationally active.84 
Abroad, the foundations carry out conferences, workshops, round tables, 
educational and expert seminars as well as discussion rounds. Moreover, 
they provide scholarships, organise exchanges, visitors’ programs and 
deployments of experts to other countries. They also use certain media like 
publications and films and they organise receptions. To a little extent, the 
German foundations support their partners financially. However, this direct 
institutional funding is used less and less. Financial resources are nowadays 
made available, almost exclusively, via project financing.85 These 
instruments, often overlapping, are generally used by all political 
foundations. What type of instrument is chosen depends on the country and 
what best serves the respective project’s objective.  
4.2.1. Political dialogue 
“Political dialogue” is an important foundations’ work approach.86 Its 
establishment coincided with the claim to create better economic, political 
and social framework conditions since in the 1970s many programs in the 
developing countries had failed.87 Understanding political dialogue as a 
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process of mutual exchange of information and ideas about options and 
activities in the development political arena,88 it aims at locating 
development bottlenecks and hindrances as well as finding suitable and 
necessary policies.89 While these dialogue processes are expected to 
generally take place at the highest political levels in the form of 
intergovernmental negotiations and discussions,90 Böhler, on the contrary, 
assumed that the German political foundations’ activities complement these 
bilateral processes on an “operative level”. Through the promotion of 
democracy aiming at developing political systems, the strengthening political 
parties, law and order, social and economic systems, the role of media, free 
elections, participation of minorities, regional integration and global 
governance, the Stiftungen participate in political dialogue.91 Treating the 
foundations’ activities in East- and Central Europe, Schneider-Deters 
stressed the replacement of the former political and civil education programs 
by political dialogue from the 1990s onwards targeting parliamentary, social 
and academic elites from other countries and in Germany. Political education 
had a negative connotation in the post-socialist states and signified 
ideological indoctrination.92 For others these dialogues are epitomes of the 
foundations’ methods in the industrialised world.93 The foundations offices 
in the industrialised countries are mostly so called “International-political-
dialogue-offices” (IPD). The IPD-departments interlink different aspects of 
the foundations’ activities where regional solutions are not appropriate, such 
as global and complex issues involving different partners and stakeholders.94 
Still, political dialogue even plays an important role for the national work of 
the foundations where it concentrates on the dialogue between the general 
public and political actors.95 In fact, political dialogue is a meta-level activity 
taking place in almost every country of activity focusing on the exchange of 
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thoughts and experiences about political and social framework conditions 
and developments on national, regional and international level.96  
4.2.2. Media programs 
In the developing countries the German political foundations undertake 
media promotion programs considering media as part of a functioning 
democracy.97 Like political dialogue, media support coincided with the 
arising claims to improve the effectiveness of development cooperation in 
the 1970s. Since then it has been an instrument of the foundations’ 
international activity.98 Media seminars, journalists’ trainings, radio 
programs, publications on media law or political opinion surveys, exchange 
programs for media professionals and the provision of grants are part of the 
foundations’ media activities. In case of the KAS the instrument includes 
also the consulting of media providers, politicians and judges.99 The KAS 
and the FES maintain regional media offices in addition to their country 
offices.100  
4.2.3. Cultural diplomacy and scholarships 
The German political foundations are also active in the field of cultural 
diplomacy. However, in the context of German AKBP (Auswärtige Kultur- 
und Bildungspolititk) coming closest to cultural diplomacy, other 
organisations, such as the Goethe-Institutes.101 According to Pogorelskaja, 
the foundations are only significant cultural actors when culture is 
understood broadly. However, they were in charge of foreign cultural 
political tasks from the very beginning of their activities.102 In the 
Konzeption 2000, the framework for last decades’ AKBP, the Stiftungen 
played a key role through the development of transatlantic and European 
cooperation, the support within the European unification process, the 
rapprochement of Central and Eastern Europe to theses structures, and the 
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performance of superregional and conflict prevention tasks.103 Moreover, the 
foundations are active in several of AKBP’s work fields: They support 
professional and educational development through the provision of 
exchanges and seminars and establish intercultural dialogues.104 A small part 
of the foundations’ activities comprises typical cultural programme work, 
such as art exhibitions and readings.105 Finally, the foundations award about 
10-20% of all granted scholarships to foreign students from developing and 
transition countries.106 A small amount of scholarships is given to foreign 
researchers.107 In contrast to other AKBP actors, the foundations do not 
primarily pursue to transfer German culture. Still, through their activities 
they impart German political culture abroad.108 
4.2.4. Think tank activities and consulting 
Around the world, the German foundations organise think tank events in 
partnership with other institutes and they are themselves considered as think 
tanks. Differentiating think tank activities from other foundations’ activities 
is difficult. Typical think tank tasks are in-house academies, research and 
consulting units and study groups focusing on different types of policy and 
research. Moreover, the foundations lecture, publish articles and books and 
organise conferences targeting research institutes and universities.109  
Heisterkamp indentified four qualities of the Stiftungen: their hybrid 
character, their multifunctionality (i.e. think tank activity is not their only 
activity), their ideological orientation and a pluralistic labour division 
between the foundations resulting from the ideological background.110 The 
Stiftungen are considered as advocacy think tanks although there are 
similarities with academic think tanks. Advocacy think tanks are 
characterized by thematic specialization, a smaller number of permanent 
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researchers, their networking with other experts and their activity as idea 
brokers instead of doing basic research.111   
Closely related to the think tank activity, is the foundations’ consulting 
activity often assessed as their core competence. While the think tank 
activities mainly take place in Germany, consulting is relevant at home and 
abroad. Consulting activities in the developing countries concern the drafting 
of law, and the strengthening of public administrations, parliamentary 
committees and the judiciary.112 This is closely connected to democracy 
assistance.113 Consulting is also practiced in the industrialised countries and 
related to political dialogue.114 On European level the foundations consult 
members of the EU parliament. The KAS, for instance, has been especially 
active in the drafting process of the EU Constitution by organising joint 
meetings with the EVP-ED Fraction at the EU Parliament helping to 
coordinate and find a position in the process.115 The foundations’ political 
orientation is surprisingly regarded as advantageous since the consulting 
foundation is expected to know the subject and those in receipt of advice. On 
the other hand, the foundation is not, in contrast to the party or fraction, 
devoted to actual trends.116  
4.2.5. Political campaigning, advertisement and monologue instruments 
The German political foundations are not involved in political or advertising 
campaigns. Their activities abroad are also not limited to a short period of 
time which becomes particular apparent in the establishment of international 
offices. In terms of monologue instruments the foundations publish books, 
articles, studies, conference papers and other material. The treated national 
and international topics arise from the specific political focus of the 
foundation and do not aim at advertising Germany directly. The material is 
introduced through seminars, conferences and consulting activity to the 
respective audience and does not, in this way, remain completely monologue.  
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In sum, the German political foundations are mainly active with dialogue 
public diplomacy instruments and cover the full range of activities as defined 
in the systematisation. This includes asymmetric communications, such as 
consulting but also symmetric communication in the form of political 
dialogue and cultural diplomacy.  
4.3. Dimensions 
Of the public diplomacy dimensions the Stiftungen are often confronted with 
the accusation of promoting propaganda. In addition, networking is 
associated with their international activity.  
4.3.1. Propaganda 
In the developing and emerging countries the criticism of interference is 
voiced from time to time. It can even manifest itself in investigations against 
the Stiftungen and their staff members or the disposed closing of offices. 
Recent cases are the questioning of KAS’s and FES’s staff members in 
Moscow by the Russian prosecution and tax investigation in 2013 as part of 
President Putin’s action against NGOs, “Western influence” and “foreign 
agents”.117 Search of premises of the KAS’s office in Egypt were carried out 
in 2011, when the then Egyptian government incriminated the Stiftung and 
several other NGOs to be foreign financed illegally.118 In 2012 the 
government reproached the KAS and other institutions for being involved in 
a conspiracy against Egypt with the result that several KAS’s staff members 
were prohibited to travel and, in 2013, convicted in absentia to several years 
of imprisonment. Also the closure of the office was ordered.119 The 
impediment of the foundations’ activities has also taken place in other places 
like Abu Dhabi.120 Of criminal infiltration and subversive activities the KAS, 
FES, FNS and HBS were accused by the Turkish prosecution in 2002 as they 
had been supported the prevention of gold mining in the region of Bergama. 
The Turkish court finally acquitted them in 2003.121 Difficulties occur no 
matter whether Germany and the respective country are friendly states. For 
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example, Israel discussed a maximum tax rate of 45 percent for political 
NGOs receiving money from foreign governments in 2012 which was traced 
back to a feeling of intrusion into internal affairs by Israel.122  
Conversely, the German foundations rationalise their interference. Chairman 
of the KAS Pöttering deemed necessary the external intervention of the 
Stiftungen in terms of cooperative partnerships with members of civil 
society. The prevention of the foundations’ work by foreign governments 
would therefore direct against the country’s own civil society. With the 
activities of the Stiftungen in the 1970s in Spain, Portugal and Greece as well 
as later in Eastern Europe and with the successful development of these 
countries, Pöttering rationalised the foundations’ course of action.123  
In the academic literature the problem of propaganda is rather discussed 
under the premise of transparency and control. Most of the authors criticize 
the lacking clearness of projects, the partly obscure financing and the 
missing parliamentary control of the foundations’ undertakings.124 Although 
in the last two decades the publication of annual reports with balance sheets, 
articles and background information increased, vagueness still exists in terms 
of detailed information on single projects as well as objectives, partners and 
financing. The FES, for instance, publishes some of their project evaluation 
reports, a conclusive list of reports is missing, however.125  
The Stiftungen make no secret of this secrecy. The FNS, for instance, 
published in 2013 on their homepage that the reform process in Burma 
increasingly allowed them to work openly in the country, which implies that 
undercover activities had been taken place before.126 The foundations 
rationalise the imprecision regarding project details and information on 
partners with the sensitivity of their work as increased transparency could 
lead to loss of trust and governmental implications for partners. Furthermore, 
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the maintained contacts generally established over several years or even 
decades could suffer from the publicity.127 In some regions the foundations’ 
activity might only be possible because of discretion and nondisclosure. 
Nonetheless, it conflicts with their public financing and control over funds. 
The foundations’ reluctance leads also to the fact that conducting interviews 
is often the only source for research.128 In former times, the AA had pointed 
out to the foundations that they should avoid giving the information to their 
partners that their financial means stem from German public resources.129 
Today, this practice cannot be confirmed anymore. As an interview partner 
assured, project partners generally knew about the sources of funds.130  
According to the AA’s requirements of non-interference, the Stiftungen must 
not get involved into internal political battles abroad which include the 
assistance in electoral campaigns.131 Especially their Latin-American 
activities in the 1970s and 1980s are viewed as examples of this 
requirement’s violation.132 In Chile the first democratically elected president 
after the Pinochet era in 1990, Patricio Aylwin, had close relations to the 
KAS.133 From time to time, the subject is still a matter of discussion.134 In 
some countries the Stiftungen seem to work underground when they do not 
receive the respective permissions, like in Belarus.135 Also the foundations’ 
support of underground organisations fighting against the respective foreign 
government is officially proscribed by the AA.136 However, it cannot be 
ruled out that in autocratic regimes the foundations seek contacts and assist 
groups that are politically outlawed by the respective government. Moreover, 
the foundations’ project secrecy would not make sense if partners must not 
fear reprisals from the government for cooperating with the foundations. 
Despite the ministry’s binding rule of non-interference the Stiftungen are 
institutions of a Western democracy. As Pogorelskaja precisely summarised, 
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most of their foreign activities can be ultimately viewed as interference into 
internal affairs.137 It depends on the involved states and their relations to the 
Western World whether they regard the activities as propagandistic. From 
time to time, the foundations were even suspected of being henchmen of the 
Federal Intelligence Service. At the end of the Franco dictatorship in Spain in 
the 1970s the German political foundations financially supported political 
parties. It is assumed that for this purpose the intelligence service had created 
a secret fund, which was allocated by the Federal Chancellery.138 Although 
such practices cannot be confirmed they are difficult to rule out. Still, they 
rationalise suspicion and mistrust. On the contrary, their relative autonomy 
and heterogeneity impede an instrumental use of the foundations for 
propaganda purposes. Moreover, there are generally several foundations 
active in one country, each promoting different objectives, partners and 
groups in society. This pluralistic approach and the fact that the foundations 
mainly support dialogue instruments speak against the assumption of 
propaganda.  
4.3.2. Networks 
The literature on German public diplomacy, so far, has not considered the 
network building of the Stiftungen. The foundations, on the contrary, are 
aware of their network operations. However, they mainly focus on their 
international contacts only.139 Also the Foreign Office considered from the 
very beginning of the foundations international activities the foundations’ 
capabilities to establish contacts in a German and foreign networking 
environment.140 The foundations’ networking has also been increasingly 
acknowledged by researchers studying the Stiftungen, but in most works it 
usually remained a side-effect. The findings either focused on the 
international relationships141 or referred to cooperation with link-minded 
civil society organisations.142 Others found networking among political, 
economic and cultural elites only relevant for the foundations’ transnational 
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and European activities.143 Very rarely, the foundations’ networking was 
mentioned in the context of democracy assistance, like in case of the 
foundations’ activities in Middle, East and Southeast Europe.144 In a 
diplomactic context Renvert mentions public diplomacy and transnational 
networking of the foundations in the USA.145 Also Schneider-Deters 
concedes to the German foundations an important role in “civil diplomacy” 
when establishing networks in the framework of the political dialogue 
instrument.146  
4.3.2.1. Relationships 
The German political foundations have strong foreign interlinks as they 
address various levels of society and politics ranging from foreign 
governments and administrations, political parties, civil society 
organisations, researchers, students and executives. Each foundation is part 
of an international party organisation or a similar umbrella organisation 
connecting members with a common political background.147 Furthermore, 
the Stiftungen liaise constantly with the German embassies and the other 
foundations’ representatives in order to coordinate their activities.148 At 
times, the foundations cooperate with other German organisations abroad, 
such as the Goethe Institute or the GIZ.149 Further relationships, for example 
with EU or UN bodies, are established on supra-national level. In Germany, 
the German political foundations are first of all linked with their affiliated 
party on organisational and personnel level.150 If the political party is in 
power the foundation also maintains contacts to the highest political level 
ranging from the ministries to the chancellery. Similar contacts exist on the 
Land level. Interaction also occurs with the German Bundestag and the 
responsible departments in the funding ministries. The German universities 
and external researchers are interlinked with the foundations: Several 
foundations’ researchers teach at universities. Research is also contractually 
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outsourced by the foundations to other researchers. Relationships between 
the foundations and German students are, similar to those with international 
students, established through the provision of scholarships. Also mentoring 
programs between former and current fellows are organised and contacts 
exist to the advising professors of the supported students.151 Public events in 
Germany organised by the foundations also help to link the German general 
public and interested civilians to the network of relationships.152 Due to 
different thematic work focus and affiliation to partners who are poles apart, 
each foundation establishes dissimilar relationships.  
The stability of the relationships in Germany stems from the fact that the 
foundations are an integral part of the German political landscape resulting 
mainly from the time factor. The Stiftungen were mostly (re)created in the 
early years of the Federal Republic and could develop and adapted 
simultaneously to Germany’s political conditions. Also their abroad activities 
are almost as old as the foundations themselves. With their world-wide 
offices at least one foundation can always be found in a region.153 Continuity 
of projects and long-term partnerships are regarded as very important by all 
political foundations and estimated as the key to trusting and firm 
relationships.154 Stability and personal contacts are further enhanced by the 
foundations’ overseas representatives. They generally stay several years in 
one place, which allows coordinating projects intensively. It is also a main 
task of the offices establishing contacts with future partners and keeping 
follow up contacts with former partners.155 The international offices usually 
employ local staff members, who further provide valuable entry points into 
the foreign societies contributing to stability.156  
Despite their public funding, the Stiftungen enjoy a great amount of 
independence from the public bodies and political parties in Germany as we 
have seen above. Partner organisations abroad may be financially dependent 
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on the foundations although financial dependence has decreased in the last 
decades.157 Also scholarship holders are financially dependent on the 
foundations. The dependency is yet relativised as there are generally several 
different foundations offering scholarships. The influence of the foundations 
also ends with the selection procedure. In the party internationals or similar 
organisations the German foundations hold a strong position due to their 
financial basis which is more solid than that of other members.158   
While the majority of relationships between the foundations and others is 
characterised by cooperation, competition has been especially relevant in 
former times. In 1982 Werner stated that the foundations often competed 
with the official German diplomats abroad which then caused irritations in 
the partner country. Moreover, the reputation as well as the influence of the 
foundations was sometimes assumed to be higher than that of the official 
diplomats.159 The archival material of the 1960s shows a great scepticism of 
the embassies in Latin America towards the activities of the political 
foundations. They overly indicated possible conflicts of interferences since 
the foundations worked with high-level politics and the opposition.160 Also 
later material shows that embassies were concerned about the activities of the 
foundations from time to time. In 1980, for example, the German embassy 
criticised a conference with leftwing and revolutionary organisations which 
was organised by the FES in El Salvador.161 Furthermore, critiques outlined 
that the foundations competed abroad.162 Their support of different political 
groupings would lead to political confusion and pointless development 
actions neutralising each other.163 The foundations are supposed to 
coordinate their activities on site.164 Today, it seems that both relationships 
embody fewer contests. The foundations and the embassies seem to depend 
on each other. Both have access to different resources of which the other is in 
need. Projects are sometimes even implemented as joint-projects. 
Information on the foundations can also be found on the German embassies’ 
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websites.165 Conflicts between the foundations and the funding ministries are 
rarely known. The actors seem to share a common sense about political 
usefulness and allowance of projects.166 The foundations’ different partner 
focuses and the distinct party-affiliation generally leads to separate spheres 
of activities and little relations among the foundations. At times, the 
foundations even collaborate.167 Also funding competition does not take 
place due to the fixed allocation formula.168 The relations to the German GIZ 
are ambivalent. 169 They are marked by cooperation as well as competition. 
Conflicts resulted recently from the extension of the GIZ’s activities.170 
Despite some common declaration intending a clear dividing line between 
the activities of both, the foundations’ mistrust did not fully dispel.171  
In sum, the German political foundations maintain a large number of 
relationships to public and private actors, abroad as well as in Germany. The 
relationships are generally stable and primarily independent characterised by 
competition and cooperation.  
4.3.2.2. Resources, values and interests 
In the context of the established relationships we can identify various 
resources which the foundations’ provide to other network members and 
from which they profit in turn. This includes financial resources, knowledge, 
information, moral authority and networking capabilities.  
Financial resources are assigned to the German political foundations from 
the German Bundestag and allocated through the funding German ministries. 
Further capital is given to them by supranational organisations.172 The 
Stiftungen make these financial resources available for their activities. 
Limited direct financial support is given to some partners.  
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From partners abroad as well as their observations and experiences the 
foundations access information on the country and its political, social and 
economic situation. The foundations’ international offices all over the world 
provide the necessary infrastructure for this task. In this gathering of 
information the foundations are similar to embassies. The foundations’ 
representatives prepare regular country reports which do not only concern 
the project but also information on the country’s political, economic and 
social development which is also sent to the BMZ.173 Research and country 
information provided by the foundations are also sources of information 
when official travelling and foreign visits to the German Bundestag are 
prepared.174 Furthermore, the foundations’ abroad offices produce material 
concerning current political topics published on the foundations’ websites. 
Information is processed and knowledge is used for the foundations’ think 
tank and consulting activities. Research is also provided by the foundations’ 
scholarship holders and often publicised on the foundations’ websites.175 
Through their coordination abroad all foundations exchange experiences and 
information informally.176 As outlined above, the German embassy and the 
foundations’ country offices are in close contact on the projects. The 
foundations are able to offer information on aspects that are generally not 
available to the German embassies due to the partners they cooperate with. 
The foundations can maintain contacts with various actors of civil society 
and to even doubtful opposition groups without being bound to official 
diplomatic guidelines. For other activities, the foundations buy expertise 
from others, who are not foundations employees but indentured for the 
specific task.177 Expertise that the foundations need sometimes comes from 
other German organisations, such as the GIZ.178 
The regular meetings of the foundations with the German ministries do not 
only concern the foundations’ international projects but also conceptual 
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questions of development policy.179 While foundations staff members 
participate at conferences and departmental meetings of the ministries, 
ministerial staff members are also regular participants in working groups 
initiated by the foundations.180 Moreover, foundations’ staff members often 
are invited to committee meetings of the German Bundestag when their 
practical experience or special knowledge as expert on a country’s or 
region’s matter is necessary.181 Finally, the political party profits from the 
affiliated foundation’s expertise, research and collected information 
presented in elaborated form. This becomes particularly valuable for political 
parties in opposition since their access is closed to such information 
resources the ministries provide to governing parties.182 This processing of 
information and knowledge from abroad to actors in Germany has been 
described as “feedback effect” and international knowledge transfer. 183  
The Stiftungen possess furthermore significant networking resources, which 
include not only being nationally and internationally well connected but also 
the capability to establish and moderate such networks.184 For the partners 
abroad not only funding and expertise of the foundations are important, but 
also the contact network that the foundations created.185 Official travels of 
German parliamentarians, parliamentarian groups as well as of committees 
and of the presidium of the German Bundestag often include visits with the 
foundations’ representatives abroad. Regularly the foundations’ 
representatives are referred to regarding information on suitable interlocutors 
abroad.186 Also the members of the affiliated political parties are interested in 
the networks established by the foundations. They are guests and speakers at 
conferences and seminars organised by the foundations abroad.187 Still, the 
foundations do not only focus on networks among politicians or on 
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connecting politicians with other actors. They are able to multidirectionally 
interlink various levels of politics and society formally or informally: 
Foreign elites, think tanks and civil society groups are brought together with 
German experts, members of civil society and politicians in visit or 
educational programs.188 At the same time, the foundations also try to 
connect similar partners from different countries.189 Partners from 
developing and transformation countries are also brought together with 
actors from the industrialised countries.190 The instrument of political 
dialogue is the epitome for this networking. But also the other instruments 
implemented by the foundations, not necessarily abroad, contribute explicitly 
or implicitly to the establishment of these networks. Also the think tank 
activity “adds up to a widely diversified network.”191 Similar to the 
information and knowledge resources, the affiliated party profits from these 
contact possibility and channels of communication especially when being in 
opposition.192 Moreover, the foundations seek to constantly extend their 
network of contacts but also to involve contact persons more closely in the 
network even when their actual interaction is terminated. The FES, for 
example, tries to establish researchers and young professionals who received 
a scholarship as experts in their home countries or region afterwards.193 
Foreign scholarship holders are also relevant as they often become future 
decision makers. The then Nepali prime minister Sher Bahadur Deuba was, 
for instance, a former FES’s scholarship holder.194 The disseminator 
approach as practiced by the foundations helps to broaden the network and 
integrate new participants and scholarship holders can function as “door-
openers”. The establishment and expansion of the network adds furthermore 
to the knowledge and information resources, as described above. Finally, the 
foundations seemed to be aware of their networking competence when they 
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changed their educational provisions to political dialogue measures.195 Their 
potential of being well connected has also been realised by other 
international actors. Its access to foreign partners and political actors was, 
according to the FNS, its comparative advantage when recently carrying out 
projects in cooperation with the EU, the UN and the GIZ.196 
Another important resource that the foundations provide is their moral 
authority. From the very beginning of the foundations’ establishment, they 
used the term “foundation” despite its legal incorrectness. This affix creates a 
false appearance about the financial situation but it is also beneficial for the 
foundations image.197 It is likely, that the philanthropic representation is 
helpful when working with groups which are rather critical of states’ 
structures. As the fact of state funded foundations is not even much known to 
the German public, it can be expected that the origins of funds are not always 
a matter of discussion when establishing contacts abroad. We can assume 
that the foundations profit from the perceived governmental independence 
which contributes to a larger network and increasing information as civil 
society actors can be involved.198 
The exchange of resources among the foundations and the different actors is 
not necessarily caused by a common interest. It can match but it can also be 
diverse. The Stiftungens’ activities broadly aim at fostering social stability 
and the improvement of political circumstances in the developing and 
transition countries.199 With most of their partners abroad as well as with the 
affiliated political party in Germany the foundations evidently share a highly 
developed sense of value which roots in a common political attitude. 
Whether these common values and policy interests are shared as well with 
the German government needs to be assessed for the field of activity as well 
as the specific region the foundations are active in. Glagow characterised the 
relation between the ministries and the Stiftungen as led by conformity of 
                                                 
195
 See 4.2. 
196
 FNS (2013a) p. 101. 
197
 See 1.8.2.; Vieregge (1977a) p. 31. 
198
 Similar AAPA Zwischenarchiv 118163 30/11/1973.  
199
 Bartsch (1998) p. 3. 
 122 
interest. The ministry cannot influence these interests as they are 
“domestically opportune”.200 We will come back to this assumption later on. 
In sum, we can see that the foundations largely operate in a cooperative 
networking environment where ideational and material resources are 
exchanged. This is a preliminary inventory. We have not found answers to 
the type of transnational network the foundations’ mainly operate in nor to 
the ideas diffused by them. This will be analysed in the following chapters.  
Conclusion 
The German political foundations are transnational actors. As public 
diplomats they mainly implement dialogue instruments and establish 
relationships with various foreign and domestic actors with which they 
exchange resources. In contrast to propaganda, creative communication 
accepts pluralism.201 It is this overall pluralistic context of various political 
preferences and different ideas in which the political foundations have to be 
seen. We will return to these ideas in the following chapters. 
We also saw that the foundations are relatively independent actors. When the 
foundations started their international activities in the 1960s and public 
funding was granted to them it had happened at the expense of public 
control. Today, even the limited existing abilities to exercise influence on the 
foundations’ work are mostly not performed by the German ministries. In 
particular the evaluations of projects do not serve as instrument of control 
but rather seem to help gathering information on the country. The political 
parties, in contrast, are not allowed to control the foundations’ activities 
officially. Recently, the foundation’s independence was further enhanced 
when starting to acquire additional funds from other supranational donors 
which originally resulted from diminishing national funding. As a 
consequence, the Stiftungen cannot be considered as tools of a “public” 
public diplomacy. Still, the foundations’ organisational autonomy was 
granted intentionally by the public bodies. As we have seen above, German 
public diplomacy is characterised by many different semi-public and private 
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actors. Although they are involved in German public diplomacy, they do not 
have to implement the AA’s public diplomacy strategy.202 
We can assume that the outsourcing of certain undertakings to the Stiftungen 
had happened since only the foundations were able to fulfil certain tasks or at 
least to fulfil them more easily. The proposed network image where 
resources are exchanged and which is characterised by labour division offer 
an explanation on the advantages which result from it, especially for the 
German government. The establishment of contacts and the dissemination of 
information between civil society actors abroad and actors in Germany 
would rarely be possible if the foundations were not a node in the network 
structure. Since a wide variety of actors could not be reached and this could 
not be compensated by other actors, the German political foundations have a 
gate keeper function. In this context, each foundation establishes its own 
network. International partners of other foundations are generally respected 
and not headhunted.203 Moreover, in cases of a power shift in a certain 
country already established contacts between former opposition groups and 
the German foundations can be helpful for the official German diplomacy.204 
An interview partner gave a concrete example: After the political change in 
Indonesia in 1998/9 when President Suharto was ousted from power the 
Federal Foreign Office did not have sufficient contacts to the following 
Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie. Regular meetings with the Stiftungen and the 
German embassy took place to fill the gap.205 Certainly, the foundations 
depend on the fact that partners abroad can be found. However, they are 
flexible enough to find them other partners and work fields when originally 
desired connections cannot be established in the first place. Recently this 
problem has been experienced by the German political foundations in some 
countries participating in the Arab Spring from 2011 onwards. Here, the 
greater transformation processes led to gaps in the desired partner 
landscape.206 While the foundations network connections and resource 
exchange is visible, the actual use of information and communication 
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channels resulting from the network can hardly be verified. There are cases 
in which such pathways can be confirmed. Pinto-Duschinsky is giving the 
drastic example where Chancellor Kohl (CDU) circumvented the Foreign 
Minister Genscher (FDP) in the months before the German reunifications by 
using KAS’s representatives in some foreign capitals as “alternative channels 
of high-level politics” due to tensions between the foreign ministry and the 
chancellery.207 
In the literature on the practical aspects of public diplomacy, it is suggested 
that the promotion of civil society as well as the struggle against terrorism 
and the prevention of conflict present apt examples of how public diplomacy 
can be undertaken.208 They are collaborative forms of dialogue public 
diplomacy. In the following chapters we will analyse the activities of the 
Stiftungen in the context of both concepts. 
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Chapter 5 - The German political foundations: 
Democracy assistants? 
Public diplomacy has several practical aspects. As already outlined, 
development assistance in transition and developing countries can be 
regarded as one such initiative aiming at the building of social 
relationships.1 Also institution-building has been mentioned.2 Moreover, a 
“soft” nation-building approach can be among such activities described as a 
long-term process where the creation of civil society and a strong middle 
class is enhanced.3 In such practical forms of public diplomacy transnational 
actors are central as they either perform a supporting role or are part of 
state-non-state joint initiatives leading to a catalytic diplomatic activity.4 
Sometimes the involvement of official diplomats is even considered 
inappropriate and the participating of transnational actors as simply more 
effective especially when civil society is promoted.5 Also the literature on 
non-state actors has highlighted these comparative advantages.6 Both, the 
public diplomatic and the non-state perspective consider the establishment 
of networks in the development political context.7  
The German political foundations have been identified as being involved in 
democratisation processes. The literature on public diplomacy mentions 
briefly their networking activities in this context.8 However, the diplomatic 
literature does not systematically introduce the development political 
concepts. Thus, the following chapter starts from the concept of democracy 
promotion in the form of democracy assistance as this comes closest to the 
activities of the Stiftungen. It also takes up the connected concepts 
mentioned by the diplomatic literature. In order to understand the overall 
position of the Stiftungen in the framework of these activities, German 
development policy and its democracy promotion component is briefly 
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introduced. Afterwards, the undertakings of the Stiftungen are analysed as 
regards the preceding considerations. We conclude with the actor 
advantages and benefits for the German government that stem from the 
construct of the foundations’ international activities.  
5.1. Democracy promotion and assistance  
Defining democracy directly is almost impossible. It refers broadly to the 
form of government in which all eligible citizens participate equally. It has 
various forms.9 The promotion of democracy in many countries has been 
policy rhetoric for the last 100 years.10 According to the modernisation 
theory dominating the development policy debate in the 1950s and 1960s 
democracy was, in short, an automatic result of economic growth. 
Development policy therefore concentrated on the latter. In the 1990s it 
was discussed that democracy was reversely a condition for development 
although this was not entirely supported by scientific evidence. 
Nonetheless, the support of democracy and human rights in the following 
time became a central goal of the development and foreign policy of the 
OECD and of most democratic states, including Germany. It based on an 
ethical and normative understanding of development policy and the 
peaceableness of democratic states among each other.11 Since then, aiding 
countries mainly use three instruments for the promotion of democracy 
abroad:12 The first mechanism is political conditionality which either 
sanctions the violation of human rights or democratic principles by refusing 
the award of payments (negative approach) and rewards positive 
developments by dept reliefs and favourable loans (positive approach). The 
second instrument is the use of positive measures, namely democracy 
assistance. It encompasses methods by transnational actors to help the 
electoral process, to assist democratic state institutions and to support civil 
society. The latter focuses on free and fair election (campaigns), the ability 
for citizens to vote, a party system where few major parties are bound to 
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democratic values and moderate ideological affiliation, a written 
constitution, the separation of powers and the rule of law, an active and 
diverse civil society articulating interests as well as independent media and 
trade unions (see table 5.1).13 Examples for this instrument are the 
sensitizing of public employees, such as policemen, military, security 
forces and judges for human rights, the support of NGOs being active in the 
fields of democracy or human rights, the assistance of journalists and 
vulnerable groups.14 It also includes the support of democratic parliaments, 
the building up of political parties and the monitoring of elections.15 Often 
these political activities are viewed as intrusion into the sovereignty of the 
state.16 The third instrument of promoting democracy is the imposition of 
democracy by force. It is not very popular due to few successful examples, 
such as post-war Germany and Japan.  
Sector Sector Goal Type of Aid 
Electoral process • Free and fair elections • Electoral aid 
 • Strong national political 
parties 
• Political party building 
State institutions  • Democratic constitution • Constitutional assistance 
 • Independent, effective 
judiciary and other law-
oriented institutions 
• Rule-of-law aid 
 • Competent, 
representative legislature 
• Legislative strengthening 
 • Responsive local 
government 
• Local government 
development 
 • Pro-democratic military • Civil-military relations 
Civil society • Active advocacy bodies 
and NGOs 
• Building civil-society 
organisations and NGOs 
 • Politically educated 
citizenry 
• Civic education 
 • Strong independent 
media 
• Media strengthening 
 • Strong independent 
unions 
• Union building 
 
Table 5.1: Democracy assistance objectives and modalities17  
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In democracy assistance a distinction is made between the developmental 
and the political approach. The first conception understands democracy 
broadly which is achieved through incremental and long-term change 
processes on various political and socioeconomic levels. The political 
approach, in contrast, mainly looks at elections and political liberties. It 
hopes to gain dominance over nondemocratic trends and to become a 
catalyst in focusing on central political processes and institutions.18 
Democracy promotion has points of contact with good governance, a 
contested reference concept in development policy first coined by the 
World Bank in the 1990s. It defines governance “as the manner in which 
power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social 
resources of development. Good governance, (…) is synonymous with 
sound development management”.19 After 1990, different international 
organisations refined the concept. Until today the term is used non-
uniformly. It centres on the characteristics of the rule of law, the 
accountability of governments, the effectiveness and efficiency of 
governance, transparency and participation.20 Good governance is, on the 
one hand, a condition for development cooperation but also its aim.21 In 
fact, it tries to establish universally structural characteristics historically 
developed in the West. As this can collide with the developed structural 
traits in the recipient countries, it is often pleaded for a “bottom-up”-
understanding centering on civil society which presents the root for the 
democratic “super-structure”.22 This requirement is also reflected in the 
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democracy assistance model as presented above (see table 5.1). Capacity 
development as a flexible process to build and enhance organisational and 
professional competencies in third countries23 is closely connected to 
democracy assistance when it comes to the furthering of political 
institutions and civil society organisations. 
The definitional separation of democracy assistance from state-building is 
difficult.24 Although democracy assistance has a stronger focus on the 
support of civil societies whereas state-building is more directed to reforms 
and the establishment of non-existing but essential state functions, both 
modalities mostly overlap. State-building is more holistic in contrast to 
democracy aid for the state sector. It does not concentrate on “democratic” 
state structures only but also on welfare state and security components.25 It 
can involve the construction institutions from scratch, while democracy 
assistance tries to reshape existing institutions. Democracy assistance does 
not particularly aid the executive state power. Authoritarian or totalitarian 
countries often have an overly powerful executive which is suppose to be 
counterbalanced.26 The modernization of the executive, in contrast, is a 
state-building component.27 The main difference is that state-building 
focuses on failed and fragile states only.28 It aims towards the following 
targets: the stabilising of existing structures and institutions, their reform if 
not transformation or their (re)construction.29 This is why it is often 
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discussed in the context of peace-building and viewed as being at the 
interface between security policy and development policy.30 In contrast to a 
state formation happening directly or indirectly on the impulses of the 
respective population, state-building involves external actors which 
implement measures straightly.31 The range of measures and the influence 
of external actors on the process vary from mere consulting activities to a 
complete state function’s substitution.32 For the aim achievement state-
building concentrates on short periods of time.33 This is different from a 
political approach of democracy assistance focusing on longer periods and 
from democracy assistance as “whatever helps democratisation directly or 
indirectly, sooner or later”.34     
Although democracy is until today on the development political agenda of 
most countries, the subject was not treated with priority by the main 
international forums from 2000 onwards.35 The “war on terror” in the 
aftermath of 9/11 also relativised U.S. ambitions in democracy promotion 
and led to a primacy of military and security policy including friendly 
relationships with non-democratic states.36 Although it is assumed that 
democracy can help combating terrorism in the long run, its promotion may 
cause conflicts due to changes unintended by the established elite.37 
Another challenge to the promotion of democracy is that some donor 
countries often do not intent political reforms and therefore diminish the 
efforts of the democracy focused donors.38  
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5.2. Promoting democracy in the context of German development policy  
The promotion of democracy is a component of German development 
policy which is influenced by various different actors and in the 
responsibility of a range of ministerial departments. As a cross-border 
policy, development policy is an integral part of foreign policy and therefore 
undoubtedly associated with its diplomatic, strategic and normative goals 
and instruments. Through the involvement of non-state actors in the policy 
implementation, it also takes place on the transnational level.39  
5.2.1. Germany’s development policy  
German development policy in terms of an overall conception did not start 
before 1956, while development aid to third countries was already given 
right after the establishment of the Federal Republic in 1949. In contrast to 
other countries, such as the USA, Great Britain and France, Germany was 
rather late coming. Colonial policy could not result in development policy.40 
In 1952 Germany for the first time contributed to the UN’s “Extended 
support program”. In 1956 the German Bundestag established a fund of 50 
million Deutsche Mark at the Foreign Office (AA) for the assistance of the 
developing countries. The federal ministry for economic cooperation and 
development (BMZ) was established in 1961.41 Over time German 
development policy followed the international trends.42 In the beginning 
development policy was understood as a diplomatic instrument only and 
used for the containment of communism. It aimed at hindering the 
recognition of the GDR in the developing world.43 As the treaties with the 
countries of Eastern Europe (Ostverträge) and the termination of the 
Hallstein Doctrine diminished the need for this kind of policy, trade became 
a new focal point in times of the German “economic miracle”. From 1969 
onwards, development policy showed some innovations and gained some 
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independence from the foreign political agenda. In times of the first oil 
crisis, development policy stagnated first and finally focused increasingly 
on conflict management. With the end of the Cold War, security political 
interests and geo-strategy became temporarily less important.44 The changed 
political situation in the 1990s triggered several international conferences 
and allowed to concentrate further on the conditions in the developing 
countries. Especially the requirement of good governance came to the centre 
of attention.45 At the same time, the budget made available to the BMZ 
shrank while private direct investments increased.46 In 2000 the UN 
members ratified the Millennium Declaration including development 
political core objectives (MDG) defined by the OECD, the World Bank, the 
IWF and the UN. It focused on the fight against poverty, peacekeeping and 
environmental protection.47 As a national support program the German 
government adopted the Aktionsprogramm 2015 in 2001 aiming among 
others at more coherence between the different policy areas.48 Finally, 
globalisation and the events of 9/11 led Germany to concentrate recently on 
global structural policy.49 Development policy is understood in such way 
that it is incorporated in global processes and has increasing responsibility.50 
Subjects like capacity and institution building in order to strengthen the 
developing countries’ ability to act have been put in the centre. Also 
cooperative solutions with the help of non-state actors and global policy 
networks are preferred.51 A recent focal point has also become the dealing 
with fragile states.52  
German development policy is a cross-cutting subject with many different 
actors involved. The ministry of finance (BMF) is responsible for the 
developing countries’ dept relief and partly for the multilateral development 
cooperation funds. The ministry of economy (BMWi) administers the 
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policies of trade and raw material. The AA is mainly in charge for 
representing German development policy abroad and emergency assistance, 
while the competence for global environmental policy lies at the federal 
ministry for the environment, nature conservation, building and nuclear 
safety (BMU). The main actor is the BMZ. It administers around half of the 
public development cooperation funds.53 Its core tasks concern program 
work, international consultations and negotiations with the developing 
countries about projects carried out by implementation organisations.54 The 
work of the BMZ is controlled by the German Bundestag where the 
technical competence lies at the Committee for economic cooperation and 
development (AwZ).55 For 2014 the BMZ had 6,44 Billion Euro available.56 
In 2013 it received 6,29 Billion Euro which equaled 2,03 percent of the 
federal budget.57  
German development policy is roughly divided into financial (FZ) and 
technical cooperation (TZ).58 FZ is capital assistance and comprises 
financial resources given to the developing countries for their economic and 
social development. It is the most important development political tool in 
terms of volume and is mainly in the responsibility of the KfW 
Entwicklungsbank (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau).59 TZ aims at capacity 
development and the transfer of technical, economic and organizational 
knowledge to a large part implemented by the GIZ (Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit) which involves the preparation, further 
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Entwicklungsgesellschaft) a subsidiary of KfW assists the private sector in developing and 
transition countries. 
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training and posting of development aid workers.60 The other actors in this 
field are the Stiftungen, the church organizations, many NGOs as well as 
certain ministries on the Land-level.61 The following figure shows the 
payments in thousand Euros and the distribution in percent of BMZ’s 
official development assistance (ODA) funds among actors of TZ of 2010:  
BMZ
23.775 T€
2%
NGOs
77.265 T€
5%
Stiftungen
154.478 T€
11%
Church organisations
184.963 T€
13%
InWEnt, DED and 
others 
222.992 T€
16%
GTZ and others 
771.901 T€
53%
 
 
Figure 5.1: Bilateral BMZ’s ODA-funds to actors of German TZ in 2010 62 
 
Germany has a prominent donor position. Internationally it ranks among 
the top three donors of development assistance. However, it continuously 
spends only a small part its national income on ODA.63 Moreover, the 
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amount of actors leads to an exceeding fragmentation of development 
cooperation.64 Others understand, in contrast, the number of actors as a 
German particularity giving a lot of flexibility and enabling a differentiated 
approach of development work.65 In the aftermath of the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 determining the main conditions for effective 
development cooperation,66 Germany merged several implementation 
organisations.67 However, problems of coherence still exist.68 Moreover, a 
lack of strategy and an over-reliance on the implementation organisations 
has been attested to the BMZ.69 Furthermore, the term “projectits” was 
coined for the lack of geographical foci and too many single projects.70 
Recently, Germany began to concentrate on certain topics and reduced the 
number of cooperating countries.71  
5.2.2. Promoting and assisting democracy in the German context 
Little research on German democracy promotion has been conducted so far 
and the German ambitions have generally not been described as very 
ambitious.72 However, from the 1990s onwards, Germany has developed an 
“increasingly explicit stance” towards democracy promotion.73 In 1991 the 
BMZ determined five indicators political conditionality should be 
orientated towards which were kept up by the following German 
governments (Spranger criterions).74 It included the respect of human 
rights, citizens’ participation in political processes, granting of legal 
security, market-oriented economic order and the orientation of the state 
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towards development. In 1992 the AA created a democracy promotion 
facility focussing on election observer missions.75 In its defence policy 
guidelines of 1992, the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg) considered 
the promotion of democracy in “Europe and world-wide” as one of the 
“vital security interests”.76 From 1992 onwards the BMZ began to prefer 
democracy assistance over imposing sanctions.77 According to the German 
government, democracy assistance became a foreign political focal point in 
1998.78 From 2006 onwards, democracy and the rule of law finally received 
a prominent role in the overall German political agenda.79 Priorities were 
electoral aid, educational work, the promotion of political participation and 
media as well as the support of constitutional bodies.80 In 2008 
“Democracy, civil society and public administration” became one of the 11 
areas for the BMZ’s technical and financial development cooperation.81 As 
of 2014, 33 developing countries have agreed on this field of activity 
focusing on long-term political reform processes.82 The defence policy 
guidelines of 2011 define the fostering of democratic values as a security 
interest.83 This is also in line with Germany’s “value-oriented” foreign 
policy referring to the values and norms of international law and human 
rights law.84 Also the German government’s coalition treaty of 2013 
stresses the strengthening of democracy.85  
The multitude of actors, typical for German development policy in general, 
can also be found as regards to the promotion of democracy: for the support 
of elections and parliaments, international democracy conferences, human 
                                                 
75
 Rüland/Werz (2002) p. 81. 
76
 BMVg (1992) II. 8 (7). 
77
 Betz (1996) p. 208. 
78
 Bundesregierung (2004) p. 37. 
79
 Lerch (2007) pp. 9f. with details; in the security political context see BMVg (2006) p. 16. 
80
 Bundesregierung (2006) p. 38; Bundesregierung (2010) p. 14; electoral observer missions 
are practiced multilaterally by the AA (http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Friedenspolitik/Krisenpraevention/2_Demokratisierungshilfe/De
mokratisierungshilfe_node.html). 
81
 For the other focal points see BMZ (2008) p. 9; OECD (2010) p. 36. In 2009 Germany 
spent EUR 388 Mio. on the specific focal point (Bundesregierung [2010] p. 14).  
82
 BMZ at: 
http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/themen/goodgovernance/demokratie/arbeitsfelder/
index.html.  
83
 BMVg (2011) p. 5. 
84
 AA at: http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Schwerpunkte/Schwerpunkte_Aussenpolitik_node.html.  
85
 BMZ (2012) p. 4; CDU/CSU/SPD (2013) p. 180. 
 137 
rights diplomacy, political dialogue, sanctions and coordination in the 
European CSFP (common foreign and security policy) the AA is 
responsible. The BMZ is in charge of the long-term democracy assistance 
measures.86 
Since the 1990s also good governance plays a major role in the German 
promotion of democracy.87 As regards to democracy, the BMZ promotes 
the following approaches: (1) the enforcement of the political systems’ 
capacity such as the (regional) parliaments in their legislative; (2) control 
and representative functions; (3) the support of the preparation and 
conduction of elections; (4) the strengthening of democratically legitimised 
institutions on all levels; and (5) the promotion of the institutionalised 
participation of civil society in political processes.88  
The German democracy assistance is characterised as retentive as towards a 
political approach. As regards political conditionality Germany prefers a 
“soft” course of action focusing on consultations, dialogue and long-term 
approaches for the exertion of influence. In the past, only few sanctions 
have been practiced.89 This course of action is very much in line with 
Germany’s role as a “civilian power” and the normative guidelines 
stemming from it. Democracy promotion by an ideal-type civilian power 
has four features: (1) it follows an “abstract and broad notion of universal 
values and rights”; (2) it views democratization as a long-term and complex 
process; (3) it prefers “pragmatic strategies of (institutional) cooperation 
and inclusion”; and (4) it is restrained in interfering in other countries 
affairs. At the same time, democracy assistance complies with what is 
                                                 
86
 Bundesregierung (2010) p. 14. In terms of democracy assistance measures the AA mainly 
supports constitutional organs, election aid including education for voters and election 
workers and local election observers as well as independent media (AA at: 
http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Friedenspolitik/Krisenpraevention/2_Demokratisierungshilfe/De
mokratisierungshilfe_node.html); Schmidt (2013a) p. 281. 
87
 BMZ (2009) pp. 11ff: These areas are: the protection, respect and guaranty of human 
rights, democracy, rule of law and media support, gender equality, administrative reforms 
and decentralisation, good financial governance, transparency in the raw materials area, and 
the fight against corruption; BMZ at: 
http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/themen/goodgovernance/index.html.  
88
 BMZ (2009) p. 13; BMZ (2010); BMZ at: 
http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/themen/goodgovernance/index.html. 
89
 Lerch (2007) p. 9; Betz (1996) p. 208. 
 138 
perceived to be Germany’s material interest as regards an export-oriented 
economy.90  
5.3. Democracy assistance of the German political foundations 
The German political foundations play a key role in democracy assistance. 
Authors have highlighted that even European democracy assistance was 
driven by the activities of the German Stiftungen.91 Others outlined that the 
overall origins of democracy assistance lay with the German foundations 
which were equipped with many offices all over the world already in the 
1990s.92 Often the German Stiftungen are termed as institutions of 
democracy assistance par excellence,93 as they are “the oldest, most 
experienced and biggest actors in international democracy assistance”.94 
Their activities differ principally from that of other German developmental 
actors in TZ, whose activities are mainly socially oriented, impartially and 
driven by altruistic motives. In their joint declaration of 1998 the Stiftungen 
determined to give developmental aid with their projects and programs and 
to contribute to development of democratic, liberal and constitutional 
structures committed to human and civil rights.95  
5.3.1. Historical overview 
The history of the German political foundations’ international activities 
went through the same phases as German development policy in general. 
Their international activity started properly with the establishment of the 
BMZ in 1961.96 In 1957 the FES had already cooperated with the 
organisation of anti-communist trade unions (ORIT) in Latin America. The 
impulse for these activities came from SPD party members and the trade 
unions.97 From 1962 the BMZ granted public funds to the FES, the KAS 
and the FNS on a regular basis for projects in the developing countries 
concerning civic education (gesellschaftspolitische Bildung) and the 
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promotion of social structures (Sozialstrukturhilfe). Some grants already 
came from the AA at that time.98 As reasons for the establishment of the 
foundations’ international activity were considered the long-tradition of 
foreign political funding dating back to Bismarck, the German practice to 
outsource governmental tasks to non-public bodies and the approval of the 
U.S. when German foreign political possibilities were still limited.99 In the 
aftermath of the Nazi-dictatorship, it was more innocuous for German 
politics to internationally operate by means of non-governmental 
organisations than on governmental level avoiding the impression of 
imperialistic nostalgia.100 While in the beginning the foundations mainly 
implemented individual projects, the international and developmental 
activities systematically expanded in the following time.101 Due to limited 
resources the foundations’ activities were restricted to the short-term 
sending of German representatives abroad, invitation of representatives 
from the developing countries to Germany and training measures in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America. It was not until 1964 and 1965 that offices abroad 
were established.102 In 1973 the principles between the German government 
and the Stiftungen defined several development political task of the 
Stiftungen. They were supposed to contribute to social equality, political 
participation and the strengthening of economic independence though the 
cooperation with partners in the developing countries.103 Although 
development aid at that time was rather technical, it aimed at gaining the 
upper hand in the Bloc confrontation. In this hustle the foundations were 
useful to the German government.104 They pursued an approach to support 
social justice, national independence and to improve the economic and 
social conditions. Political participation was rather not part of their 
ambitions. At that time already, the political foundations began to move 
outside of the defined limits. In the 1980s several foundations supported 
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different political groups and governments in South Africa during apartheid 
and in the political struggles in Latin American.105 The end of the Cold War 
brought a stronger political focus and more independence since the 
foundations were now “no longer part of the great game”. Similar to 
international development policy focusing on good governance and political 
conditions in the early 1990s, the foundations paid increased attention to the 
promotion of political participation.106 A new regional focal point at that 
time became East Europe. In this context the foundations’ international 
work was extended from the developing and industrialised countries to the 
transition countries.107 Some assumed that the foreign political importance 
of the Stiftungen diminished with the fall of the iron curtain due to the lack 
of instrumental use by German foreign policy.108 Others, on the contrary, 
assumed that the German foundations helped to maintain Germany’s role as 
civilian power.109 We will return to these considerations in the following 
chapters. 
5.3.2. Literature review  
The early literature on the German political foundations did not treat their 
international activities or still less their democratisation activities. An 
exception is Watson’s work of 1976 mentioning that “the new German 
democracy intends to teach democracy to autocratic countries”.110 With the 
increase of studies on the foundations’ international activity from the 1980s 
onwards, development became the focal point. Moreover, the significance 
of the Stiftungen for the German foreign affairs was a matter of discussion. 
The first work focusing exclusively on the Stiftungs’ international activity 
by Werner in 1982, looked at the relevance of the Stiftungens’ international 
activity for both the political parties and German politics.111 In 1985 
Forrester concentrated on the geographical distribution of development 
projects and showed for each foundation some regional preference, target 
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group and fields of activity.112 While the literature written in the 1980s was 
initially more descriptive, detailed case studies on the foundations’ activities 
in the developing countries came up in the following years. Kress’s 
substantial analysis of 1985 looked at the FES’s and KAS’s cooperation 
with political partners abroad and compared their activities in Venezuela. In 
1989 Schürmann analysed the KAS’s activity in India. However, these 
works did not contain cross references between German policies and the 
activities of the German foundations. Wagner, in contrast, investigated the 
German foundations’ foreign and development policy in Latin America in 
1994. He looked at conditions, advantages and disadvantages describing the 
foundations’ autonomous activities as “semi-official” and concluding that 
the Stiftungen were of elementary importance for German Latin-American 
relations.113 He lastly predicted a shift of the foundations activities from 
South America to East Europe in the future,114 which matched with the 
actual development.   
From the 1990s onwards, the literature on the Stiftungens’ international 
undertakings began to focus on the up-coming democracy promotion. In 
1991 Pinto-Duschinsky dealt with U.S. and German foreign political aid.115 
In this context he investigated the German foundations’ activities and some 
US organisations set up in the 1980s on the German model. According to 
Pinto-Duschinsky, political aid was the building of democracy. It forwarded 
donor government’s interests, impacts on the donor country’s political life 
and is highly cost-effective, unlike economic or military assistance.116 In the 
increasing use of non-governmental organisations by development and 
foreign ministries and the up-coming of public diplomacy he saw a reaction 
to the changing forms of international relations. The considerable number of 
independent states and the influence of political parties, unions and pressure 
groups made it essential for governments to enter the political arena in 
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foreign countries.117 He concluded with the prediction that “payments for 
foreign politics will be increasingly significant instruments of modern 
diplomacy and development aid”.118 In 1996 Mehler published a short 
article on chances of support programmes for democratisation in West 
Africa and the Stiftungens’ contribution.119 Erdmann looked at the 
foundations’ democracy assistance activities in South Africa and Chile.120 In 
his work in 2000 Mair, resuming the results of his cross-sectional 
comparison on democracy assistance carried out three years before, took a 
close look at the foundations’ democracy assistance in sub-Saharan 
Africa121 supporting Pinto-Duschinsky’s argument122 that foundations’ 
projects were often more political than they seemed.123 In 2002 Pinto-
Duschinsky mapped foreign sources of political funding in Latin America, 
focusing on the activity of the KAS giving grants to partner organisations.124 
He dealt with the legitimacy of giving money to politicians in foreign 
countries and established the link between democracy promotion and 
interference.125 In the following time, authors happened to be interested also 
in certain aspects of democracy assistance. In 2006 Erdmann published two 
analyses on political party aid. One dealt extensively with the German 
foundations’ party aid in Africa,126 while the other one looked more 
generally at issues in international party promotion.127 Erdmann understood 
party aid as synonym of party assistance which is part of the democracy 
assistance spectrum.128 Burnell’s article forged links between globalisation 
and democratisation through international party aid referring to the 
Stiftungen among others.129 Moreover, Böhler discussed the foundations’ 
political dialogue activities, in his view, virtually a synonym for democracy 
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assistance.130 He outlined especially the networking function of the 
foundations as well as their value orientation when promoting democracy.131 
Several studies took account of the foundations’ turn towards the countries 
in East and Central Europe. At the same time, more researchers happened to 
be interested in how the Stiftungen contributed to German and European 
foreign relations and how they practiced diplomacy in the transition 
countries.132 In 1999 Philipps treated the foundations’ activities of in 
Central-East Europe as “ideal-typical activities” in the field of democracy 
assistance though concluding with mixed results and supporting a rather 
limited ability of the foundations to “export” democracy.133 As already 
mentioned, in 1997 Pogorelskaja investigated the foundations’ activities in 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Baltic States. She 
connected them to aspects of German foreign policy concluding that the 
foundations improved the bilateral relations with these states while party 
interests were rather secondary.134 Also the instrumental and actor 
characteristic of the Stiftungen in German foreign policy Pogorelskaja 
discussed in 2002.135 Due to the current process of denationalisation 
interdependences Pogorelskaja presumed that the role of the German 
Stiftungen in German foreign policy was about to increase.136 In 2006 
Progorelskaja explored the German political foundations’ role in the EU 
policy towards the East European Countries (CEECS) and the CIS 
presenting exemplary the foundations’ activities in Russia.137 Pogoreskaja 
assumed that the German foundations could enrich European foreign and 
security policy, if they got deeper involved into the European 
neighbourhood policy.138 In 2009 she also treated the foundations’ activities 
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in the context of German foreign cultural policy139 and conflict 
prevention140. In 2002 Dakowska studied the impact of the EU enlargement 
process on the identity of Polish political elites providing case studies on the 
activities of the KAS and the FES particularly active in the field of 
transnational communication. Dakowska considered the foundations as 
transmitter of political culture since they enable contacts between the CEEC 
and European parties which played an important role in the pre-accession 
period.141 In 2005 she concentrated on the foundations’ civic education in 
Poland142 and treated the FES’s activity in Poland between 1971 and the 
“peaceful revolution” accompanying the German policy towards East 
Europe.143 In 2007 Egger analysed in detail the activity of the FES in 
Mexico and Poland and their adaption to the transformation in East Europe 
highlighting that the foundation became successfully accustomed to the new 
contexts.144 As already outlined, Schneider-Deters treated the shift of the 
foundations’ activities away from civil education towards political dialog 
and civil diplomacy in East and Central Europe.145 The specific potential of 
the foundations he saw in the promotion of the convergence of Russia and 
the former Soviet republics at the European Union. He compared the 
foundations’ democracy assistance to US NGOs’ activity in this area.146 The 
work of Mohr of 2010 offered several regional case studies of the 
foundations’ democracy assistance addressing extensively the current issues 
around theses activities.147 In 2012 Renvert outlined in a short article the 
difficulties of the foundations’ democracy assistance in the Arab world and 
in the recent transformation processes.148 
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In the last decade there has been an increasing amount of descriptions of 
themselves by the German Stiftungen treating their international activity 
which are more self-reflected than earlier publications. In 2003 Beaugrand 
chronicled the founding of the KAS with the help of contemporary 
witnesses’ reports giving detailed historical insights.149 Von zur Mühlen, a 
historian who had worked for the FES from 1975 onwards dealt with the 
beginnings of the FES’s international activity and treated the period until the 
Cold War. It is a substantive work von zur Mühlen with several years of 
research in the FES’s archive.150 His work is part of a series of books 
published since 2007 on the history of the FES’s international work offering 
numerous country case studies and including internal documentation.151 In 
2005 and 2006 the KAS treated its media encouragement and the rule of law 
support.152 Other publications treated its party cooperation in Middle, East 
and Southeast Europe providing a helpful overview on the party support 
activities in fourteen countries.153 An extensive presentation of the FES’s 
cooperation with political parties and liberation movements in Africa gave 
Vinnai in 2007.154 The foundations’ integration in foreign and development 
policy in the context of globalisation was also recognised by authors of the 
FES.155 
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Until today the literature on the Stiftungen is still sparse and mostly written 
in German. 156 Some authors assume that the foundations prefer to keep a 
low profile as they operate in very sensitive surroundings.157 This is an 
impression which the author can confirm as regards the conducted case 
studies.158  
5.3.3. Geo-political regions  
In former times the Stiftungen seemed to “distribute” countries amongst 
each other.159 The FES in the 1980s had its regional focal point of the 
activity in Southeast Asia (ASEAN-countries) and the Iberian Peninsula. 
The KAS focused on Latin America. The FNS concentrated mainly on 
Africa and Latin America. The HSS, back than new in the international 
field, initially gave attention to Africa and became then active in the Pacific 
and Latin America complementing the work of the KAS.160 Despite these 
key regions the foundations had offices in other countries. In the 1990s the 
FES concentrated mainly on sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and 
Southeast Asia. The KAS named Latin America as regional focal point, 
while the FNS focused on East Europe and Southeast Asia and the HBS on 
East Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. These indications by the foundations 
also corresponded with the regional distribution of the foundations 
international offices.161 In 2013, the regional dissemination was only 
partially consistent with that of the 1990s.162 The FES had most of their 
offices in Europe (29 offices). So did the KAS (22 offices). The focal points 
of the FNS in the 1990s could still be confirmed as regards East Europe (6 
offices) and Asia (9 offices) though the Middle East/North Africa (6 offices) 
                                                 
156
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was also important. The former HBS’s focus on East Europe was still 
obvious in the spread of offices (8 offices) while in sub-Saharan Africa 
there was almost the least number of HBS’s bureaus. The regional 
distribution of the youngest of the foundations, the RLS, was relatively 
balanced. The HSS had a regional focus on Asia regarding the distribution 
of offices (21 offices). The shifted focus towards the countries in East, 
Southeast and Central East Europe, which had already been noted by the 
literature,163 could be thus confirmed. A comparison between the numbers 
of offices in West, Middle and South Europe and those in Southeast, East 
and Central-East Europe showed about twice as many offices in the latter 
region (see figure 5.2). Besides their country offices the foundations often 
had regional offices. This allows especially the smaller foundations to 
ensure project work in countries where they do not have a local office.164 
Several foundations can be generally found in one country. 
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Figure 5.2: Number of foundations’ offices in European countries in 2012/13 165 
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[2013a] p. 9).  
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The overall distribution of all foundations offices is relatively balanced (see 
figure 5.3). Most of the total numbers of foundations’ offices are in Europe 
(26%) followed by Asia (25%). In sub-Saharan Africa the proportion of 
foundations’ offices is at 18%, in Latin-America at 16% and in the region 
North-Africa/Middle East at 12%. The share of offices in North-America is 
at 3%. Also the ODA grant distribution provided to the foundations by the 
BMZ in 2010 per region confirms this finding (see figure 5.4). 
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Figure 5.3: Regional distribution of all German political foundations’ international offices 
in 2012/13 166 
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foundations’ headquarters are not considered.   
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Figure 5.4: Regional distribution of ODA funds provided to the foundations by the BMZ for 
2010 167 
 
5.3.4. The Stiftungens’ democracy assistance objectives 
The Stiftungen assist democracy in the developing, emerging and transition 
countries using, as outlined, consulting and dialogue-oriented 
instruments.168 According to the BMZ, the foundations’ developmental 
tasks are “the sustainable promotion or establishment of democracy and 
civil society. That involves strengthening the key institutions in a 
democratic social order, such as parliaments, political parties and an 
independent judiciary, as well as promoting good governance and 
opportunities for civil society participation”.169 As a consequence, 
foundations’ international activities can be found in every democracy 
assistance sector.170 According to the above definition, the foundations are 
thus “ideal-types” of democracy assistants.171  
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Until the 1990s democracy assistance was not the only developmental 
activity of the Stiftungen. Around one third of funds were dedicated to the 
support of social structures which the BMZ financed from an additional 
budget title.172 The participation of broad levels of society was purposed by 
means of supporting self-help-organisations and cooperatives.173 Especially 
at the outset of activities in a country, it enabled contacts and acquired some 
insights on the country before working with higher political levels.174 It was 
mainly due to the financial cutbacks in the 1990s that the foundations 
refrained from this approach.175 In 1997, the payments for social structural 
projects were ceased. Ongoing and new projects in this field are since then 
funded by the BMZ’s regular budget item available to the Stiftungen. These 
funds allow tackling development political objectives beyond democracy 
assistance, such as the fight against poverty, as long as projects intent to 
change political structures.176 The support of social structures though still 
important for German development policy, is generally assigned to other 
organisations.177    
Since the beginning of the Stiftungens’ international activities, the specific 
focus on democracy assistance sectors has often changed and was 
determined by the geo-political regions.178 Although each foundation’s 
partner focus influences the used measures, there is no clear distribution of 
sectors among the foundations. The improvement of the electoral process 
has always been on the agenda of the German political foundations and is 
mainly evidenced by their party aid. The foundations’ intense cooperation 
with political parties, a unique characteristic in comparison with other 
German actors in this field, was already touched.179 The Stiftungen generally 
practice a “partisan approach” when supporting political parties which 
implies the assistance of ideologically affiliated political parties.180 Since 
the beginning of their international activities, the Stiftungen supported 
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political parties dating back to the late 1950s in Spain. In 1973 the FES was 
even involved in the establishment of the Portuguese socialist party.181 In 
the 1970s party collaboration was at the foundations’ agenda in Africa. In 
the decades that followed, the foundations paid less attention to party aid in 
Africa until it became a primary focus from the mid-1990s onwards.182 In 
the 1980s the foundations supported heavily political parties in Latin 
America. From 1989 onwards then flourishing political parties in Central-
East Europe were assisted.183 Soon afterwards the foundations focused on 
fraction and members of parliament.184 Nowadays, the direct financial 
support of political parties abroad as well as the financing of election 
campaigns is, however, not permitted for the German Stiftungen according 
to the Federal budget law.185 Nonetheless, some authors noted the direct 
funding of political parties’ institutes in order to circumvent this 
regulation.186 Also campaigns were supported indirectly. In Central-East 
Europe, for example, the foundations offered programs to affiliated party 
members in order to learn about successful campaigning as well effective 
media for the respective affiliated partners.187 Moreover, activities of the 
foundations have also been noted as regards electoral aid. During the 1990s 
the AA collaborated with the Stiftungen in Africa which were in charge of 
the technical preparation.188 Today, there are also cases when the 
foundations monitored elections with local partners.189 Moreover, the 
Stiftungen assist state institutions abroad. They help to professionalise key 
democratic institutions and concentrate on constitutional advice, on the 
support of legislators, and the judiciary.190 The foundations also focus on 
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minority rights.191 The promotion of the rule of law is a priority of the KAS. 
In Chapter 7 we will analyse these activities in detail. Also the other 
foundations implement rule of law measures.192 Moreover, the foundations 
improve professionalism in communal politics and public administration.193 
Although civil-military relations are rarely mentioned in the literature and 
the foundations’ publications, the activities of the FES in Thailand as 
presented in Chapter 8 show such aid. Also Mohr noticed an explicit focus 
of the HSS on military issues and their role in democracies.194 Finally, the 
German political foundations are active in the civil society sector. In the 
early 1990s, similar to the international trend in democracy assistance, the 
foundations focused on civic education.195 While some authors observed a 
shift from the promotion of self-help organisations to the enhanced support 
of elites by focusing on managers, decision makers and disseminators from 
the mid-1990s onwards,196 this trend cannot be confirmed.197 As already 
outlined, the support of NGOs and other civil target groups is part of all 
foundations’ partner portfolios. Moreover, they also back young 
professionals, women’s and youth organisations, academics, medium 
companies and economic associations among others.198 Despite the 
tendency to work with governments, the conducted interviews showed a 
substantial flexibility regarding the choice of partners which also depended 
on the available partner structure in the country. As already outlined, the 
support of the free press and media is part of the foundations international 
activity.199 In the beginning the support of trade unions was practiced by 
most foundations. Today, it is a key component in the FES’s democracy 
assistance due to their affiliation with the Federation of German trade 
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unions (DGB).200 However, direct financing of unions as well as of labour 
disputes are prohibited for the foundations.201   
The overall politicisation of foundations’ activities abroad is what 
differentiates the foundations from other actors in this field. While Forrester 
in the 1980s still differentiated between the “foundations’ political activity” 
and their “developmental activities”,202 from the 1990s onwards, most of the 
foundations’ activities were finally considered as political. Even projects 
seemingly or declared non-political often have political intent.203 “Civil 
education” is the label and budget item for all foundations’ activities 
financed by the BMZ, hence, mainly all types of democracy assistance apart 
from electoral aid which is financed by the AA.204 The foundations do not 
strictly separate between the democracy assistance sectors. The KAS rule of 
law support, for instance, also includes the support of NGOs.205 There are 
also meta-aspects which are relevant for all work areas. The FES, for 
instance, focus on the promotion of women and gender equality as a cross-
cutting issue.206 Also the foundations’ IPD-departments in the industrialised 
countries serve indirectly the democracy assistance program, as they include 
stakeholders from the developing countries in dialogue processes.207  
The foundations characteristics in development cooperation are the long-
term presence of the foundations’ field representatives, the long-term 
partnerships and short term initiatives as well as their value orientation.208 
They also undertake activities that go beyond the democracy assistance 
spectrum and are rather part of a state-building approach. It includes, among 
others, approaches for decentralisation and the modernisation of public 
administration,209 security sector reforms,210 economic strengthening,211 and 
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the support of human rights.212 Nonetheless, the foundations’ undertakings 
do not only take place in fragile or post-conflict states and have a strong 
focus on the support of civil societies which speaks against an emphasis on 
state-building. Despite their short-term measures, the foundations expect 
actual changes to happen in a long period of time.213 They thus support, like 
the German government, a developmental approach to democracy assistance 
as they concentrate on long-term processes of political development.  
Conclusion 
Certain actor advantages and benefits for German politics stem from the 
construct of the German political foundations’ democracy assistance.214 
Moreover, the foundations also have comparative advantages over other 
actors in the field of democracy assistance. Already in 1982 Werner judged 
that the foundations’ independence lead to a wider frame of action for the 
foundations. While governments were obliged to work together with other 
governments, the foundations could chose from a wide range of partners to 
cooperate with.215 High versatility and flexibility have been attested to the 
foundations for their developmental activities. They are able to take 
advantage of windows of opportunity and to work in difficult political 
surroundings, like in Sudan or Myanmar.216 They enable the establishment 
and the keeping of contacts with opposition leaders and members of 
liberation movements which might come into power and which cannot be 
achieved by official diplomats which are too sensitive for the formal arms of 
government and which could be undoubtedly viewed as intrusion.217 This 
ability to operate in “a grey zone” as well as to cultivate lasting and close 
partnerships has been stressed as a major advantage.218 Moreover, the ability 
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to choose either political or civil society partners is advantageous for the 
foundations. In case the countries’ political development does not allow the 
cooperation with political actors or is politically difficult, the withdrawal to 
civil society actors helps to keep a “foot in the door”.219 A recent example is 
the democracy assistance activity of the Stiftungen in Tunisia in 2011. 
Despite the foundations long-standing presence in Tunisia before the start of 
the Arab Spring in 2010, the KAS, HSS and FNS had problems to find 
partners as the existing political parties were mainly leftist. In contrast to the 
FES, which collaborated with Mustapha Ben Jafaar, founder and leader of 
the Forum démocratique pour le travail et les libertés (FDTL) and since 
2011 president of the constituent assembly, the other foundations 
concentrated on enterprises and market economic matters, and in case of the 
KAS, additionally on interreligious dialogue. At the same time, the 
foundations’ ability to rapidly react to short-term political changes becomes 
apparent. With little administrative effort and with additional means from a 
German governmental fund ad hoc created for the democracy assistance in 
North Africa, the subject became immediately part of the foundations’ 
international portfolio.220   
Since different foundations’ representatives usually complement each 
other’s activities by focusing on different political parties, Germany 
advantageously “can hope to gain a friend as head of the government no 
matter who wins”.221 At the same time, this construct contributes to a 
pluralistic society enabling the exchange of different views and productive 
political discussions.222 The foundations also focus on different values: The 
FES is dedicated to social democratic values, the FNS to liberal values and 
both, the KAS and the HSS to Christian and federal democratic values. The 
HBS feels bound to ecological and emancipatory values and the RLS on 
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social and participatory values.223 In this respect the legitimate support of 
democratic pluralism is a positive outcome.224 Furthermore, the outsourcing 
of activities which are originally tasks of the ministry to the foundations is 
advantageous as regards efficiency. The costs of government employees are 
generally higher in contrast to staff members of the foundations. Moreover, 
the parliamentary control of the ministry does not apply to the foundations 
undertakings.225 Another benefit deriving from the foundations international 
activities is the protection of international relations on a long-term basis.226 
A change of government in Germany does not lead to the termination of 
successful foundations’ projects abroad.227 This bears comparison with the 
concept of public administrations in relation to the varying governments. In 
contrast to other organisations active in democracy assistance, the 
foundations’ budget is assumed to be the highest.228 While the fact that 
Germany had not been among the colonial powers was at the beginning of 
development policy a disadvantage, for the democracy assistance activities 
it is helpful as activities appear rather “neutral”.229 According to the then 
Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, Dirk Niebel, 
the German political foundations are the important backbone of the German 
development work.230 At the same time, they are considered as “Germany’s 
most powerful diplomatic asset.”231 Development policy is a multi-purpose 
system including various interests.232 It allows that actors take different 
roles. It is highly political233 and can be therefore easily made subject of a 
public diplomacy portfolio. As ideal types of democracy assistants the 
German political foundations simultaneously support a collaborative public 
diplomacy approach which focuses on values and dialogue processes. The 
above consideration on democracy assistance will be connected to public 
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diplomacy in the case study on the KAS’s rule-of-law program in Southeast 
Europe.234 
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Chapter 6 - The German political foundations: 
Conflict managers? 
The literature on the practical aspects of public diplomacy does not only 
highlight democracy assistance as one such form.1 It also looks at 
transnational actors’ supportive role in peace-building and other peace-
maintenance activities in international conflicts as a catalytic diplomatic 
activity.2 Public diplomacy’s mediating role has also been stressed when it 
comes to conflicts among different values such as Western and Islamic 
ideals.3 Moreover, the bridging of social and political divides and the 
transformative strength of dialogue in conflict management processes 
through trust-building collaborative activities has been highlighted.4 In these 
cases, the affinity of public diplomacy and track two diplomacy, in which 
third parties can operate as facilitators or mediators,5 is striking.6 The idea 
that dialogue processes can help to mitigate, prevent and solve conflicts can 
furthermore be found in concepts of foreign cultural policy.7 
While conflicts until the end of the Cold War were mainly such clashes 
between states or alliances, the security situation of the 21st century’s 
multipolar system is much more complex, ranging from transnational and 
regional conflicts to various intra state disputes and classic two-state-
conflicts. The prevailing opinion assumes that these situations require 
comprehensive and networked proceedings which are based on military and 
civil components and the involvement of various state and non-state actors. 
Current conflict management consequently faces a broad range of tasks and 
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covers a long period of time.8 The modern conflict situation and the 
assumed dependence between development, peace and democracy also 
renewed interest in development cooperation9 as democracy assistance can 
help to stabilise a conflict situation.10 Instability, in turn, is often viewed as 
a central reason for missing development successes.11 The international 
community frequently discusses this interdependence in connection to its 
own security.12 High competence and flexibility has been attributed to 
transnational actors when dealing with the recent conflict situations.13 In 
some fields, such as humanitarian aid and early warning, governments and 
IOs almost completely depend on non-state actors.14  
Supportive functions have been increasingly but still rarely attributed to the 
German political foundations. As will be shown, they undertake a wide 
range of conflict management activities. The chapter’s first section offers a 
systematisation of the management of international conflicts shedding light 
on the establishment of complex approaches and defining transnational 
actors’ general activities and concrete measures along the conflict 
management cycle. The following section summarises the official German 
ambitions in this field. Finally, the German political foundations are put in 
these contexts. Their activities are analysed according to the established 
framework and illustrated with several examples.  
6.1. Crisis and conflict management 
Since the end of the Cold War the security field has enlarged revealing 
space for transnational actors to become involved. From their traditional 
humanitarian and developmental role they expanded their position to the 
                                                 
8
 Kloke-Lesch/Poeschke (2013) pp. 306f.; Major/Schöndorf (2011) p. 1. 
9
 C.f. UN Secretary General (2011), see also 5.1. Peace can be defined as the “facilitation of 
non-exploitative, sustainable and inclusive social relationships free from direct and indirect 
violence and the threat of such violence” (Mac Ginty [2008] pp. 15ff., 24). 
10
 See 6.1.2; Burnell (2000a) p. 12. 
11
 Klingebiel (2013) p. 23 quoting World Bank (2011); BMZ at: 
http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/themen/frieden/friedensentwicklung/index.html.  
12
 Kloke-Lesch/Poeschke (2013) p. 292; Beswick (2011) p. 1913; critically Bermeo (2010) 
pp. 83f. Security can be either defined as “absence of danger” or as the “persistence of 
worths over time” (Frei/Gaupp [1978] p. 5). 
13
 Stephenson (2011) p. 403. There is also a dark side of non-state actors’ involvement in 
conflicts. A strand in the literature deals with armed and violent actors (c.f. Schneckener 
[2006]). Others stress the conflict’s intensification by them (Barak/Cohen [2014] p. 10). 
14
 Eberwein (2011) p. 375; Roth/Klein (2007); Bakker (2001). 
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management of conflicts corresponding with the increase of liberal peace 
building, the finding of dependence between development and conflict, a 
greater interest in the affected society and a modified definition of state 
sovereignty.15  
6.1.1. Comprehensive approaches  
Comprehensive approaches emerged in the last decade to successfully 
manage conflicts internationally assuming that civil, political and military 
instruments need to be used together or sequentially.16 They are supposed to 
ensure legitimacy and coherence among the expanded number of actors 
involved. While comprehensive approaches are used on the international 
level, the coordination of different interdepartmental policy areas on the 
national level is termed as whole-of-government approach.17  
The establishment of comprehensive approaches coincided with an 
expanded concept of security: While security during the Cold War mainly 
referred to that of states, individual security has increasingly come to the 
fore becoming particularly apparent in the principle of human security.18 
Moreover, the averting of danger made way for precaution and risk 
management often highlighted in preventative crisis management concepts. 
While before the 1990s security mainly referred to military threats, 
humanitarian aspects became central in the following time relating to human 
rights. Security was furthermore extended from the national territory to the 
international space, often referring to global security as world society’s 
security.19 Moreover, internal and external security became increasingly 
connected.20 Internal security, generally very institutionalised by means of 
cooperation among security services, refers to the political system’s 
                                                 
15
 Goodhand/Walton (2012) pp. 430ff. Due to the non-uniformly application, I use conflict 
and crisis interchangeably. Conflict inherent in every social relationship is a socially 
constructed reality created through interaction inseparable from the cultural frameworks in 
which it has emerged (Lederach [1995] p. 9). In accordance with the peace definition (Ch. 
6 fn. 9) it can be defined as a system or action of exploitation, exclusion, and of limited 
opportunity and direct violence (Mac Ginty [2008] p. 59). 
16
 Exemplary NATO (2006), OECD (2006).  
17
 Major/Pietz/Schöndorf/Hummel (2011) p. 43.   
18
 First mentioned in the Human Development Report of UNDP in 1994, human security 
puts development policy in the centre of security political considerations 
(Major/Pietz/Schöndorf/Hummel [2011] p. 12). 
19
 Daase (2010). 
20
 Endreß/Petersen (2012). 
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protection against internal enemies while external security relates to outside 
threats.21 The multilateral cooperation of states and various other actors in 
order to avert to various threats is termed as “co-operative security”.22 
Comprehensive approaches and the broad notion of security are also 
relevant in the international discussions on the “responsibility to protect” 
(R2P) aiming at protecting human beings from strong violations of human 
rights and humanitarian law.23 In 2001 the International Commission of 
Intervention and State Sovereignty defined R2P as a principle formulating 
three responsibilities: to prevent such a situation, to react to it and to 
reconstruct.24 Subsequently, the UN outlined a list of situations, such as 
genocide, war crimes and ethnic cleansing in which R2P applies.25 UN 
General Secretary Ban Ki Moon added three pillars of R2P in 2009: (1) the 
responsibility of the state to protect its own population, (2) the responsibility 
of the international community to help states meet this requirement through 
international assistance and (3) the timely and decisive response in case of 
the state’s failing including military intervention and, as ultimate rationale, 
the use of force.26 Since then the UN Security Council referenced R2P in 
several cases, such as South-Sudan, Syria and Libya, but only in the context 
of pillar one.  
The application of comprehensive approaches becomes apparent in the 
international dealing with fragile states combining democracy assistance 
and military intervention. Complex approaches can also be found in the 
literature on diplomacy, assuming that state diplomacy alone is not able to 
transform conflicts and stressing the importance of transnational actors. This 
is particularly apparent in Hocking’s catalytic diplomacy model.27 
                                                 
21
 Rausch (2005b) p. 886. 
22
 Von Bredow (2006) pp. 9f. 
23
 R2P is part of the debate on humanitarian interventions defined as the protection of 
human rights of people who are nationals and/or residents of a country by another country 
or a group of countries through threats or the use of force (EP [1994] p. 3). R2P is wider as 
it includes components of prevention, reconstruction and non-military reaction. On the 
discussion whether R2P is a principle, concept or norm, see Rudolf (2013) pp. 12ff. China 
and Russia generally reject R2P referring to Article 2(7) UN Charta (Masala [2008] p. 23). 
On R2P as great powers’ instrument see Mallavarapu (2013). 
24
 ICISS (2001). 
25
 UN (2005) p. 31 (§§138f); UN (2006). 
26
 UN (2009b) pp. 8f. 
27
 Hocking (2011) p. 230. 
 162 
Collaborative approaches focus on long-term and dialogue processes, the 
building of capacity in civil society, the enhanced public support and 
structural development.28 Also approaches which combine development, 
diplomacy and defence have been identified aiming at stabilising the 
recipient country and gaining its acceptance while donors pursue military 
interests.29   
6.1.2. Transnational actors’ instruments in conflicts 
In conflict situations transnational actors take various peace-supporting 
activities comprising some general tasks and concrete measures along the 
conflict management cycle. Civil approaches, collaborative public 
diplomacy and track two diplomacy generally stress transnational actors’, 
advocacy networks’ and epistemic communities’ establishment of trust-
based and communicative relations, dialogic interactions and information 
and ideas exchange among conflict parties.30 Moreover, the informal 
diplomatic function of think tanks was highlighted offering neutral spaces of 
interaction for those searching for conflict resolution policies which can 
cover public and private actors’ networks.31 Also transnational actors’ 
policy work in conflicts was mentioned aiming at wining over governments 
and international institutions. It comprises agenda-setting, campaigning, 
coalition building and the generating of knowledge through analytical skills 
and information accessed on-site.32 The latter is also relevant in the non-
state actors’ involvement in early warning defined as the methodical 
gathering and analysis of information on the crisis in order to foresee violent 
developments offering policy options to decision makers and institutions.33 
Capacity building in affected civil societies, the promotion of public support 
                                                 
28
 Davies/Kaufman (2002); Cowan/Arsenault (2008).  
29
 Amos (2014) p. 147. 
30
 Heinrich/Lange (2009) p. 254; Azar (2002) p. 23; Cowan/Arsenault (2008); Hocking 
(2011) p. 230; Mbabazi/MacLean/Shaw (2005); Simon (2002); Bolewski (2007) coined the 
term soft-track-two diplomacy (p. 39). 
31
 Stone (2011) pp. 244f. 
32
 Hocking (2011) p. 230; Goodhand/Walton (2012) pp. 434f. A typical example is the 
successful International Campaign to Ban Landmines (Stephenson [2011] pp. 399f.).  
33
 Bakker (2001) pp. 264f., 267, 272. 
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for the peace processes and the encouragement for justice were furthermore 
indentified as transnational engagement in conflicts.34  
All of these transnational actors’ general tasks are also conspicuous in 
concrete measures along the conflict management cycle. According to the 
ideal-typical model of Major/Pietz/Schöndorf/Hummel, there are four 
different phases of a (potential) crisis to which actors can react with specific 
measures (see table 6.1).35 In the first phase crisis prevention measures are 
involved as the situation is peaceful or at least armed conflicts do not occur. 
In the second period, actors can react to the crisis with mediation and 
intervention instruments. In the following phase, in which an armed conflict 
has broke out, crisis management refers to conflict transformation measures, 
while the later fragile post-conflict phase makes tools of peace consolidation 
necessary. Measures can often be used in several phases and at times 
overlap.36 As the conflict’s process is circulating, the last phase potentially 
leads into the first period. In practice, the phases are difficult to determine 
and frequently in the same region the peace and conflict situation varies 
tremendously.37 The whole conflict management cycle is ideally guided by 
certain principles, such as R2P, human security, do-no-harm, local 
ownership and UN resolution 1325 on the involvement and protection of 
women in conflict processes.38 There are several actors involved in the 
management of crisis: The EU and the UN are potentially active in all 
phases of a conflict. While the OECD implements measures in the field of 
crisis prevention and peace consolidation, NATO can step in when it comes 
to escalation and armed conflicts.39 Moreover, states are multilaterally and 
bilaterally involved in the management process as well as transnational 
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 Goodhand/Walton (2012) pp. 433ff. 
35
 Major/Pietz/Schöndorf/Hummel (2011) p. 6; for a similar systematisation on 
transnational actors’ instruments see Fischer (2006) pp. 6ff. 
36
 In Afghanistan (as of 11/2014) the multilateral peace enforcement ISAF mission is for 
example combined with the political United Nations Assistance Mission mainly active in 
peacebuilding. Parallel to this, the Operation Enduring Freedom US-led and without a UN 
mandate is active. 
37
 Schaller/Schneckener (2009) p. 10. 
38
 See 6.1.1. “Do-no-harm” refers to the necessary conflict sensibility as external 
intervention might cause negative effects. “Local ownership” stresses the importance of 
local actors to be involved in the crisis management phases in order to ensure sustainability 
(Major/Pietz/Schöndorf/Hummel [2011] pp. 10f.). 
39
 NATO, however, assumes its activity even “before and after the crisis” (NATO [2010] 
pp. 7f.). On the problematic relationship between these IOs see Giegerich (2012) pp. 95f., 
102; Yost (2007) pp. 88f.   
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actors whose activities and available instruments are particularly important 
for the analysis of the German political foundations’ conflict management.  
The conflict prevention instruments implemented in the first phase of the 
conflict attempt to resolve conflicts with peaceful measures and low costs.40 
Despite the importance of conflict prevention for most international actors’ 
agendas timely action is often missing as seen in Rwanda and Kosovo in the 
1990s and in Darfur in 2004 and 2005.41 A positive case is the 
implementation of the UN preventative deployment force in Macedonia in 
1995.42 In the prevention phase transnational actors implement the 
instruments of small arms control, political missions, reforms of the security 
sector (SSR), and election observation. Small arms control comprises 
measures to prevent illegal access to small weapons and to improve the 
control of legal arms trade.43 Political missions are a collective term for 
primarily civilian missions by international organisations including a wide 
variety of different measures such as humanitarian action, human rights 
monitoring, development work, peace-building and traditional diplomacy. 
Often political missions follow peace-keeping operations.44 SSR aims at 
transforming the dysfunctional bodies responsible for internal and external 
security and involving primarily military and police institutions, the 
respective political levels, the jurisdiction and the intelligence services.45 
Election observation, closely connected to democracy assistance (see 5.1), 
refers to the monitoring of the electoral process by external and local actors 
stemming from the idea that elections help democratically stabilise 
conflictive situations.46  
During the conflict’s second phase transnational actors mediate and 
intervene through multidimensional peace-keeping and conflict resolution. 
                                                 
40
 It is disputed whether conflict prevention only applies to situations in which the conflict 
is not yet broken out (Gareis [2006] pp. 208f.) or also when the conflict’s reoccurrence 
should be avoided (Varwick [2002] p. 5). The latter assumption is convincing when, as 
outlined, the conflict’s process is understood as a cycle. 
41
 Naumann (2001). 
42
 Gareis (2006) pp. 211f. 
43
 Major/Pietz/Schöndorf/Hummel (2011) p. 35; for details see Bob (2014) pp. 133ff., see 
Stephenson (2011) pp. 401f. for examples. 
44
 Gowan (2010) pp. 2f. 
45
 Hänggi (2005); Bryden (2006) p. 23. 
46
 Kühne (2010) p. 3; Kumar (2000). 
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Peace-keeping involves international troops stationed in the conflict region. 
In contrast to peace-building, where certain actors are supported to 
strengthen capacity locally, it is a neutral approach.47 Traditional peace-
keeping bases on Chapter VI of the UN Charter and requires the conflicting 
parties’ approval. There are several other forms like peace enforcement and 
observer missions.48 In multidimensional approaches traditional peace-
keeping is supplemented by a civil component, such as election monitoring 
or the training of police forces. For traditional and multidimensional peace-
keeping, UN troops (Blue helmets) are deployed using force for their self-
defence.49 Transnational actors’ conflict resolution covers activities trying to 
diplomatically and dialogically end the conflict through mediation and good 
offices. Mediation is the structured, results-oriented decision-making 
process for a mutually agreed solution. Good offices provide the logistical 
prerequisites for direct talks of the conflicting parties.50 Both are also part of 
track two diplomacy.51 As outlined by the public diplomacy literature, part 
of conflict resolution is also collaboration in which participants from 
different (conflicting) countries work together on projects of general 
interest.52   
In the transformational conflict phase, civil actors offer humanitarian aid 
and can participate in multidimensional peace-keeping and civil-military co-
operations (CIMIC). Humanitarian aid is defined as a life-saving activity in 
armed conflict focusing on the short-term relief to those in need including 
the provision of shelter, food and health services.53 It bases on the principles 
of non-interference, neutrality, impartiality and independency.54 CIMIC was 
defined in the context of NATO missions and has three core functions: the 
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 Schaller/Schneckener (2009) pp. 11f. 
48
 Peace enforcement, frequently a UN-led mission regulated by Chapter VII UN Charter 
allowing the use of weapons, aims at the termination of fighting by use of compulsive acts, 
at the separation of the parties of conflict even against their will and at securing the respect 
of the ceasefire (Schaller/Schneckener [2009] pp. 10f.). The forces are not UN troops and 
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 Page Fortna (2004) p. 270. 
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 Liese (2005) pp. 549f. For transnational actors active in conflict resolution the term 
CROs (Conflict resolution organisations) was coined (c.f. Amos [2014] p. 146). 
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 Berridge/James (2003) p. 260; Goodhand/Walton (2012) p. 433; see 3.1. on track two 
diplomacy. 
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 See 3.1.1. 
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 Eberwein (2011) p. 363; Rodon/Serrano/Giménez (2012) p. 367. 
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 Kloke-Lesch/Poeschke (2013) p. 300. 
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establishment of civil-military relations in general, the civil forces’ support 
through insights into the civilian situation, and the support of civil 
institutions and actors to increase the acceptance of the forces on-site.55  
The last phase of the conflicts’ peace consolidation offers the most 
instruments for non-state agents. An important task is peace-building as a 
cross-cutting measure comprising other means which can also be used 
independently.56 It was first mentioned in 1992 in the UN Agenda for Peace 
of the then general secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali referring explicitly to 
the consolidation phase after the armed conflict ended. This temporal 
determination has gained ground in the literature and political practice.57 In 
2005 the UN created the Peace-building Commission elaborating strategies 
for conflict-affected countries and coordinating the funding members.58 The 
Peace-building Fund established in 2006 provides financial resources to 
countries emerging from conflict.59 Peace-building aims at the removal of 
wars’ political, economic, social and psychological consequences and 
focuses on the conflicts’ structural reasons. It mixes security-political and 
development-political approaches with a central focus on local capacity-
building.60 The security dimension of peace-building includes the measures 
of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and the 
establishment of efficient political, legal and penal structures including SSR. 
While disarmament and demobilisation generally make a military 
component necessary, the reintegration of former combatants is part of civil 
actors’ long-term engagement.61 Peace-building’s political dimension 
attempts to build political institutions focusing on the rule of law, the 
observance of human rights, free elections and the establishment of political 
parties. The socio-economic dimension includes economic recovery, the 
rebuilding of infrastructure, the promotion of the economic, health and 
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 Paul (2008) p. 3.  
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 Major/Pietz/Schöndorf/Hummel (2011) p. 6. 
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 UN (1992) Sec. 55ff. Peacebuilding is partly used as a generic term for peace 
enforcement, peacekeeping (Doyle/Sambanis [2000] p. 781) and peacemaking 
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 UN at: http://www.unpbf.org/who-we-are/.  
60
 Schaller/Schneckener (2009) pp. 10f. 
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 Major/Pietz/Schöndorf/Hummel (2011) p. 26; Bryden (2006) p. 23. 
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educational sectors and the combat of criminal structures.62 In the context of 
the psycho-social dimension, the reintegration of refugees and war victims, 
the dealing with war crimes, reconciliation and transitional justice processes 
can be initiated. Reconciliation has several linked components, such as the 
healing of survivors, retributive or restorative justice and the seeking for 
publicly recognized truth and reparations.63 Transitional justice embraces 
judicial and non-judicial measures against the violation of human rights 
including institutional reforms, truth commissions and the establishment of 
victims’ organisations.64 Partly the literature assumes a fifth dimension of 
peace-building, integrating the neighbouring regions into the peace process 
and promoting the conflict countries’ (re)integration into the international 
structures and markets.65 Part of the conflict’s consolidation phase are 
furthermore democracy assistance,66 the establishment of international 
tribunals and police missions as well as the before mentioned political 
missions, conflict resolution, small arms control, election observation and 
CIMIC. International tribunals cover the international criminal court (ICC) 
and other tribunals limited in time and region. They are not completely 
recognised by the international community. Transnational actors often lobby 
for the tribunals’ establishment or offer networked support.67 Police 
missions assist the security forces in crisis states and help creating internal 
security. Their scope has been continuously extended in the last decades to 
consulting and training for police forces, prosecution, frontier protection, 
and SSR.68 
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 Bloomfield (2006) p. 11.  
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 Zupan/Servaes (2007) p. 4. 
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Conflict’s phase Conflict 
management 
Transnational actors’ 
instruments 
Peace/absence of 
armed conflict 
Conflict prevention • Small arms control 
• Political missions 
• SSR 
• Election observation 
Escalation Mediation, 
Intervention 
• Multidimensional peace-
keeping 
• Conflict resolution 
Armed conflict Conflict 
transformation 
• Multidimensional peace-
keeping 
• Humanitarian aid 
• CIMIC 
Fragile post-conflict 
phase 
Peace consolidation • Democracy assistance 
• DDR 
• Peace-building 
• International tribunals 
• Small arms control 
• Conflict resolution 
• Political missions 
• Police missions 
• SSR 
• Reconciliation and 
transitional justice 
• Election observation 
• Economic recovery 
• CIMIC 
 
 
Table 6.1: Conflict management cycle and transnational actors’ instruments69 
 
6.2. German conflict management  
German security policy from the unification onwards referred to a “transfer 
of stability”. It purposed the export of security and focused on conflict 
management as the violation of the German territorial integrity was no 
longer at risk. In 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court’s ruling which 
followed the “out of area debate” on the German Armed Forces’ 
deployment outside the NATO territory regarding the 1991 Gulf War, 
brought significant changes. The ruling, in short, confirmed under 
constitutional law the German participation in combat and armed UN and 
NATO missions with parliament’s approval.70 While Germany had already 
                                                 
69
 Major/Pietz/Schöndorf/Hummel (2011) p. 6. The systematisation originally included 
possible instruments of all involved actors.  
70
 BVerfGE 90, 286 of 12/07/1994 (Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court) so called 
“Blue-helmet-ruling”; Der Spiegel 29/1994 pp. 23ff. According to Article 24(2) German 
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participated in smaller UN-lead missions since the 1960s, its involvement in 
international military operation increased from 1994 having a strong focus 
on the determent of violence in Southeast Europe. As a consequence, the 
role of the German Armed Forces changed from a deterring to an 
intervention force while politically Germany followed the strategy of 
integrating its Eastern neighbours into the international structures.71 The 
most important missions regarding size and amount of involved German 
soldiers are the ISAF mission in Afghanistan of 2001 and the KFOR 
mission of 1999, both on-going, UN-mandated, and NATO-led peace 
enforcement missions.72  
Despite this increasing military course of action Germany has been partly 
characterised as a “through and through pacifist nation”73 which is, 
however, not convincing. As already touched, Germany is a classic civilian 
power74 which aims at civilising politics accepting cooperation, preferring 
non-military over military means and striving for supranational structures to 
deal with obstacles.75 In Germany, this is rooted in the experiences of the 
Second World War and National Socialism, the German division and the 
connected foreign political guidelines of the allies.76 Before and after the 
unification, Germany felt bound to the normative principles of the Western 
democracies, its foreign political predictability and the reliability to its 
partners. It is more oriented towards economic growth and social prosperity 
                                                 
Constitution “with a view to maintaining peace, the Federation may enter into a system of 
mutual collective security.” A collective security system is a multilateral institution of 
universal or regional scope offering security to its members in case of interstate aggressions 
(Rudolf [2005] p. 443). In order to comply with the German constitution, the system needs 
to have a defensive character (Jarass [2000] § 24 GG, 20). The notion of defence was 
increasingly widened in the last couple of years. Concisely is the famous statement of then 
defence minister Peter Struck in 2004 that “Germany’s security is not only but also 
defended in the Hindu Kush” (BT [2004] p. 8601). Since 2005 the requirement of 
parliamentary approval to international armed missions is governed by the Parliamentary 
Participation Act. For details on the on-going debate see BPB (2014). 
71
 Hellmann (2007) pp. 610ff., (2013) p. 54; precisely on the conflict in Yugoslavian wars 
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 As of August 2014 3640 German soldiers participated in 17 UN, NATO and EU peace 
operations, see the Federal Armed Forces at: 
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 Bender (2008) p. 4. Extensively on the question of German pacifism Delgaard-Nielson 
(2006) p. 142.   
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 See 5.2. 
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 Maull (1990/91) pp. 92f. referring to the soft power concept (see 2.3.2). 
76
 Lapins (2007) p. 7. 
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and less towards territorial expansion and becoming a great power.77 Since 
the end of the Cold War and until recently Germany has been repeatedly 
criticised by its partners for its military reluctance.78 The German reserve 
towards the Iraq War led to a tremendous crisis in German-U.S. relations. 
Although this reluctance was consistent with the civil power concept,79 
other approaches interpreted the situation differently. According to the 
realist idea of Germany as the European central power, due to its geographic 
position, the size of its population, the strong economy and its cultural 
influence, Germany preferred an open conflict with the U.S. and 
increasingly militarised in the last two decades.80 This perspective, however, 
overlooks that German politicians, journalists and researches generally tend 
to avoid using the term “power” when referring to Germany.81 Also the 
German public is generally sceptical about military interventions.82 In 2013 
Guido Westerwelle still referred to a “culture of military reluctance” as the 
core of Germany’s foreign policy.83 From a constructivist perspective Risse 
argues that civilian power, multilateralism and European and pro-Western 
orientation are components of the German foreign political identity guiding 
the political preferences.84 Consequently, Risse views the debates on the 
German rearmament and the participation in international military 
operations as debates on the German identity.85 The German support of 
international military operations is not a break with the civilian power 
concept since it is different from a pacifist policy renouncing the use of 
military means. Moreover, Germany has always preferred political over 
military solutions. Risse convincingly regards the confrontation with the 
U.S. as a clash of the two components, civilian power and Western 
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 Maull (2007) p. 76. 
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orientation, with the first prevailing.86 Others recently stressed that Germany 
develops towards a “civilian-military” power taking account of the 
increasing military involvement in the last decades.87 However, the German 
abstention to the resolution of a no-fly-zone in Libya in 2011 throws doubts 
on this assessment. 
In line with its foreign political identity Germany is mainly multilaterally 
engaged in international conflict management88 taking as a basis a broad 
notion of security.89 It follows the peace imperative, as peace enjoys a 
priority position in the German constitution. 90 Its preamble outlines that the 
adaption of the basic law is “inspired by the determination to promote world 
peace”.91 The government perceives state conflicts, cross-border organised 
crime and terrorism, poverty, struggles for resources, and the effects of 
climate change as threats92 and prefers a comprehensive approach 
coordinating the relevant areas of foreign, security, developmental, 
economic, financial and environmental policy. It understands conflict 
according to the conflict cycle.93 Multifaceted crisis management with 
emphasis on the civil component is outlined in the government’s action plan 
for “civil crisis prevention, conflict resolution and peace consolidation” 
(Aktionsplan) of 2004.94 Moreover, the “networked security” approach is 
summarised in the “White paper on security policy and the future of the 
German armed forces” (Weißbuch) published by the Ministry of Defence in 
2006 assuming that military and civil means are equally important and 
multilaterally used for the achievement of broad security.95 Aktionsplan and 
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Weißbuch are not coherent, however. The Aktionsplan does not refer to 
military means whereas “networked security” seems to include measures 
across departments but is often rejected by civil society actors due to its 
military origin. In practice, undertakings are not sufficiently coordinated 
among the different ministerial departments.96 Civil components are mostly 
financially and personally underequipped and subordinated to the military 
missions97 which in turn lack evaluation and legitimacy as the parliamentary 
decisions deviate from public opinion.98 Often Germany offers 
compensation for its military nonparticipation to partners being involved in 
battles.99 The Aktionsplan outlines 161 civil activities with long-term 
implementation scope,100 recognises the “Do no harm” concept101 and 
establishes connections to democracy assistance.102 However, it does not use 
notions uniformly. Prevention, for example, refers to the whole conflict 
cycle.103 Moreover, it lacks concrete measures104 and includes too many 
aspects not necessary part of a conflict prevention portfolio, such as the 
reactive fight against terrorism.105 Despite these issues and although 
Germany turned to conflict management rather late, it has continuously 
expanded its policy.106 In summer 2014 the Bundestag agreed to an increase 
of appropriations in the field of conflict prevention.107 
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Apart from the general support of UN missions through membership dues 
and civil personal, its contribution to the UN peace-building fund108 and its 
engagement in the Peacebuilding Commission which it chaired in 2010,109 
the AA additionally backs conflict management measures implemented by 
other IOs and NGOs. Since 1999 the government-supported Ifa-project 
(Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen) “Zivik” constitutes the interface between 
the government and the implementing NGOs.110 The AA’s conflict 
management focus is on the rule of law, transitional justice, the support of 
women and the reintegration of child soldiers and former combatants.111 
Concrete measures are the training of police forces, the formation of judges, 
SSR and the reinforcement of the civil society.112 Moreover, the AA 
supports single democracy assistance projects concerning constitutional 
bodies, election aid and election monitoring.113 Additional funding is 
provided for projects supporting the democratic transition in North Africa 
and the Middle East.114 German AKBP115 was assigned the role to mediate 
between cultures through dialogue processes, to be active in early warning 
and to establishment intercultural competence.116 The AA gives a special 
emphasis to the intercultural dialogue with the Islam.117  
The BMZ complemented to the Aktionsplan and outlined its cross-sectoral 
concept on crisis prevention, conflict management and peace support in 
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2005118 which was replaced by the concept on “Development for peace and 
security, Development political commitment in the context of conflict, 
fragility and violence” in 2013.119 In 2008, crises prevention and peace 
development were termed as focal points of Germany’s development policy. 
So was the promotion of democracy and civil society.120 Projects of the 
BMZ focus on democracy, rule of law, good governance, human rights, 
promotion of the economy, protection of the resources and the environment, 
education, SSR and strengthening of the civil society.121 Along the 
conflict’s phases the BMZ promotes dialogue processes on various levels, 
government consulting, peace conferences, local peace projects, economic 
recovery and reconciliation.122 The BMZ-funded Civil Peace Service (ZFD) 
established in 1999 internationally seconds civil experts to partner 
organisations for conflict resolution tasks.123 Crisis management was also 
connected to a cultural and dialogue dimension in terms of intercultural 
acceptance and understanding.124 
Since 2005 the German government explicitly supports R2P125 and is 
member of the “group of friends” an informal union of states at UN 
headquarters supporting R2P as a principle126 whereas the literature 
criticises the German reluctance and a lack of coherence in this field.127 
Moreover, the German government feels bound to UN resolution 1325.128 In 
2012 it adopted an action plan for the resolutions’ implementation 
establishing the principle as cross-cutting theme129 and continuously 
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reported on respective German measures.130 Furthermore, it focuses on the 
concept of human security highlighting human rights and the security of 
people in conflict regions.131 
For the management of conflicts Germany established certain national 
structures.132 Since 2004 the inter-ministerial steering group on civil crisis 
prevention (Ressortkreis Zivile Krisenprävention) coordinates activities and 
ensures the Aktionsplan’s implementation. The advisory board for civilian 
crisis prevention (Beirat für zivile Krisenprävention) created in 2005 
involves civil stakeholders from the fields of human rights, developmental 
and security policy. The parliamentary subcommittee on civilian crisis 
prevention, conflict management and integrated action established in 2010 
enables the study of the subject in the Bundestag. It cooperates with the 
steering group. Moreover, the Center for International Peace Operations 
(ZIF) set up in 2002 strengthens German civilian capacities for international 
peace operations including the recruiting, training and deploying of civilian 
specialists and election observers as well as some academic activity.133 The 
Working Group on Peace and Development (FriEnt) founded in 2001 
includes the BMZ and eight non-governmental members seeking to pool 
information and capacities through public events, expert meetings, 
publications, training measures and advice.134 
6.3. Conflict management of the German political foundations 
Since the beginning of their international undertakings, the German political 
foundations have been active in countries of latent or acute conflicts. 
Scholars, however, did not become interested in this matter until the late 
1990s. The attention grew simultaneously to the topic of civil conflict 
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management on the German political agenda.135 Conflict prevention, civil 
conflict management, the fight against terrorism and the dealing with fragile 
states are tasks increasingly assigned to the Stiftungen and mostly 
compatible with the existing foundations’ approaches. New strategies have 
been partly adopted as well. In this context, the foundations also profited 
from additional funding made available by the German government.136  
6.3.1. Literature review 
Since the late 1990s the German political foundations’ conflict management 
and peace activities appear more often in the literature selectively and 
mainly in context of democracy assistance.137 In 1999 Ronge and Pascher’s 
article treated the foundations’ contribution to peace assuming that 
interaction on multiple levels builds trust.138 According to them, the 
foundations are able to modify and compensate foreign policy when 
working in countries of underdeveloped official diplomacy due to 
dictatorships or revolutionary regimes. The foundations furthermore 
mediate in cases of violent situations within one country, exemplified in 
Latin America, or in conflicts between two or several states, such as Israel 
and Palestine. Moreover, through the active participation in UN summits, 
the foundations influence a global peace policy.139 In 2000, however, Mair 
still identified a foundations’ disinterest in conflict management when many 
other actors had entered the domain already. He mentioned lacking 
capacities as a reason but stressed that the foundations’ democracy 
assistance, such as the provision of dialogue and discussion floras, already 
covered much of conflict management.140 In 2005 Renvert studied the 
foundations’ activities as regards the crisis between Germany and the USA 
due to the intervention in Iraq.141 Renvert saw an “early warning system” in 
the work of the foundations allowing to harmonise political tensions and to 
identify ways of cooperation.142 An increased significance of the 
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foundations in preventing intrastate and regional conflicts was noticed by 
Pogorelskaja in 2006.143 In 2007 the foundations’ activities were mentioned 
briefly in the context of development cooperation with non-state armed 
groups exemplified by activities of the KAS in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo and of the HBS in Afghanistan.144 In 2009 Pogorelskaja 
identified foundations’ conflict management as a trend in the foundations’ 
international activity mentioning negotiations, mediation and “structure-
oriented” long-term conflict prevention defined as democracy assistance.145 
She noted a dense network of offices in the conflict regions of the Middle 
East and North Africa.146 Other regional focal points are Afghanistan, 
Central Asia and the Caucasus. She concluded with a case study on the 
foundations’ activities in Uzbekistan lacking, however, specific measures in 
conflict management.147 Some descriptions of themselves by the German 
Stiftungen have mentioned their peace-supporting activities. Hennig referred 
to the KAS’s contribution to discussions on security structures and 
conceptions and their democracy assistance in conflict regions such as 
Cambodia, Thailand, Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Indonesia and Nigeria.148 In 
2005 Wahlers showed the intention to strengthen the KAS’s support of 
peace and security in the future.149 Gerster outlined the KAS’s support of 
the reconciliation processes between Israel and Germany which started in 
1980 mainly through media and educational projects and later through think 
tank and consulting activities.150 
6.3.2. The conflict management objectives of the Stiftungen 
The German political foundations’ democracy assistance in conflict regions 
has always supported peace on an overall level.151 Nonetheless, projects 
with a clear conflict perspective increased from 2000 onwards.152 In 2007 
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the KAS outlined a stronger focus in their international work on security 
threats caused by fragile states and terrorism among others.153 However, it 
did not become a central task.154 The FES recently emphasised the 
importance of its conflict management155 and regards peace and security as 
a cross-cutting field156 and strategic goal.157 Also the FNS has more 
explicitly integrated conflict prevention and resolution to its activity 
portfolio in the last decade.158  
The foundations’ conflict management is closely related to the German 
official ambitions. The government recognised the important role of the 
Stiftungen and referred to them in several documents. In 2005 the BMZ 
stressed the long-standing experience of the foundations (and other 
organisations) and their independently developed peace-building 
strategies.159 In 2013 it highlighted the foundations’ active shaping of peace 
and security referring to their network and partner structures.160 The 
foundations are also integrated in the respective national conflict 
management structures. Since its establishment in 2005 representatives of 
every political foundation participate in the Beirat für zivile 
Krisenprävention offering expert advice to the Ressortkreis Zivile 
Krisenprävention. Moreover, the FES and the HBS are founding members 
and part of FriEnt established in 2001.161 The FNS joined FriEnt in 2003, 
resigned from an institutional activity a couple of years later but still 
cooperates on a project basis.162  
The foundations’ conflict management activities concerns three broad areas: 
general peace-supporting activity on the international and regional level as 
well as in Germany, concrete measures along the conflict management cycle 
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of conflicts between two or several countries or within one country, and 
crisis management which involve Germany as a conflicting party. 
6.3.2.1. General tasks 
First of all, the Stiftungen initiate political dialogue on security policy and 
peace support and channel information on international and national 
discussions.163 One such example is the German-Chinese symposium on 
global security issues and cooperation organised by the KAS and its Chinese 
partners in 2007 in Beijing.164 At the recurring Asia-Europe Roundtable co-
organised by the FES since 2000 ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) members 
discuss cooperation in conflict management and other global aspects.165 At 
the annual European Strategic Forum, politicians and experts exchange on 
developments in European security policy. Security dialogue is also initiated 
by several foundations between the USA, Europe and Russia.166 In 2011 the 
KAS, the FES, the HBS and the FNS organised a joint program for Afghan 
civil society actors prior to the International Foreign Ministers’ Conference 
on Afghanistan which aimed at formulating policy recommendation. The 
results were presented on the Civil Society Forum in Bonn.167 Information 
from these international fora is channelled in national and regional debates 
through the foundations’ country offices. They feed back regional and 
national perspectives to the foundations’ supranational offices.168 Peace and 
security dialogues among politicians and researchers and scholarship 
holders are also offered by the foundations in Germany.169 The Stiftungen 
are furthermore involved in policy work. An early example is the 
foundations’ cooperation with the Conference on Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (CSCE) in the mid-1990s when NGOs where allowed to 
participate in the process.170 The foundations’ participation in UN summits 
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was already mentioned.171 They are also involved in lobbying for conflict 
management in Germany.172 In 2008, the KAS, for example, intended to 
convey more intensely the necessity of the international deployment of 
German Armed Forces and to help produce respective arguments.173 
The foundations are also involved in conflict analysis, knowledge-
generating and the processing of information. The offices in the 
industrialised countries monitor and analyse the developments on the 
international level, such as the UN and the EU.174 On the occasion of the 
German membership in the UN Security Council in 2010/2011 the FES, for 
instance, started a series of publication on matters of the Council.175 The 
country offices in the conflict regions offer analysis and studies on concrete 
cases, such as the study on decentralisation conducted by the FNS and 
Centre for Policy Alternatives after the civil war in Sri Lanka in 2010.176 
Furthermore, findings in the form of policy papers and outcomes from the 
dialogues are published on the website and disseminated to decision-
makers.177 The FES, for example, channelled the results of the experts 
interchange in Afghanistan in 2012 and 2013 to the respective politicians 
on-site, in Germany and Europe.178 Experiences from their conflict 
management are also treated in seminars with politicians, researchers and 
business experts in Germany.179 Already in the mid 1990s the FES was a 
founding member of the UN initiative “Lessons Learned and Best Practice 
Unit” in New York which elaborate best practices in UN peace missions. 
Since then the FES focused on the creation of interregional networks to 
transfer conflict experiences.180 In partnership with the Stockholm 
international peace research institute the FES also organises research-
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supported regional dialogues between emerging countries and troop-
providing countries on challenges of peace operations.181  
The foundations also further the establishment of regional early warning 
systems.182 However, early warning on-site is surprisingly not assigned to 
the foundations. The Aktionsplan mentioned explicitly the German 
embassies,183 whereas the potential of the German Stiftungen in terms of 
analysis capacity, the necessary access to the civilian population and the 
embassy-like infrastructure was not highlighted.  
The foundations are finally active in capacity-building. In 2014 the KAS 
and its partners offered a capacity-building program in Senegal for 
stakeholders from the public, the non-public and the academic sector being 
involved in conflict management. It was part of the AA-supported ifa-
program “zivik”.184 The KAS also organises a recurring academic training 
module on conflict management together with Bar-Ilan University in Akko, 
Israel.185 Also the RLS focuses on conflict management capacity-building in 
the Middle East.186 In 2005 the FES, the AA and a local NGO organised a 
project treating the tolerance of religious and non-religious teachers and 
students187 and a summer school on conflict prevention and religion for girls 
of a Koran school in Tadzhikistan. 188 Seminars in conflict management are 
also offered by the foundations to individuals in Germany.189 Apart from 
these general tasks the foundations make use of other methods as well. The 
RLS, for instance, regularly organises festivals and cultural events to 
support peace in the Middle East and Bosnia-Herzegovina.190  
                                                 
181
 FES at: http://www.fes.de/GPol/inhalt/konfliktbearbeitung.htm; SIPRI at: 
http://www.sipri.org/research/conflict/pko/new-geopolitics-of-peace-operations; FES 
(2002) p. 18. 
182
 C.f. FES (2010). 
183
 Bundesregierung (2004) pp. 59, 64. 
184
 See 6.2.; KAS at: http://www.kas.de/senegal-mali/de/publications/30574/.  
185
 KAS at: http://www.kas.de/israel/de/publications/38011/; KAS (2014c).  
186
 RLS annual report (2005/2006) p. 49.  
187
 Bundesregierung (2006) p. 58; FES at: 
http://www.fes.de/GPol/inhalt/projektbeispiele.htm; FES (2002) p. 43. 
188
 BMZ (2007) p. 45. 
189
 C.f. FNS (2013b) p. 28. 
190
 RLS annual report (2005/2006) p. 49; RLS at: 
http://www.rosalux.de/news/40519/kultur-des-friedens.html.  
 182 
6.3.2.2. Concrete measures 
The Stiftungen implement most of the outlined transnational actors’ 
instruments along the conflict management cycle. However, it cannot be 
confirmed that instruments are strictly implemented in the respective 
conflict management phases. Often instruments are combined or overlap. 
Especially the FES and the HBS are very active in this field but also the 
other foundations undertake such tasks, even if mainly in a democracy 
assistance context. The establishment of the KAS’s rule-of-law program in 
Southeast Europe, for example, was originally initiated to help peace and 
secure consolidation.191  
The principles which ideally guide conflict management activities are also 
important for the Stiftungen. Explicitly mentioned is the do-no-harm tenet192 
which is particularly apparent in the FES’s PCIA (Peace and Conflict 
Impact Assessment) methodology, applied since 2002 and in accordance 
with the BMZ’s strategy.193 PCIA focuses on conflict sensitivity and the 
monitoring of the impact of activities. The conflict is analysed first and the 
project work is adapted to the findings. Afterwards, the conflict dynamic is 
monitored and project adjustments are made. On the basis of long-term case 
studies also methodical guidelines were established.194 Furthermore, the 
foundations critically monitor the international coordination processes in the 
context of human security.195 Moreover, the foundations’ partner approach 
furthers the principle of local ownership.196 The foundations also focus on 
R2P and the protection and involvement of women in conflict regions. In 
2007 the FES and FriEnt, for example, organised a workshop on R2P.197 A 
discussion on the Asian and European perspective on R2P was organised by 
the KAS in Shanghai in 2011.198 In 2014 the HBS held a conference 
together with other organisations as regards the safety of women in 
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countries of the Arab Spring.199 In 2004 it supported an Israeli women NGO 
in their activities to integrate gender mainstreaming in the Israeli conflict 
management.200 In 2002 the FES organised an international women peace 
conference in Angola. The subject is also continuously treated in a 
symposium in Germany.201 The HBS and the FES are also founding 
members of the German Women’s Security Council, a network of German 
women organisations and researchers to further the implementation of UN 
resolution 1325 in Germany.202  
Of the instruments in the conflict prevention and peace consolidation phase 
the Stiftungen undertake small arms control, SSR and election observation. 
The FES made disarmament and arms control a special focus in their peace 
support activities203 and supports UN and regional programs in this field.204 
In 2010, for example, it co-organised a conference on small weapons control 
together with the UN Institute for Disarmament Research and the Geneva 
Centre for Security Policy and arranged a conference on humanitarian 
disarmament in 2014.205 Regarding SSR, the FES supports the democratic 
integration of the security sector and targets political decision makers to 
implement reforms.206 The foundations’ activities also include educational 
programs for police forces and civil-military dialogues207 which show 
overlaps with the instruments of police missions and CIMIC. The KAS, for 
example, organized a dialogue program between military officers and 
politicians in West Africa in 2007. A continuous program educates officers 
in rule-of-law.208 Election observation is mainly covered by other German 
actors. Nonetheless, it is closely connected to the foundations’ democracy 
assistance. Examples can be found in the monitoring of elections with local 
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partners and capacity-building.209 In 2014 the KAS, for instance, co-
organised several workshops for poll watcher in Tunisia. Participants were 
supposed to further train other poll watchers subsequently leading to several 
thousands of trained individuals.210 In 2001 the FES supported a radio and 
TV campaign in the run-up of the presidential election in Benin which was 
directed against election corruption and aimed at mobilising voters.211   
Of the transnational instruments which are ideally implemented in the 
conflict escalation and consolidation phases, the Stiftungen undertake 
conflict resolution through dialogue creation, track two diplomacy and 
collaboration. Particularly important in this context is the foundations’ 
political dialogue instrument and the establishment of vertical relationships 
and horizontally among different types of actors.212 Moreover, the 
foundations act as mediators in bringing together the conflicting parties or 
offering exchange platforms.213 In 2012 the FES furthered the Afghan 
experts’ dialogue including the neighbouring countries on peace policies for 
the time after the withdrawal of the ISAF-troops. Four policy groups of 
ambassadors, civil servants, military generals, parliamentarians, leading 
civil society figures, researchers and media people from Afghanistan, 
Central Asia, India and Pakistan were formed. Additional expertise came 
from China, Turkey, Iran and Russia. The different stakeholders within one 
group and the different regional groups interacted with each other.214 The 
results were outlined in a joint declaration presented at the UN headquarters 
in 2013.215 For many years the HBS and the FNS have been active in 
fostering dialogues between the ethnically and territorially conflicting 
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groups and societies in the Southern Caucasus.216 In 1998 the HBS 
supported a women-NGO and the environmental ministry in Somaliland. 
Both thereafter cooperated horizontally in the form that the ministry was 
allowed to use the NGO’s technical infrastructure and in turn defended the 
NGO from other ministries’ tutelages.217 An interesting early example is a 
trilateral conference between politicians from the U.S. State Department, the 
AA and a Cuban delegation including Ricardo Alarcón, then vice foreign 
minister of Cuba organised by the FNS in 1987 in Germany which treated 
the different political positions and cooperation possibilities. According to 
the FNS, the Cuban side had contacted the FNS in order to win them over to 
the conference organisation and to establish a contact to the U.S. side with 
the help of the then Foreign Minister Genscher, a member of the FNS-
affiliated Free Democratic Party.218 The KAS is particularly active in Asian 
ethic-religious conflicts.219 In cooperation with the Philippine Centre for 
Islam and Democracy, for instance, it publishes academic works on the 
subjects.220 The FNS organised study trips for Israeli and Palestine 
parliamentarians and staff officers to create channels of communication 
between them.221 FES’s activities can furthermore be found in collaboration 
where conflict parties’ experts cooperate on specific technical projects of 
general interest and regional cooperation is furthered.222 Between 2001 and 
2006 the FES organised the Jerusalem Berlin Forum where Israeli, 
Palestinian and German experts worked out common solutions in water 
management and regional planning among others.223 In 1999 it initiated an 
EU-funded joint agreement on public administrative cooperation, such as 
health, education and fight against crime in the West Bank’s and Israel’s 
boarder region. Further consulting was offered to the parties from the region 
of “RegioTriRhena” at the Southern Upper Rhine where France, 
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Switzerland and Germany cooperate in the field of communal policy.224 In 
2002 the FES facilitated the exchange among governments, 
parliamentarians and researchers of the conflicting Azerbaijani, Georgian 
and Armenian to foster economic cooperation in the South Caucasus.225 
Also consulting is offered by the FES. Since 2004 it advises the ECOWAS 
(Economic Community of West African States) Initiative on a common 
democratic security architecture.226  
The Stiftungen, as regards instruments in the peace consolidation phase, are 
active in democracy assistance and peace building, in particular DDR, SSR, 
reconciliation and transitional justice and economic recovery. They also 
lobby international tribunals and advocate small arms control and monitor 
elections, as already outlined. The foundations’ democracy assistance was 
extensively presented previously.227 To differentiate strictly between 
democracy assistance in conflict regions and such in the rest of the world is 
difficult as it generally aims at eliminating structural conflict causing 
deficits. The Aktionsplan of 2004 and the subsequent reports stress the 
foundations’ long-term relations with politics, political elites and civil 
society actors and their media promotion helping to stabilise a peaceful 
situation.228 In the context of conflict it mainly involves the capacity-
building.229 Measures are the foundations’ fostering of civil society 
structures, to be empowered for mediating in conflicts, their rule of law 
engagement and constitutional assistance.230 Also, the foundations’ media-
strengthening is relevant, aiming at deactivating or defusing conflicts.231 In 
2004 and 2005 the FES supported the elaboration of several radio programs 
by Iraqi journalists on the elections in Iraq and its broadcasting all over 
Iraq.232 Workshops for Afghan parliamentarians were also offered to 
overcome ethical divides.233 Democracy assistance in conflict regions 
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covers most of peace-building’s political and security dimensions. The 
foundations’ activities in the context of DDR can also be found. Since 2012 
the HSS has been engaged in dialogue programs in Columbia between the 
FARC-guerrilla fighters, the Columbian government and the peace 
commission focusing on demobilisation, and reintegration of former 
fighters.234 Also minority rights are strengthened. The FES’s regional office 
in Southeast Europe monitors such rights and furthers consulting activities 
of local organisation towards the respective public bodies.235 Although the 
foundations are not active in economic recovery as such, they, however, 
help strengthening the economic sectors as already outlined.236 Closely 
connected are the foundations’ activities in environmental protection. In 
2002 the FES, for example, furthered economic and environmental regional 
cooperation among conflicting parties in Central Asia where a conflict over 
water was expected.237 The HBS organised several conferences on the 
connection between nature conservation and crisis management in 2002 and 
2003 in Berlin.238 Regarding the psychological and social dimension of 
peace-building foundations’ undertakings in the field of refugee 
reintegration, reconciliation and transitional justice can be found. Together 
with the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation in South 
Africa the FES held a workshop with UN mediators, governmental and 
nongovernmental participants at the international conference “Building a 
Future on Peace and Justice” in 2007 on the importance of reconciliation.239 
Reconciliation is also combined with SSR or media capacity-building when 
integrating public security forces or journalists.240 The FES, for example, 
initiated dialogues and used media work to facilitate the return of refugees 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia after the Balkan war.241 The foundations 
also organise transitional justice conferences,242 are active in human 
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rights243 and further truth commissions. In 2005 the FES’s annual human 
rights award honoured the heads of the Chilean and Peruvian truth 
commissions.244 The Columbian truth commission was supported with 
monitoring245 and the Indonesian truth commission was encouraged with a 
study trip to South Africa.246 As already outlined, the foundations are active 
in integrating neighbouring countries in peace processes. The foundations 
furthermore lobby international tribunals. In 2010 the FES, the International 
Centre for Transnational Justice (ICTJ) and the Moroccan Centre for 
Human Rights conducted a training session on the International Criminal 
Court with members from the Moroccan Coalition for the ICC and 
journalists.247 In 2008 the ICTJ and the FES organised a series of events 
aiming at raising awareness for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.248  
There are only few transnational activities along the conflict management 
cycle where the foundations’ engagement is completely missing. The 
Stiftungen are neither involved in humanitarian aid as they do not carry out 
short-term life-saving tasks, nor in cases of multidimensional peace-
keeping, presumably because the foundations’ activities are not politically 
neutral. 
6.3.2.3. Conflicts in German foreign relations 
The Stiftungen are also involved in managing political conflicts which 
involve Germany as a conflicting party.249 The foundations’ maintaining of 
relations with foreign opposition groups outside of the Federal Foreign 
Ministry’s reach and official adequacy and with countries of 
underdeveloped diplomatic relationships was already mentioned.250 
Furthermore, the foundations foster dialogue processes between Germany 
and Israel. In this context the HBS also focuses on cultural events, 
exhibitions and readings.251 Moreover, the foundations establish 
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intercultural dialogue with the Islam.252 Some authors observed an increase 
in the foundations’ activities in the Middle East from 2005 onwards 
coinciding with an intensified German political interest in the region and 
dialogues with the Muslim world.253 For many years, the KAS has been 
particularly active in establishing religious dialogues in Germany and 
internationally. Since 9/11 the engagement has been further enhanced.254 
Often these dialogue processes are put in the context of democracy and 
political participation. In 2013 the KAS implemented the project “Muslims 
in state and society world wide” which brought together workshop 
participants from different countries in Istanbul, Singapore and Casablanca 
discussing the relationship of religion, culture and politics and including 
activities with the Muslim community in Germany.255 Since 2006 the office 
of the KAS in Turkey organises trainings for imams of the Turkish religious 
authority. They are prepared for their work in German Muslim 
communities.256 Finally, the Stiftungen as already outlined, helped 
smoothing the U.S. German relationship during the political crisis from 
2002 onwards.257 
Conclusion 
The potentials which stem from the German political foundations’ activities 
in conflict management are mainly congruent with those outlined for 
development assistance. This includes high flexibility and the opportunity to 
establish contacts and work with groups unreachable for official 
diplomats.258 Especially the foundations’ diverse partner structures on-site 
and their duality between the state and non-state sphere makes them being 
accepted by different types of conflicting actors.259 This is ideal, since the 
difference between state and non-state actors in conflict regions is often 
blurred.260 Not being bound to work with one type of actor only, allows the 
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establishment of trustful and communicative relations horizontally and 
vertically. According to the FES, conflicts can only be managed when the 
political level is integrated in the process as it needs to enable the necessary 
reforms.261 The FES activities in Central Asia in 2005 and 2006 therefore 
concentrated on such conflicts which the governments themselves wanted to 
avoid.262 At the same time, conflict management extends the foundations’ 
foreign working relationships as it allows integrating governments in 
complex conflict management approaches which are rather unwilling to take 
part in democracy assistance programs.263 
The foundations’ democracy assistance as practiced for several decades 
equips them well for taking on conflict management tasks. For the 
foundations it is rather old wine in new bottles as most of their 
developmental activities easily fit in the new context. Nonetheless, they 
added additional conflict-focused activities. As the review on the 
foundations’ conflict management has shown, most of the transnational 
instruments used in conflicts are covered already. In its focus on civil 
conflict management also the German government has identified the 
foundations’ potential in peace and security. It highlights their long-term 
international experience and global networking.264 The foundations have 
hence expanded their sphere of activity and influence from development to 
security policy.265 Since it is to be expected that war and violent conflicts 
will increase in the future266 equally the foundations’ role in effective 
conflict management will continue to gain importance. 
For overall development policy, authors observed a movement towards 
conflict-relevant humanitarian aid in the 1990s, an increased politicisation 
and its integration in broad security concepts.267 The “securitisation” of 
development268 and the fact that transnational actors are taken in for 
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different strategic purposes might be one side of the coin.269 The renewed 
interest in development, on the contrary, led to an increase in necessary 
initiatives.270 Finally, these changes paved the way for conflict management 
to become part of collaborative public diplomacy approaches. In chapter 8 
we will connect conflict management to public diplomacy. 
 
 
 
                                                 
269
 Roth/Klein (2007) p. 13 quoting former US foreign minister Powell on NGOs’ strategic 
purposes in Iraq. 
270
 Gareis (2006) p. 221. 
Part III 
Case studies  
 
 193 
Chapter 7- Practising public diplomacy through 
democracy assistance: The rule of law program of the 
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Southeast Europe 
In the following chapter I look in detail on the rule of law program (RLP) of 
the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) in Southeast Europe. The case aims at 
illustrating how public diplomacy in the catalytic and collaborative form of 
democracy assistance is practised by the Stiftung. In particular, it allows 
getting some detailed insights into the status of the network surroundings and 
on the common values of network members as it compares the objectives and 
activities of the RLP against German policy formulations. More generally, it 
reflects on the KAS’s impact as a transnational actor.  
The chapter starts with an overview on the framework in which the RLP 
operated before I shed light on the KAS’s public diplomacy in the context of 
the RLP. The chapter bases mainly on an in-depth interview conducted in 
2014, an evaluation of the RLP in 2013 as well as other material which the 
KAS kindly made accessible to me. The evaluation was carried out on behalf 
of the KAS by Otto Luchterhandt, professor for public and Eastern European 
law at the University of Hamburg.1 
7.1. Southeast Europe and Germany 
The KAS’s RLP in Southeast European2 covered the former Eastern Bloc 
countries of Rumania, Bulgaria and Moldova (as part of the USSR), the 
former Yugoslavian states and Albania. The following subsection outlines 
perceptions of the political situation, the region’s deficits and the KAS’s 
relations to the aid organisations on site. It then looks at German policy 
towards the region which is often similar to European policy. Afterwards, the 
ambitions of the German political foundations in Southeast Europe are 
briefly outlined, while the last subsection introduces the KAS’s RLP in 
Southeast Europe followed by an excursus on the overall RLPs’ conception.  
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7.1.1. Political situation and aid organisations  
In 2014, the political conditions in Southeast Europe the interview partner at 
the KAS described as diverse: Albania was very isolated in the region before 
the 1990s. Bulgaria and Rumania were geostrategically significant and hence 
the first to be integrated into the EU (European Union). Moldova had 
declared its independence even before the break-up of the Soviet Union, 
while the Yugoslavian countries experienced conflicts during the 1990s. In 
common these countries underwent political, social and economical 
transformative processes. The interview partner stressed the astonishing 
progress in the last decades. It included democratic constitutions, elections 
and institutions. He mentioned the long-term and complicated processes 
which were necessary for the proper parliaments’ functioning, the 
constitutional jurisdiction to fight for recognition, and the difficulties in 
executive institution-building. As challenging, he regarded the economies’ 
transformation due to missing management experience and the old elites 
often gaining advantage from the privatisation at the general public’s cost. 
Furthermore, political parties which could have been addressed by the KAS 
or other organisations were nonexistent. The political parties already 
developed were little ideologically programmatic, oriented towards the 
interests of certain groups and hence differed considerably from Western 
parties. Despite major advances, the transformation process was, according 
to the interview partner, not completed and substantial deficits, especially 
regarding the rule of law were still persisting.3 These deficits were: a weak 
civil society and an underdeveloped media sector due to former state’s 
oppression of private initiative; high demands towards the state and low 
individual political and social engagement paradoxically combined with 
renouncing the state and political parties, having few members, a strong 
leader fixation and a weak democratic structure; underdeveloped political 
oppositions as counter-elites to the Communist Party regimes and a low 
propensity to deal with the past; the former state bureaucracy with a rather 
“tactical” attitude to democratic principles and the rule of law which 
enriched itself during the transformation processes and; problems to establish 
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rule of law principles as elites lacked conviction; and political clientelism 
due to the ruling political parties’ tendency to fill posts in the executive with 
their adherents.4     
Many international organisations were active in Southeast Europe in 2014. 
Partly they were state-controlled, like USAid, which consulted with large 
expenditures. Although the interview partner stressed the indispensability of 
many organisations, he gave rise to the concern that they did not send 
consistent messages. U.S. organisations, for instance, had different ideas than 
the KAS. At times, too much aid was available and strange and “patchwork-
like” solutions were developed originating from US and European influence. 
To partners on site the KAS communicated to follow the European advice 
rather than what was recommended by the Americans since they desired the 
integration into the European Union. The situation among the organisations 
was described as competitive.5 The main rule-of-law-focused international 
organisations active in the region were USAid, the American Bar 
Association, the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, the EU and the 
OECD. Other German organisations were the GIZ (Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit), the IRZ (Deutsche Stiftung für 
international rechtliche Zusammenarbeit e.V.), and the other Stiftungen.6  
7.1.2. Germany’s policy  
In the past, German foreign policy towards the Southeast European countries 
was characterised by the German division and the East-West conflict. While 
the GDR already had economic and military relations with the region before 
the Berlin Wall Fall, intense policy of the unified Federal Republic yet had to 
develop.7 The relocation of the German Parliament from Bonn to Berlin in 
1991 was viewed as swing towards the region.8 The relationships with 
Bulgaria, Rumania and Moldova developed smoothly. Rumania had a 
significant German minority which for the most part left the country after 
1989. Still, it was challenging to remove the Eastern neighbours’ fears of a 
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unified and powerful Germany, to advocate their interests and, 
simultaneously to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union/Russia.9 
Until today, the Eastern EU integration and affiliation leads to tensions.10 
German-Yugoslavian relations were already intense before the Wall Fall: 
Germany was the most important Yugoslavian trading partner, many foreign 
workers in Germany came from Yugoslavia, which was also a popular 
German travel destination and supported by the German government.11 In the 
Yugoslavian crisis starting in 1991 Germany took an active role. Since the 
situation increasingly required military engagement it finally led to a 
redefinition of German foreign and security policy and to foreign political 
identity changes.12 Also the German-Albanian relations were characterised as 
sympathizing since the 1990s including cooperation, active governmental 
exchanges and German assistance in the Albanian transformation and Euro-
Atlantic integration.13  
Over the last decades German policy supported all efforts to integrate or link 
the countries of Southeast Europe into the EU and to expand the NATO 
eastwards in order to secure a peaceful neighbourhood,14 reduce migratory 
pressure and tape new sales markets.15 With the focus on trade, aid and 
integration Germany also exhibited the characteristics of a civilian power.16 
Its political and economical motivations in Southeast Europe consequentially 
coincided.17 Nowadays, German foreign policy is mainly driven by EU 
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politics and the stabilisation and association process (SAA).18 It supports the 
European Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) helping financially 
the accession efforts and supporting all in all reforms, capacity building, 
development, employment, education, agriculture and regional cooperation 
since 2007. Of the countries covered by the RLP the resources are available 
to Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and 
Serbia.19 Also German foreign cultural relations and education policy 
(AKBP) supports the EU integration process.20 A particular emphasis the AA 
puts on regional cooperation in Southeast Europe in order to avoid the 
former reactive crisis management.21 On the German EU Council and G8 
presidency’s initiative in 1999 the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe was 
established covering the former Yugoslavian countries, Bulgaria, Rumania 
and Moldova and allowing for an EU membership prospect.22 It was replaced 
by the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) in 2008 and is now part of the 
Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP).23 Bulgaria and Rumania 
became EU member states in 2007. In 2013 Croatia accessed the EU. 
However, the European Commission still systematically asses the Bulgarian 
and Rumanian progress in judicial reforms and the fight against organised 
crime and corruption (benchmarking).24 Since 2009 Moldova is part of the 
EU’s Eastern Partnership policy. As component of the EU’s Eastern 
Neighbourhood policy it aims at politically associate and economically 
integrate the former countries of the USSR with the EU.25 In this context, the 
German government particularly supports civil society organisations and 
their interlinking with NGOs in the EU.26 Although Moldova is not a key 
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state for German politics,27 the relations have been recently intensified, 
according to the AA.28  
During the early transformation processes the German government offered 
multilateral assistance and bilateral credits to Southeast Europe. Under the 
coordination of the BMZ, it also provided advice to Rumania and the 
Yugoslavian countries which had been recognised developing countries. The 
consulting first focused on economic activities. This is why critics assumed 
the elaboration of a German trade facilitating social market economy. Over 
time, it was replaced by the political cooperation of the German political 
foundations.29 Legal advisory comes also from the IRZ, a Justice Ministries’ 
initiative in 1992 and funded governmentally and by the EC. It supports rule 
of law based and democratic constitutional structures and the harmonizing of 
national with EU law.30 For the non-developing countries in the region, such 
as Bulgaria, the AA and the BMWi coordinated the consulting assistance 
between 1994 and 2005 in the so-called “TRANSFORM” program.31 Today, 
Germany’s bilateral development cooperation covers Albania, Serbia, 
Kosovo, Bosnia Herzegovina and Moldova.32 Much assistance takes place in 
European development cooperation formats.33 Overarching developmental 
objectives in the Southeast Europe are EU orientation, good governance, 
conflict prevention, the fight against corruption, and job creation. Political 
focal points are the promotion of economic activity, public administrative 
and judiciary reforms and the infrastructure’s modernisation.34 In the context 
of judicial foreign affairs, the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer 
Protection (BMJV) promotes rule of law and democratic structures in the 
                                                 
27
 Bos (2007) pp. 456, 467. 
28
 BT (2011c) p. 19; AA at: http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/sid_329E5AB6408C1CB6571D1B4A47E52427/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laende
rinfos/Moldau/Bilateral_node.html.  
29
 Dauderstädt (2007) pp. 430ff; see 7.1.3. 
30
 IRZ at: http://www.irz.de/index.php/en/about-us.  
31
 BMZ at: http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/laender_regionen/Mittel-Ost-und-
Suedosteuropa/transform/index.html. Since 2005 the TRANSFORM successor program 
concerns Russia, Belarus and Ukraine (BMWi at: 
http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Presse/pressemitteilungen,did=201520.html).  
32
 BMZ (2013b) p. 27. 
33
 For details see BMZ at: 
http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/laender_regionen/Mittel-Ost-und-
Suedosteuropa/eu_programme/index.html.  
34
 BMZ at: http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/laender_regionen/Mittel-Ost-und-
Suedosteuropa/index.html; BT (2011c) p. 20.  
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region including expert exchanges, legislative support, conferences and 
seminars for foreign jurists. Thematically it concentrates on the spread of 
human rights and criminal law principles and in light of the German 
economy on commercial and corporate law.35 In the “Alliance for German 
law” the BMJV and the major German professional organisations advertise 
Germany as a legal location mainly through the initiative “Law – Made in 
Germany”.36  
The CDU (Christ-Democratic-Union) the KAS is affiliated to and ruling 
party since 2005 supports EU orientation and stabilization in the region. It 
welcomes the former EU enlargement and highlights the EU’s responsibility 
towards the Balkan and East European countries. Although stressing also the 
EU’s integration ability, it emphasizes the necessity of good neighborly 
relations, cooperation agreements and partnership treaties.37       
7.1.3. Landscape of the German political foundations 
In 2014, all of the German political foundations were active in the countries 
of Southeast Europe with partly overlapping work fields. Apart from the 
RLS, they all focused on the EU integration process next to other thematic 
areas.38 
The KAS aimed at bringing the Southeast European countries closer to the 
Euro-Atlantic structures and supported accession strategies through specific 
measures. It gave assistance in the democratic and economic transformation 
processes and focused on political and socio-political dialogue as well as 
regional cooperation.39 It maintained offices in all countries of the region 
except for Montenegro which was supported from the Serbian office.40 In 
                                                 
35
 BMJV at: 
http://www.bmjv.de/DE/Ministerium/Abteilungen/EUInternationaleZusammenarbeit/INT-
KOR/_doc/Zielgerichtete_Justizau%C3%9Fenpolitik.html?nn=1471926 (accessed on 
20/09/2015). 
36
 BMJV at: 
http://www.bmjv.de/DE/Ministerium/Abteilungen/EUInternationaleZusammenarbeit/INT-
KOR/_doc/Das_Buendnis_fuer_das_deutsche_Recht.html?nn=1471926 (accessed on 
20/09/2015); http://www.lawmadeingermany.de/; CDU/CSU/SPD (2013) p. 154. 
37
 CDU (2007) No. 328-30. 
38
 On the Stiftungs’ activities in East Europe compared to other regions see 5.3.  
39
 KAS at: http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.4785/.  
40
 KAS annual report (2013) p. 100. 
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addition, it had a regional media program and a rule of law program. The 
latter will be analysed extensively in the following sections.  
The activities of the FES in Southeast Europe focused on a just society, 
innovation, progress and democracy. Important work fields were elections 
and parliaments, economic and social policy, working relationships and 
social dialogue, education and media policy, communal policy and regional 
development, protection of minorities, foreign and security policy and 
challenges of globalisation. It fostered regional dialogue on these subjects. 
With view to the SEECP it promoted the European integration, good 
neighbourly relations and cooperation.41 The FES held as many country 
offices in the region as the KAS and an additional regional office.42     
Contacts of the FNS to the region already dated back to the 1970s.43 With its 
consulting, dialogue and educational activities the FNS focused on the 
economic transformation and liberal conceptions. It assisted the 
rapprochement with the EU, furthered cooperation and concentrated on 
freedom, human rights, democracy and market economy.44 The FNS 
supported among others liberal parties, associations, institutions, 
disseminators, individuals and media representatives.45 The regional office in 
Sofia coordinated the activities in Central, East and Southeast Europe, South 
Caucasus and Central Asia. In the sub-regions offices in Bulgaria and Serbia 
were responsible for Southeast Europe and the Western Balkans.46  
The HBS mainly supported democracy and the rule of law. It assisted the 
development of civil society, the dealing with the past and the countries’ 
European integration. A particular focus was on the economies’ 
environmental transformation, urban development and the protection of 
                                                 
41
 FES (2011a) pp. 6ff., (2011b); FES at: http://www.fes.de/international/moe/index.htm, 
http://www.fes.de/international/moe/in_moe/progr_so.htm.  
42
 FES at: http://www.fes.de/international/moe/in_moe/moe_so.htm, http://www.fessoe.de/.  
43
 FNS (2013a) p. 62. 
44
 FNS (2013b) pp. 20f. 
45
 FNS (2013a) p. 66. 
46
 FNS at: http://www.msoe.fnst.org/webcom/show_article.php/_c-1559/i.html; The 
Bulgarian office was also responsible for Macedonia, Rumania and Moldova (FNS at: 
http://www.freiheit.org/webcom/show_article.php/_c-218/i.html [accessed on 29/09/2015]). 
The Serbian office also covered Montenegro, Kosovo, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina und 
Croatia (FNS at: http://www.freiheit.org/webcom/show_article.php/_c-221/i.html [accessed 
on 29/09/2015]).   
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common resources. It targeted journalists, jurists and political scientists. 
Methodologically the HBS initiated media debates and workshops. It 
consulted reform-minded political parties and focused on the consolidation 
of the Green political spectrum. It also offered analysis and education 
measures and supported regional networking. In Southeast Europe the HBS 
had offices in Serbia, Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia. The office in 
Belgrade also coordinated activities in Montenegro and Kosovo. 47 
The RLS was committed to trade union representation of interests, anti-
fascism, feminism, democratisation of the education system, strengthening of 
alternative political discourses and the support of critical research. Primarily, 
its activities targeted civil society organisations and social movements, trade 
union initiatives, schools and educational institutions, leftist academic and 
cultural institutions and researchers.48 It also aimed at transnational 
networking of leftist initiatives, the critical coming to terms with the past of 
the left-leaning political parties and academic discussions on the redefinition 
of a modern leftism. The activities of the RLS in Southeast Europe started in 
2002 and were further expanded to almost all Southeast European countries 
coordinated by the regional office in Serbia.49   
The activities of the HSS primarily focused on EU integration and crisis’ 
prevention. They directed to the establishment and consolidation of 
democratic, rule of law based and civil society institutions targeting public 
administrations, police forces and judiciaries. Methodologically, the HSS 
offered education, seminars, trainings and interregional cooperation 
facilitating conferences. The HSS had five offices in Southeast Europe and 
activities in all countries of the region.50 
                                                 
47
 Fischer (2011) p. 3; HBS at: http://www.boell.de/de/2013/11/20/regionalbuero-
suedosteuropa-belgrad (accessed on 20/09/2015).  
48
 RLS (2011) pp. 7f.; RLS at: 
http://www.rosalux.de/weltweit/osteuropa/suedosteuropa/themenschwerpunkte.html 
(accessed on 20/09/2015).  
49
 RLS at: http://www.rosalux.de/weltweit/osteuropa/suedosteuropa.html (accessed on 
20/09/2015).  
50
 HSS (2015); HSS at: http://www.hss.de/internationale-arbeit/regionen-
projekte/europa.html.  
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7.1.4. The rule of law program of the KAS 
The KAS’s RLP in Southeast Europe started its work in 2006. Originally it 
concentrated on five countries and was extended successively. As of May 
2015 it covered Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Republic Moldova, Rumania und Serbia.51 The 
office was located in Bucharest and existed alongside the KAS’s country 
offices. In 2014, it comprised a director and four Rumanian local 
employees.52 In 2012 its annual budget amounted to 419.000 Euros.53 
Since the beginning the RLP had a strong European perspective 
concentrating of EU integration and the resolution of democracy and rule of 
law deficits. It was clear to the KAS that the countries of the Western 
Balkans only had an integration prospect in case they overcame these 
deficiencies. The program was supposed to send a signal of assistance to the 
Southeast European countries in their transformative processes. Since the 
RLP had already been established in other parts of the world, a program in 
the immediate sphere of European influence appeared necessary to the KAS. 
The program was organized regionally due to the comparability of the 
countries’ rule of law issues and in order to improve the respective 
information exchange among them.54 Rumania’s importance in the region, its 
forthcoming EU accession and its stability in contrast to the former 
Yugoslavian states were reasons for establishing the office in Bucharest.55 
The overall objective of the RLP was therefore the EU integration and EU 
corresponding legal orders and cultures.56 Sub-targets oriented towards the 
RLP’s objectives world-wide57 were the consolidation of democratic 
institutions through cooperation with constitutional courts and consulting of 
democratic institutions’ representatives, the modernization of constitutions, 
constitutional jurisdictions, substantive and procedural laws, the 
                                                 
51
 The initial countries covered by the RLP were Rumania, Serbia-Montenegro, Macedonia 
and Croatia (Luchterhandt [2013] p. 28). For the RLP’s website see: 
http://www.kas.de/rspsoe/en/. 
52
 Interview 8. 
53
 Luchterhandt (2013) p. 40. 
54
 Interview 8. 
55
 Luchterhandt (2013) p. 50. 
56
 KAS at: http://www.kas.de/rspsoe/en/about/.  
57
 See excursus. 
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strengthening of the public administration, judicial independence, human and 
minority rights, the counteraction of corruption and the dealing with the 
past.58 Moreover, the RLP focused on the promotion of the European ideal 
and the strengthening of regional cooperation and law-oriented networks.59 
Several aspects were considerably different in Southeast Europe from the 
other regions the KAS’s RLPs were active: the high level of political 
conflict, the post communist or post socialist transformation processes and 
the efforts to join the EU.60 
The RLP generally pursued long-term goals although some activities had 
medium- or short-term objectives, such as the revision of a certain law.61 
Although it was an internal requirement that equal weight needed to be given 
to the objectives, the matter of dealing with the past had never played a 
significant role, not every objective was equally important in each country 
and activities in Rumania were more strongly developed.62 The RLP’s 
directors also had some flexibility with regard to the choice of activity which 
recently had led to an increase in regional projects. Still, the types of 
activities were relatively steady and those of 2013 and 2014 were almost 
identical.63  
Excursus: rule of law programmes  
In 1991 the KAS established the first RLP in Latin America. In 2006 the 
RLPs for Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Europe and Asia started their 
work.64 In 2013 the RLP in North Africa and the Middle East followed.65 
The programmes were designed as regional sector programmes 
complementing the other KAS’s international undertakings. They were 
supervised by fully qualified German lawyers at offices in Bucharest, 
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 Interview 8. 
59
 Luchterhand (2013) p. 19.  
60
 KAS (2008b) p. 25; Luchterhandt (2013) p. 17. 
61
 Similar KAS (2014a). 
62
 The evaluation mentioned as reasons for the imbalance limited resources, political issues, 
a low propensity to participate in some countries and inequalities in the countries’ 
development (Luchterhandt [2013] pp. 18, 28). Croatia’s integration in the program, for 
example, was weak (ibidem p. 28). Little interest in the RLP was also attested to Albania, 
Kosovo and Montenegro (ibidem p. 39).  
63
 Interview 8. 
64
 KAS annual report (2006) p. 36. 
65
 KAS annual report (2013) p. 13. 
 204 
Nairobi, Mexico City, Bogota, Singapore and Beirut coordinated from the 
KAS’s headquarters in Berlin.66 The KAS defined four general objectives of 
the RLPs: (1) promoting rule of law structures and institutions; (2) the 
division of powers including a strong and independent judiciary and an 
executive bound to the law; (3) strengthening fundamental and human rights; 
and (4) reinforcing respective regional cooperation and networks.67  
The regional approach was driven by the insight that rule of law reform 
processes often ran regionally parallel, such as the Southeast European 
constitutional reforms after 1998 and those of Latin-American criminal 
proceedings in the mid-1980s. A catalyst for the set-up of the RLPs were the 
Spranger criterions of the German government which had highlighted the 
rule of law, among others.68 According to the KAS, the approach across 
countries also helped to work on topics which could not be addressed 
publicly on the national level and regional networking among experts also 
strengthened the self-help.69 The rule of law support had a high priority in its 
international work since development and security needed stable 
democracies as said by the KAS.70 While the KAS’s guidelines nonetheless 
did not mention the rule of law, the foundations’ common declaration 
considered rule of law engagement.71 
The instruments involved in the RLPs did not deviate from those generally 
used by the Stiftungen and included conferences, seminars, workshops, panel 
discussions, trainings, the publication of research, studies and other material, 
visiting programs in Germany, scholarships and consulting.72 As target 
groups and partners the KAS mentioned private and public-sector individuals 
such as legal practitioners including judges, lawyers, prosecuting attorneys 
and judicial staff officers, legal scholars, members of the parliaments, 
legislative committees, ministers and civil servants from the ministries’ of 
justice and internal affairs. The KAS also sought cooperation with 
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 KAS (2015a), (2008) p. 4. 
67
 Luchterhandt (2013) p. 17; KAS (2008b) p. 9. 
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 Interview 14; see also 5.2.2. 
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 KAS (2008b) p. 10. 
70
 KAS (2015a). 
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 FES/KAS/FNS/HSS/HBS (1998). 
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 KAS (2015a), (2008) p. 11. 
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professional associations of lawyers, political parties, NGOs, church 
associations and media representatives.73  
Next to the RLPs, the KAS maintained several other regional sector 
programs, such as media and regional dialogue programs mostly developed 
in 2010. As of 2015, the KAS had 19 such programs world-wide.74 
7.2. The practice of public diplomacy through democracy assistance? 
The following section looks in detail on how the KAS is public 
diplomatically active in the context of its RLP in Southeast Europe whilst 
applying the integrated public diplomacy model.75 I trace the communicative 
process either taking place as one-way communication or within a network 
surrounding where connected actors bring various resources and share values 
and interests. Afterwards, it is set in connection to the collaborative and 
catalytic public diplomacy form of democracy assistance adopting the 
systematisation of chapter 5. Finally, I consider the impact of the KAS as a 
transnational actor in the region.  
7.2.1. Generator 
In the context of the RLP in Southeast Europe the KAS showed the ability to 
generate public diplomacy. The KAS was autonomous in the decision over 
measures and their implementation and the case did not reveal a dependence 
link on German state institutions or the affiliated CDU. The RLP, like the 
other foundations’ activities was funded over the Federal Budget. In 2014, it 
did not receive international backing and was therefore not bound by 
respective requirements. Although the KAS’s RLP office had contacts with 
the German embassies in the region, they were not allowed and had not tried 
to give instructions. At times, the KAS consulted with the embassies as 
regards a measure.76 One example, however, was found where the Stiftungen 
became part of an AA’s public diplomacy initiative: In 2013 the German 
embassy in Sofia held together with the KAS, the FNS and other German 
organisations a series of cultural events in North Bulgaria with the intention 
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 KAS (2015a). 
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 See KAS’s annual reports between (2009) and (2013); (2014) pp. 100f. 
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 See 3.2. 
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 Interview 8. 
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to present a multifaceted image of Germany and to highlight cooperation.77 
The example is still not appropriate to prove the KAS’s instrumental use by 
the AA’s public diplomacy initiative measured by the overall amount of 
KAS’s activities.  
The KAS’s headquarter left the RLP free reign over decisions and it acted 
independently from the KAS’s country offices in the region. The decision on 
implementing a measure was taken by the RLP’s director and the whole 
implementation procedure was in his hands.78 Although in all measures the 
KAS cooperated with local partner organisations,79 activities were conducted 
as Eigenmaßnahmen implying the KAS’s involvement in some form, for 
instance through the provision of seminar’s speakers, and the measures’ 
(partially) financing. Each measure’s costs generally did not exceed 15.000 
Euros.80 The RLP’s office collected project proposals until the 30th of 
September of each year and selected 30. Afterwards it submitted them for the 
headquarter’s approval which normally consented. Partly, the director of the 
office had promoted certain measures to be implemented by partners. But he 
also appreciated the proposals of the partners often having more exact 
information on issues on-site. Follow-up measures were implemented in the 
subsequent year when the KAS considered their appropriateness.81  
The interview partner estimated that partners perceived the KAS neither as 
part of official diplomacy nor as an extension of the state but as civil society 
organisation. He associated the term public diplomacy with the KAS but 
objected that it was a term known to insiders.82 
7.2.2. Addresses and instruments 
Of the three groups public diplomacy can target, that is the general public, 
the media and specific disseminators, the RLP in Southeast Europe addressed 
mostly the last group. Its work mainly focused on a law-oriented audience.83 
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 Luchterhandt (2013) pp. 25, 37. 
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The evaluation described the target group as broad and the activities as elite-
focused.84 For the media sector’s support the KAS had established a specific 
regional program in 2005 located in Sofia.85 The instruments involved in the 
RLP only slightly differed from those generally used by the foundations. 
The RLP was organised as project work in cooperation with partner 
organisations. Civil society actors were important partners. In 2014, the ratio 
of civil society partners and partners from the state was relatively balanced 
with a slight preponderance of the non-state sector.86 The overall partner 
choice was considered as challenging and the KAS had to assess potential 
partners closely. Selection criteria were the potential partner’s rule of law 
support and reliability. The interview partner also referred to the 
foundations’ public funding why partners had to ensure correct accounting. It 
was often difficult to estimate whether potential partners pursued serious 
targets or whether they depended on invisible actors.87 
The RLP showed particularities regarding the cooperation with political 
parties and high level politics which were different from the general findings 
made before.88 Cooperation with high-level politics was “legitimized” in the 
RLP as for rule of law topics they were the natural target group. 
Furthermore, it was difficult for the KAS to find suitable political parties to 
cooperate with and even to alternatively cooperate with parliament’s 
committees and fractions. Political party structures were not comparable to 
those of German political parties. Legal-policy or domestic affairs 
spokesperson were missing to be supported systematically and the strong 
parties’ hierarchy hindered the development of expertise.89 The often 
changing committees’ compositions furthermore impeded the 
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parliamentarians’ responsibility for respective issues.90 Rule of law 
structures, moreover, could not be discussed on a party-political basis having 
the effect that the KAS even cooperated with rather left-leaning 
organisations. The KAS was nonetheless pleased with partners being 
politically affiliated.91  
The RLP’s instruments corresponded to the medium- and long-term public 
diplomacy instruments and were broadly situated within dialogues, 
discussions and the transfer of knowledge. The RLP organized around 30 
conferences, seminars and workshops per year which took place successively 
in the Southeast European countries. Activities in Germany of the RLP did 
not happen except for some part of the Rumanian junior lawyers program. 
Parallel measures were not carried out as the RLP’s director attached 
importance to sit in on every activity.92  
The political dialogue instrument was most important for the RLP and a 
meta-level work approach which included the other instruments. The RLP 
followed a political, value- and dialogue-based approach in contrast to a 
rather technical and advisory method when promoting the rule of law.93 It 
thereby focused on the political fields of law such as combating corruption, 
the dealing with the past and minority rights. With value orientation it meant 
the focus on peace, freedom, equality, democracy and the rule of law.94 The 
approach was highlighted as the KAS’s “unique selling position” and 
contrasted with the capacity building and training measures of other actors in 
the field.95 Only one example was found where the RLP had offered 
technical support: In 2012 together with the GIZ it supported the Serbian 
parliament in publishing a manual about how to draft legislation. According 
to the KAS it had wanted to push the cooperation with Serbia difficult to be 
integrated into the RLP.96  
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Elements of cultural diplomacy were visible in the RLP. It organised cultural 
events and an annual human rights festival. Scholarships were granted to 
students in the region by the country offices but the RLP organised certain 
events for former and current legal scholarship holders.97 Moreover, it can be 
believed that the RLP imparted German legal culture in the region as the 
German legal system was a framework of reference in activities and high-
ranking German lawyers and legal institutions were integrated in the 
program.98 The KAS also linked its rule of law engagement to an assumed 
world-wide interest in German legal culture.99 
The RLP was also active in think tank events and consulting. It organised 
conferences with think tank partner organisations, such as the Romanian 
Centre for European politics (CRPE), the Romanian Expert Forum (EFOR) 
and the Serbian Centre for Advanced Legal Studies (CUPS). Some 
cooperation took place with universities, such as with the Serbian 
Singidunum University’s affiliated faculty of European law and political 
science.100 The RLP also offered on its website serial country reports and 
analysis of political events connected to the rule of law.101 The KAS’s RLP 
was also involved in legal consulting of democratic institutions’ 
representatives focusing on EU corresponding legal orders.102 Consulting 
could also be found as regards the regions’s stabilization: In 2012, the RLP 
organized advisory meetings with Kosovan and Serbian actors on rule of law 
solutions for the relations between them.103  
Due to the regional media program the RLP did not undertake media 
activities. However, one workshop on media and transitional justice in 2013 
was found.104 Also monologue public diplomacy instruments were rare. The 
RLP produced certain material, such as studies and books as well as the 
above mentioned serial publications but mostly as result of a dialogue 
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instrument. One monologue example is the translation of significant 
decisions of the German constitutional court into some of the regional 
languages.105 Other monologue instruments, such as political campaigning 
and advertisement could not be found.  
7.2.3. Dimensions: Propaganda and network 
The promotion of the rule of law and the direct cooperation with judicial 
institutions as practised in the KAS’s RLP was highly political. The KAS 
was aware that rule of law aid could be perceive as propagandistic or 
international intrusion. It had also dealt with manipulations, the tendency to 
mendacity and the lack of credibility, aspects the literature often connected 
to propaganda.106 According to the KAS, its political affiliation and value-
based dialogue approach created credibility on site.107 It also assured that it 
did not force the German legal culture onto the countries, put bluntly German 
interests and avoided hidden agendas.108 In this context it outlined that “rule 
of law helps the recipient country to improve their development 
opportunities. At the same time, it is in the German economic and security 
political interest when counting on stable and democratic partner countries 
under the rule of law.”109 KAS’s involvement in internal political battles or 
criticism by the recipient countries could not be noted. The promoted EU 
affiliation was mostly also intended by the governments of the Southeast 
European countries. This was different from other regions where the political 
ideas of the KAS and those of the respective countries collided. According to 
the interview partner, the RLP did not cooperate with secret services and 
transparently presented its partners and events on its website. Also the 
KAS’s affiliation to the CDU was known to the partners. Despite missing 
financial information former activities could at least be found several years 
past. During the conducted interview the atmosphere was very cooperative 
and the requested information was disclosed. What finally spoke against a 
propaganda dimension in the KAS’s RLP was what has been generally noted 
for the Stiftungen: the KAS’s relative autonomy, the implementation of 
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mostly dialogue instruments and the pluralistic approach of several 
Stiftungen offering different solutions to rule of law issues.110 
The networking dimension, in contrast, was well recognizable in the RLP’s 
case. It also enjoyed a prominent position in the RLP’s activity portfolio 
although it referred to the linking of actors in the region only and did not 
consider the KAS as an important node. The following subsections analyse 
the relationships as well as the exchanged resources and common values and 
interests of the network participants. We conclude with the attempt to specify 
the overall network surrounding (7.2.3.3).   
7.2.3.1. Relationships 
In 2014, diverse relationships to local, foreign and German actors existed in 
the context of the RLP. Most of them were stable, independent, characterized 
by cooperation. Although the local relationships mainly concerned the legal 
sector in the Southeast European countries, diverse state actors, NGOs, 
students, academics and professional organizations were included. 
Relationships with media people and political party members were 
underdeveloped, yet.111 Intensive contacts on site existed also to the KAS’s 
country offices and the regional media office, to German embassy members, 
to the other Stiftungen and German organisations, such as IRZ, GIZ and the 
German church organisations as well as to foreign organisations.112 With the 
US think tank Freedom House in Rumania the RLP, for instance, had held a 
workshop on the fight against public procurement criminality in 2012.113 It 
also cooperated with the Chinese Scheherazade foundation.114 The KAS had 
contacts and cooperated with foreign embassies and supranational levels.115 
Examples were a round table event in Rumania on the inclusion of Roma 
people organised by the RLP, the Slovakian embassy and the EU 
commission in 2014116 and a speech of the RLP’s director on the UN anti-
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corruption strategy for Central and Eastern Europe at the US embassy to 
Rumania in 2015.117  
The RLP profited from the wide variety of contacts which existed between 
actors in Germany and the KAS. German politicians of the CDU at the 
federal and the state level participated in the RLP’s conferences and events 
and senior officials of the German ministries showed interest in the 
program.118 The RLP’s director had also political contacts on the German 
local level due to his former membership at the Lübeck parliament and the 
Landtag Schleswig-Holstein for the CDU. These contacts were also used for 
the RLP.119 A particular conspicuous aspect in the RLP was the integration 
of high ranking German lawyers and German institutions in the RLP’s 
activities. Judges of the Federal Constitutional Court had been, for instance, 
guest speakers at the Rumanian and Moldavian Courts during book 
presentations of significant German decisions translated to Rumanian.120 The 
Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency’s director, Christine Lüders, visited the 
RLP in the context of conference on the 10th anniversary of the Rumanian 
Anti-Discrimination Agency.121 NGOs in Germany, moreover, occasionally 
established contacts to the RLP and German academics participated in 
activities on site.122  
Initially the RLP’s relationships depended on the KAS’s country offices. The 
RLP was even directed by the Rumanian office in the first year. Afterwards 
it increased its activities and independence. Additionally, it referred to the 
existing links of the country offices to actors on site.123 The relationships’ 
stability was central since the KAS considered important continuity and 
long-term partnership prospects. In Rumania and Bulgaria the KAS remained 
active beyond 2007 although the aim of the EU membership was already 
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achieved. According to the evaluation the partners highly acknowledged it, 
especially because other international organisations prevailingly had left the 
country.124 Furthermore, the RLP’s office in Rumania was an important 
guarantor of stability. It was an important point of contact for the partners. 
RLP’s undertakings were also easier to be organised than in other countries 
leading to a preponderance of activities in Rumania. Moreover, the 
employment of local staff members and the permanent German 
representative contributed to the stability of contacts.125  
Although the overall situation among donor organizations on site and 
especially with USAid was characterized as competitive,126 the KAS’s 
relationships with other actors were mainly cooperative. Joint-measures were 
implemented with the German embassy.127 Intensive cooperation could also 
be found with the KAS’s country offices and the media office in Southeast 
Europe.128 The country offices were supposed to generally focus on all 
aspects of the countries’ political development while the RLP specifically 
directed to legal issues for which extensive legal knowledge of a person 
being in the law was deemed necessary.129 Still, both showed conceptual 
similarities in the support of the countries’ rapprochement with the EU, the 
dealing with the communist past, political party cooperation or parliamentary 
assistance, the consulting in constitutional reform processes (in Bosnia 
Herzegovina) and the explicit cooperation with rule of law actors (in 
Albania).130 To avoid activity overlaps, coordination took place. Direct, e-
mail and telephone contacts with the other directors were frequent.131 
Annually the offices’ staff members in the region met to discuss the KAS’s 
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overall activities. Also the other German political foundations’ activities on 
site and those of the RLP partly corresponded as they equally circled around 
EU affiliation, stabilisation, democratisation and the rule of law.132 However, 
the RLP’s in-depth and explicit specialisation on the rule of law stood out. 
The KAS exchanged views with other German Stiftungen and occasionally 
met with them. One such instance was the German embassy periodically 
inviting the foundations.133 The FES in Rumania and the RLP both 
maintained a partnership with the National Association of Judges but a 
particular competitive situation between them the interview partner did not 
confirm. Several times in the past the KAS and the FES even had organised 
joint conferences in the field of justice.134 According to the evaluator also the 
other Stiftungen were willing to cooperate with the RLP.135 Remarkably, the 
missing approach of different political partners in the region did not equally 
result in increased competition among the foundations. Also the relations 
with the other German organisations the interview partner described as 
cooperative. Projects were carried out together with the German catholic and 
protestant churches. With the GIZ the RLP had a joint-project in Serbia at 
the time of the interview and the IRZ was an occasional conversation 
partner.136 Both, the IRZ and GIZ followed a technical and advisory 
approach and the GIZ concentrated on civil and commercial law which led to 
activities and partners other than those of the RLP. In case of overlapping, 
for example with the IRZ in supporting public law reforms in Moldova and 
with the Venice Commission regarding constitutional reform processes 
activities were coordinated.137  
7.2.3.2. Resources, values and interests 
Within the framework of the aforementioned relationships the RLP and the 
other actors exchanged resources and to a high degree shared values and 
policy interests.  
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Financial resources received over the Federal Budget the RLP used for the 
activities on site. One fourth was made available directly to the partner 
organisations on side.138 Partners often had some financial means and 
contributed moreover with human resources and labour. Financial support of 
political parties was not allowed and did not take place, whereas the 
cooperation with politicians or party foundations was possible.139 The 
evaluator attested to the RLP a shortage in human, physical and financial 
resources.140  
Information resources were accessed by KAS through the partners on site 
and from its own experiences. Partners generally had an advantage in 
knowledge on the local situation. All RLP’s exchanged experiences at 
regular meetings in Berlin. Information was also exchanged with the German 
embassies and the other foundations.141 The KAS’s country offices provided 
logistical resources and information through the monitoring of the political 
situation and indentified suitable partners for the RLP especially for 
measures in other countries than Rumania. In turn, the country office 
benefitted from the RLP’s measures in its country.142 Necessary expertise 
was also bought from other actors.143 The information collected was further 
processed in analysis of the situation on site and was used for the reports to 
the KAS’s headquarter and the German ministries. The headquarter assessed 
and compared the information to that of other RLPs.144  
The RLP, moreover, had significant networking resources. Promoting the 
cooperation between the Southeast European countries was one of the RLP’s 
objectives and viewed as condition for the program’s sustainability. 
According to the evaluation, the KAS was able to interlink actors at the 
constitutional and other courts, rule of law oriented NGOs, qualified junior 
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lawyers and former scholarship holders in the region. Many nodes already 
potentially existed through the country offices and before the RLP’s 
establishment.145 Challenging was considered in this context to arouse the 
countries’ interests in each other.146 The evaluation also mentioned the 
linguistic differences between them.147 The KAS also connected partners 
from the different RLPs world-wide.148 As outlined, the KAS invited 
German politicians and legal actors to the region, established connections to 
their foreign counterparts and tried to furthered political cooperation. Also 
the KAS’s visit and educational program in Germany and the RLP’s 
Rumanian junior lawyer program focused on the relationship building 
between actors from both countries. The KAS’s approach of its own 
participation in the measures and the inclusion of local partner ensured the 
necessary contacts on site and the integration of German actors. Since the 
director of the RLP attended the measures he also had some control over the 
establishment of contacts. Furthermore, the office located on site was 
obviously important for the networking as the RLP had most of its local 
contacts and activities in Rumania, whereas in other countries the RLP 
depended on the country offices and the integration of actors was more 
challenging.  
The KAS furthermore provided moral authority in the context of the RLP. 
The KAS’s affiliation to the CDU was known to the partners and therefore 
often associated it with Chancellor Angela Merkel. At the same time, it was 
perceived as civil society organisation. The interview partner saw an 
advantage of promoting rule of law as a German organisation as the highly 
respected German Constitutional Court, the good institutional set-up, the 
professional parliament and the profound substantive and procedural law 
allowed “products to sell well” and increased credibility when advocating 
these aspects in Southeast Europe. He also stressed that Germans were 
considered on site as competent and reliable.149 According to the KAS, 
Germany also served as a role model owing to the successful GDR’s legal 
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integration.150 Often this German model character was viewed in dissociation 
to the US model.151 
Apart from the exchange of resources, the RLP’s network was characterised 
by shared policy interests and values of the involved actors. As already 
outlined, values were particularly highlighted in the RLP’s work approach. 
The RLP’s objectives moreover fitted almost “template-like” with the 
German and EU integration policy towards the region. Also the KAS traced 
the RLPs’ initiation world-wide to the beginnings of German development 
policy’s conditionality and the emphasis on political criteria in the aiding 
countries152 as well as the international agendas attaching increasing 
importance to the rule of law from the 1990s onwards.153 In Southeast 
Europe these considerations were reflected also in the EU enlargement 
policy.154 With the take over of the BMZ’s consulting assistance in the 
region, the Stiftungen, as outlined, became an integral part of the German 
policy.155 The interview partner explained the RLP’s engagement by the 
desire to assist the countries in meeting the admission conditions and 
becoming equal members.156 Concrete accordance can be found with the 
policies of the BMZ and of the European’s IPA in the support of public 
administrations’ and judiciaries’ reform processes, the fight against 
corruption (BMZ) and regional and territorial cooperation (IPA). The RLP’s 
objectives were also consistent with the BMJV’s policy although the 
ministry emphasised civil and economic law while the RLP did not promote 
economy-related legal fields and focused on public law. Both furthered 
standards in criminal law. Moreover, the countries covered by the RLP were 
those of the EU’s Stability Pact, largely consistent with the IPA countries 
and with the EC’s benchmarking as regards Bulgaria and Rumania. 
Moreover, the German government meant exactly the countries covered by 
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the RLP when referring to Southeast Europe.157 The engagement of the KAS 
was furthermore in line with the CDU’s political program stressing 
cooperation treatments and EU membership prospects. With the visiting 
German politicians the RLP also shared conservative values. With actors 
from German legal institutions the RLP had in common the worthwhile goal 
of the rule of law. German and international organisations on site either 
shared the political interest in EU integration or the focus on the rule of law. 
Local partners the RLP chose when they supported the rule of law. Although 
it is uncertain whether other local actors and addressees associated with the 
network shared these mutual values and interests, the governments of the 
Southeast European countries largely supported the EU integration.  
7.2.3.3. Types of transnational policy network 
The network in which the RLP operated in 2014 did not corresponded to the 
outlined ideal-typical forms of transnational policy networks.158 Although it 
came closest to the global public policy network, attributes of other network 
types could be found and led to a mixed character. The network resembled a 
transnational advocacy network (TAN) only in terms of the common issues 
circling around the rule of law deficits in the region. The prerequisite of a 
campaign was missing as the situation’s improvement could not be achieved 
in a foreseeable period. Contrary to TANs, the network also linked actors on 
site which often did not have anything to do with each other, included the 
public sector and exchanged more resources than information only. 
Furthermore, the connections furthermore resembled a transnational 
executive network due to links with civil servants on site and in Germany. 
However, the KAS was not part of the German public administration and, 
according to the interview partner, was not perceived on site as government 
official. Moreover, due to the integrated professionals and experts the 
network was similar to a global knowledge network (KNET). Knowledge 
generation, the informing of policy, its application and networking itself 
played an important role. Also the measures involving research, networking, 
advice and consulting in the policy making process were consistent with 
those of the RLP. German public bodies supported the RLP leading to a 
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semi-official position. The RLP also controlled resources and was 
internationally experienced. However, experts and professionals were not the 
only network’s participants. The KAS also lacked scientific neutrality 
particularly highlighted in its value-based approach and combined political 
affiliation which was, though secondary but still important for the KAS. 
Finally, the RLP’s network was trisectoral, as it included public sector 
officials, civil servants and civil society professionals similar to a global 
public policy network (GPPN). Still, the included individuals, such as 
students and scholarship holders did not appear in the GPPN terminology. 
Due to the missing economic sector, the network could not be termed as a 
tripartite global governance network. GPPNs consider international actors 
while the current case involved mainly national and local actors and did not 
have a particular supranational character. Whether the deficit in the rule of 
law was a shared problem existing over cross-boarders according to the 
GPPN’s definition depended on the perspective of the involved actor. For the 
KAS it was a regional phenomenon and part of the supranational integration 
policy why it furthered regional cooperation. The national countries, in 
contrast, were often not interested in it. They obviously deemed the 
processing of the rule of law deficit as something to be managed on the 
national level which complied with the EU’s practice of integrating national 
countries in contrast to regions.          
Loose couplings and issue networks have been suggested forms of 
interaction between state and non-state actors in the context of public 
diplomacy.159 Unlike these types, the public sector presence in the current 
network was relatively high and interaction between the non-state and the 
state actors was strong. In contrast to the issue network, it existed among 
most actors a common policy objective and the permeability of the network 
in terms of new actors’ inclusion was rather low due to the RLP’s selection 
procedure. The integration of the established network into the policy making 
process was ambivalent as several processes came into question: In the 
Southeast European countries the influencing of partners directly involved in 
policy making was difficult due to the lack of collaborating political parties 
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and chairmen of parliamentary committees. This and the fact that the KAS as 
a transnational actor dominated the setting spoke for the issue network. In 
Germany, the KAS was strongly involved in the policy making process. As 
outlined in Chapter 4, it consulted formally with the respective German 
ministries and delivered expert opinion at the parliamentary committees. It 
also actively implemented the policy of the BMZ in Southeast Europe. In this 
respect the network appeared to be a policy community actor.160 The 
internationalized policy environments of multilevel governance and self-
regulatory, private regimes, where the public sector is more strongly 
involved compared to the loose coupling were still not appropriate to 
characterize the current case’s interactions. Both assume a highly 
institutionalized form of cooperation among actors and a certain degree of 
formality, which neither in Germany nor in Southeast Europe could be 
found.  
7.2.4. Assisting democracy? 
In the model of democracy assistance the state institutions’ support allows 
for rule of law aid directed at other countries’ legal systems. It aims at an 
independent and effective judiciary and other law-oriented institutions.161 In 
this context, Carothers itemises firstly the reforming of institutions including 
judicial reforms, legislative strengthening, retraining of prosecutors, police 
and prison reform, bolstering public defenders and introducing alternative 
dispute resolution; secondly, the rewriting of laws, such as modernizations in 
criminal, civil and commercial laws; thirdly the upgrading of legal 
professionals including the strengthening of bar associations and legal 
education; and finally the increasing of legal access and advocacy aiming at 
the support of law-oriented NGOs, public interest law reforms, legal media 
training and the support of legal aid clinics.162  
The RLP’s activities in 2014 focused on all four fields of rule of law 
assistance: It aimed at the consolidation of institutions and furthered 
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constitutional jurisdiction. In the public sector the KAS mainly cooperated 
with constitutional courts and association of judges. Its collaboration with 
parliaments also intended the legislatives’ strengthening. It also focused on 
the modernization of public and procedural laws and on legal education as it 
targeted legal scholars and professional legal organizations.163 In 2015 it had 
also initiated a program to further the knowledge transfer on the rule of law 
in grammar schools.164 Through its partnerships with law-interested NGOs 
the RLP was also active in assisting the advocacy sector.  
The RLP’s democracy assistance ambitions were not restricted to rule of law 
aid only, although aid in the state institutions’ sector prevailed and the 
judiciary’s support was most significant.165 The RLP irregularly supported 
electoral processes. It had, for instance, organized penal discussions in order 
to confront politicians with critical questions of the audience. However, 
election aid was rather a country offices’ task and elections were not 
supported technically. In the context of the democracy assistance’ political 
party building, the KAS looked for contacts to them and acted as an advisor, 
although, as already outlined, it proved difficult.166 The modernization of 
constitutions and the furthering of the division of power were RLP’s 
objectives and part of democracy assistance’s constitutional aid. In Bosnia-
Herzegovina, for instance, the RLP had helped elaborating a constitutional 
commentary available in the local languages and in English and drafted by 
domestic and foreign experts in 2010.167 The RLP also focused on local 
political development. The office had established contacts between Serbian 
mayors and the association of German cities and towns.168 The RLP’s 
cooperation with NGOs and other civil society actors finally can be viewed 
as aiding democracy assistance’s civil society sector.  
The RLP’s long-term involvement and the focus on long-term political and 
social reform processes in the region were in line with the developmental 
democracy promotion approach. Still, the RLP’s activities even 
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approximated the wider approaches of state-building169 and conflict 
management:170 The RLP’s objectives of human rights protection, of 
comprehensively supporting transformation processes and the strengthening 
of public administrations were part of a state-building approach. Also the 
RLP’s focus on combating organised crime complied with the state-
buildings’ security component and peace-building. According to the 
interview partner, the KAS cooperated with police forces in this context 
which referred to the instrument of security sector reforms. The RLP’s 
dealing with the past regarding war crimes and totalitarianism complied with 
peace-building, reconciliation and transitional justice. Also the RLP’s 
strategy to further integrate the region into the EU and the fostering of 
regional cooperation corresponded to peace-building. According to the 
partner organisations, the RLP was able to bring together political and legal 
actors of different views to talk to each other in cases of domestic tensions171 
which can also be viewed as dialogic interaction among conflicting parties. 
Although state-building is generally focused on a short-term aim 
achievement and the RLP, in contrast, adopted a long-term approach 
integrating elements of both state-building and conflict management was 
justified as the stability of most of the countries in the region was not 
sufficient.172 
7.2.5. Impact of the KAS  
In chapter 2 I reflected on the difficulty of measuring the impact of 
transnational actors by policy outcomes and their influence on the policy 
making process. To causally link the RLP’s activities to political results in 
the Southeast European countries was equally impossible. I found one such 
success story the KAS credited itself with: During the Rumanian political 
crisis in 2012 the constitutional court, which had cooperated with the KAS 
since many years, had held a key position to end the conflict between the 
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political camps as it had to decide about the referendum on the president’s 
removal. It was not awed by the intimidation attempts of one of the political 
camps what was virtually celebrated as the victory of the rule of law.173 Still, 
to trace back this success to the RLP’s engagement only is doubtful. 
Although the interview partner believed that the RLP had initiated social 
reform processes and positive changes he also regarded as particular difficult 
to change and encourage thought processes and to become one of the crucial 
socialisation factors among all the other aspects of influence.174 Also the 
evaluation stressed the RLP’s positive effect on the region’s modernisation 
and EU integration.175 However, to fully meet the needs in rule of law 
activities the funds had to be increased by ten times or more.176 Cooperation 
with political parties and parliamentary committees also showed the 
difficulties of the KAS to offer expertise and exercise influence on the 
agenda setting process. The interview partner and the evaluation both 
concluded that it was all about a progress towards the defined RLP’s 
objectives and not about the actual aim achievement by the RLP’s activities 
alone.177 Nonetheless, the evaluation regarded the RLP as the most important 
external rule of law program, at least in Rumania.178 The KAS tried to 
overcome this difficulty of measuring causal results by focusing on the 
proper implementation of measures. The interview partner referred to the 
concept of sustainability including the subject’s relevance for the respective 
country and the production of a certain result. In the follow-up of a 
conference, for example, an academic work, a these paper or the initiation of 
a network was a necessary requirement.179  
As a consequence, considering the KAS’s impact in the region in light of 
policy changes or development effects did not lead to results. While it was 
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also methodological difficult to trace back how information and experiences 
gathered in the context of the RLP influenced German policies towards the 
countries in Southeast Europe, the RLP was, as demonstrated, strongly 
involved in implementing parts of the German policy. Furthermore, with its 
focus on aid and EU integration it supported indirectly Germany’s role 
concept of a civilian power. To view the RLP as a sheer executive organ for 
German politics, however, is misleading since its activities often went 
beyond the respective policy implications. In 2014 the BMZ, for example, 
was only partially active in Southeast Europe due the focus on specific 
countries and the fact that some states were not defined as developing 
countries. In these cases, the ministry relied on other actors, such as the 
Stiftungen. Especially in rule of law aid, state actors were not aped for the 
task and the Stiftungens’ undertakings were often the only possibility when 
the claim of interference was to be avoided.180 Still, the fragmented German 
foreign policy making process which included different departmental 
responsibilities181 also apparent towards Southeast Europe does not allow 
speaking of the KAS as a vicarious agent for the German policy. Interests of 
economic policy, for example, promoted by the BMJV could not be found in 
the RLP.  
According to the point of view taken here and understanding impact as the 
establishment of communication channels and operation in networks, sheds a 
completely different light on the KAS’s impact. Within the established 
RLP’s network, the KAS took a central position as it controlled the exchange 
of resources and was therefore more dominant than the involved state actors. 
The KAS was also mainly involved in the network’s building and maintained 
a bridging function which can be viewed as an “example of mattering” 
itself.182 The case showed furthermore a high flexibility of the KAS to adapt 
its activities to the domestic conditions in the region. With abandoning its 
world-wide practised approach of predominantly working with affiliated 
partners and focusing on law-oriented addressees instead the KAS bypassed 
the problem of missing partners with a political background akin to the KAS. 
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From a more general perspective, the RLP also intensified the links between 
Germany and the countries of Southeast Europe on different levels. Also the 
interview partner believed that the activities of the RLP contributed to the 
bilateral relations.183 Whether the RLP positively impacted the image of 
Germany and its law in the region as assumed by the evaluator184 is difficult 
to verify, in contrast. Although the KAS did not plan in the near future the 
establishment of other RLPs world-wide and the progress in Southeast 
Europe was slow, the interview partner was cautiously optimistic regarding 
future developments in the rule of law field and pleaded for a committed 
continuation of work in the region.185  
Conclusion 
With the case of the KAS’s rule of law program in Southeast Europe I tried 
to illustrate the public diplomatic undertakings of the Stiftungen. It showed 
that the KAS predominantly planned activities for the long-term, mainly used 
dialogue instruments and purposed in particular the building of favourable 
relationships. 
The RLP was organised as a sector program. It showed several particularities 
which translated into the public diplomacy approach. Due to the focus on the 
rule of law the public diplomacy’s addressees were limited to specific 
disseminators while simultaneously the target groups were extended to 
politically non-affiliated partners and high-level politics. It secured the 
KAS’s own ability to act in countries were political partners were missing as 
partnerships were defined through the specific topic. It also legitimized the 
cooperation with state actors on site, something actually desired by the 
Stiftungen.186 The balance between the German political foundations, on the 
contrary, was disrupted. Although competition between the KAS and the 
other foundations could not be noted, the adopted target group concept 
neutralised the unwritten partner pluralism among the foundations which I 
consider at least partly as a guarantor against propaganda activity.   
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The network surrounding mainly determined the KAS’s impact on site. Not 
only exchanged the KAS resources with various actors, it also actively build 
networks, mainly controlled the links between actors and acted as a gate 
keeper. Especially the RLP’s office in Rumania and the long-term KAS’s 
activities in the region positively impacted the network building. The 
network was characterised by a mixed character and features of different 
transnational policy networks. It showed a high degree of shared values and 
policy interest among actors but German and European policy interests were 
put to the fore. Although the KAS acted independently from governmental 
guidelines, it implemented large parts of German policy in the region and 
indirectly extended the official margin for manoeuvre through its cooperation 
with a wide variety of actors which otherwise could have never been reached 
by governmental actors. This also happened fully intentional as the KAS 
frequently referred to German politics when justifying its undertakings on 
site. Although the KAS appeared as a civil society organisation on site, it 
disguised neither its affiliation to the German ruling party nor the fact that it 
was a political organisations purposing political changes. Finally, the case of 
the RLP showed moreover that the KAS mixed several catalytic and 
collaborative public diplomacy forms. Neither did it limit its democracy 
assistance to rule of law aid only nor did it strictly differentiate between 
democracy assistance and conflict management task. Activities were rather 
adapted flexibly to the perceived necessities and possibilities on site.   
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Chapter 8 - Practising public diplomacy through 
conflict management: The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 
in Southern Thailand 
The following chapter aims at illustrating how German political foundations 
are active in the field of conflict management. This is shown in the case of 
the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) and its ambitions to further peace in the 
Southern regions of Thailand where violence, without much international 
perception, is the order of the day. The chapter is based mainly on fieldwork 
conducted in Thailand in 2009. It also includes more recent material. The 
chapter starts with an overview of the framework in which the FES operated 
in Thailand in 2009. Afterwards, we look more closely at the FES’s public 
diplomacy ambitions in the context of its conflict management in Thailand’s 
deep South.  
8.1. Thailand and Germany 
The kingdom of Thailand is the only Southeast Asian state without a 
colonial history. The revolution of 1932 led from absolute to constitutional 
monarchy as well as to power struggles between concurring groups of 
armed forces and of social elites. Since World War II, Thailand has seen all 
manner of different forms of government, ranging from military 
dictatorships to electoral democracy. Seventeen constitutions and charters 
have been in power since that time. They all approved the monarchy. Most 
of Thailand’s numerous post-war governments were controlled by the 
military and periods of parliamentary democracy alternated with military 
governments.1 King Bhumipol Adulyadej has been ruling Thailand since 
1946. He is the world’s longest-serving monarch and is assumed to be the 
world’s richest royal.2 He is the head of state, the supreme commander of 
the armed forces and the highest Buddhist dignitary. He also confirms the 
prime minister, who is elected by the House of Representatives. 
The 1997 constitution was widely hailed as a landmark in democratic 
political reform. It included electoral innovations, an increase in checks and 
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balances, the establishment of the constitutional court and the explicit 
recognition of human rights.3 At the time of the interviews, Thailand's 
constitution was that of 2007, which had replaced an interim constitution 
formed in 2006 after an army-led coup. It provided for a bicameral 
parliament. Members of the House of Representatives were elected on a 
proportional party list by popular vote. The Senate consisted partly of 
representatives of the 76 Thai provinces; the other part was appointed by a 
committee and consisted of members who were not allowed to be political 
party members and mainly belonged to the social and military elite. 
In the 1980s, Thailand experienced an economic boom and became one of 
Southeast Asia’s economically leading countries, making the leap from a 
developing to a threshold country.4 It managed to recover from the 1997 
Asian financial crisis by 2001.5 In 2002 the Federal Foreign Office (AA) 
considered Thailand a small “tiger economy”.6 Thailand is a founding 
member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asian 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA). In 2009, at the time of the interviews, the political situation in 
Thailand was one of conflict; this situation grew out of control soon 
thereafter.  
The following sections will give an overview of the political situation in 
Thailand and challenges faced by the German political foundations, the 
situation in the Southern provinces, the official relations between Germany 
and Thailand, and the landscape of the German political foundations on site. 
They take into account the perceptions of the interview partners. 
8.1.1. Political situation and aid organisations  
In 2009 Thailand experienced conflicts between the political camps of 
Thaksin Shinawatra, former prime minister of Thailand (the “Reds”) and the 
conservative elite in Bangkok (the “Yellows”). Thaksin, a 
telecommunications businessman and one of the wealthiest people in 
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Thailand, ruled from 2004 to 2007, a time dominated by gross violations of 
the rule of law and by clampdowns on Muslim dissenters in the Southern 
provinces.7 The “Reds” were mainly rural workers supporting the pro-
Thaksin People Power Party (PPP) led by Prime Minister Samak 
Sundaravej. Thaksin fled from Thailand in 2008. The “Yellows”, supporters 
of the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), were for the most part a 
loose grouping of royalists, businessmen and the urban middle class, led by 
media mogul Sondhi Limthongkul and Chamlong Srimuang, a former 
general with close ties to the king.8 During the 2008 PPP government, 
protests and violence did not relent and led to the occupation of the two 
international airports by members of the PAD. From late 2008 onwards, 
Abhisit Vejjajiva was prime minister and leader of the opposition Democrat 
Party (DP), associated with the “Yellows”.9 Political instability continued in 
2009. The pro-Thaksin United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship 
(UDD) stormed the ASEAN Conference in Pattaya and violence escalated 
in Bangkok. In the months that followed, the internal affairs situation 
calmed down after the government initiated a military intervention, but 
protests resumed in 2010.10 The military intervened several times. In 2013, 
during the governmental term of Thaksin’s sister Yingluck, who had been 
elected in 2011, protests flared up again and were ended by a military coup 
in 2014.  
Although most Thais see the king as the source of stabilisation and 
modernisation, the king’s political role is not undisputed.11 Since the 
beginning of his reign, a coup d’état has taken place every six years. Most 
of them were supported by the throne when the acting civilian government 
became too democratic or its independence seemed to be no longer tolerable 
for the monarchy.12 The “Yellows” fear for their privileges since the king is 
too ill to exercise his authority, whereas the “Reds” act with increasing 
confidence, supported with money and video messages by the exiled 
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Thaksin.13 At the time of the interviews, the human rights situation in 
Thailand was characterised by limits on freedom of expression and 
assembly curtailed by emergency decrees issued after violent 
demonstrations in 2008. Restrictions on the media had also increased. 
Moreover, the number of people charged with lese majesty had augmented 
substantially in 2008 and 2009 with drastic sentences of imprisonment.14  
In 2009 the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 
(KAS), the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (HBS) and the Friedrich-Naumann-
Stiftung (FNS) had offices in Thailand. They faced several challenges. 
Firstly, it was complicated to openly address problems, as this was not part 
of Thai culture. Communication of unpleasant, negative or conflictive issues 
was avoided and often meant a loss of face.15 Thais tended to prefer indirect 
communication, which set hurdles for the aid organisations.16 However, the 
occupation of the airport in Bangkok in 2008 and the storm of the ASEAN 
conference in 2009 damaged Thailand’s international reputation, which in 
turn opened up the situation for assistance from abroad.17 Secondly, 
working conditions were very restrictive. Only nine international 
organisations were accredited at the TICA (Thailand International 
Development Cooperation Agency), a department in the Thai ministry of 
foreign affairs. Of the Stiftungen only the FES and the KAS held 
accreditation, whereas the other German foundations, bilateral actors and 
NGOs had to work in a grey area. The German foundations which were not 
accredited at the TICA regretted not having official status. They had to re-
register every second year at the Thai Ministry of Labour. In the beginning a 
lot of persuasion had been necessary to become registered. Over the years, 
the relationship to the authorities had improved, but comprehensive 
reporting to the public bodies was still necessary.18 Thirdly, the political 
crisis in Thailand created different framework conditions every couple of 
months.19 The organisations were forced to constantly adapt to the changing 
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situations and new governmental actors.20 During times of military 
governments, it was more difficult for the Stiftungen to maintain their 
activities as they were often restricted.21 Fourthly, the political crisis had led 
to a severe polarisation within the party landscape and society at large, 
which made the work of the Stiftungen more complicated. It was often not 
known which side the local partner supported and partners refused to enter 
dialogue with the other camp. Being viewed as partial, getting caught 
between the camps and being forced to adopt a clear position was 
considered as challenging.22 Finally, the language barrier was considered a 
major challenge for finding partners. Only the Thai elite spoke English. It 
was therefore necessary to have an office in Thailand with Thai staff 
members.23 
Apart from the four political foundations, several other German aid 
organisations were active in Thailand in 2009. Technical assistance came 
from the Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst (DED), the Internationale 
Weiterbildung und Entwicklung gGmbH (InWent) and the Gesellschaft für 
technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). All three became the Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in 2011.24 Some consulting 
organisations which were assumed to be spin-offs of the GTZ also worked 
on site. For German financial assistance, the Deutsche 
Entwicklungsgesellschaft (DEG) was active.25  
8.1.2. The conflict in Southern Thailand 
In 2009, the conflict in Thailand’s Southern provinces of Narathiwat, Yala, 
Pattani, Satun and Songkhla, mainly inhabited by Muslims of Malay 
ethnicity, smouldered.26 Between 2004 and 2009 thousands of people were 
killed in bombing attacks and confrontations between Muslim insurgents 
and the Thai government. Whether the insurgents were separatists, terrorists 
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or criminal groups was unknown. In 1902, after Siam, the former Thailand 
had already annexed the independent Muslim Sultanate Patani when violent 
excesses took place. In the 1970s and 1980s militant groups fought for 
separation. In the 1990s violence slackened but in the middle of 2001 
several assassinations of policemen led to an upsurge in violent behaviour. 
Experts began speaking out about an escalation of violence in 2004; that 
year 18 schools were set on fire and several bombs exploded in Narathiwat. 
Moreover, several insurgents who had attacked police and military stations 
were shot by the Thai military when a mosque in Pattani was stormed. One 
hundred and seven militants were killed. Furthermore, 78 protesters 
suffocated to death while being moved to a military camp handcuffed and 
stacked on top of each other in a van.27 By 2010 the number of deaths had 
reached around 4000 with another 6500 injuries.28 Targets belonged to all 
different kind of groups, such as policemen, soldiers, officials, teacher, 
students, farm workers, local businessmen, monks and Muslim clerics.29 
The rhetoric around the conflict was charged with conspiracy theory.30 
Several reasons behind the conflict can be identified, however. Firstly, the 
culture, language (Jawi, a Malay dialect) and ethnicity of the Thai Muslims 
had not been taken into account by the Thai government, which provided a 
breeding ground for separatist movements. In the 16th and 17th century the 
Muslim Sultanate Pattani was the centre of Islam in Southeast Asia and 
particularly important both politically and economically. Armed conflict 
with Siam had occurred in earlier centuries. Despite the reign of Siam, 
Pattani had kept its political and economical structure until the early 20th 
century. Some scholars therefore connected a historical reason to the 
conflict.31 Secondly, the social, economic and educational situation in the 
Southern regions was viewed as a reason for the conflict. It was 
characterised by poverty and unemployment as well as a lack of subsidies 
for educational institutions.32 One interview partner assumed that economic 
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interests such as the access to oil and gas fields as well as smuggling in the 
border regions to Malaysia could be a catalyst.33 Thirdly, the Southern 
provinces were often exposed to radical policies of assimilation in the last 
decades and Thaksin’s policy had furthered this by dissolving the Southern 
Border Provinces Administration Centre (SBPAC), the responsible authority 
for the Southern regions and a stabiliser, and attributing the responsibility to 
the police.34 Thaksin also closed ranks with the Bush administration, which 
inspired sympathy for Al-Qaeda among young people in the Southern 
provinces, according to some observers.35 Finally, the unclear legal 
situation, the lack of legal security and the violations of human rights were 
blamed for the smouldering of the conflict. In 2004 the government had 
proclaimed martial law in numerous Southern districts, which was still in 
force in 2009, giving impunity to soldiers and police officers. The 
government did not take disciplinary action in cases of violation of the law. 
Arbitrary arrests, detentions, torture, and killings of people in the Southern 
regions seemed to be carried out systematically.36 Also, the Act on Internal 
Security of 2008 gave wide powers to the Thai military and security forces. 
Its application to the insurgency in Southern Thailand remained unclear but 
it restricted fundamental rights, the overriding of civilian administration, 
and did not require the declaration of a state of emergency.37 In 2009, there 
was limited access to the Southern regions. The AA issued a travel warning, 
as attacks against state institutions and private individuals happened on a 
daily basis.38 The conflict was believed to be one of the most dangerous in 
Southeast Asia.39 
Of the German political foundations, the FES, the KAS and the FNS were 
active in Southern Thailand. Activities were kept low-profile in order to 
avoid appearing as interfering actors from abroad. The Thai government 
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was assumed to have no interest in conflict handling through the UN or 
other international actors. However, foreign actors were tolerated within a 
limited framework.40 Other international organisations such as the ASIA 
Foundation were also involved in managing the conflict. The military putsch 
in 2006 had opened up the situation in the Southern regions for foreign 
actors and an increase of actors was noticed.41 
8.1.3. Germany’s policy 
Political cooperation between Germany and Thailand dates back to 1858 
when the hanseatic cities signed commercial contracts with the kingdom of 
Siam. Over the following decades, German merchants and experts wielded 
great influence in Siam’s economic life and occupied influential positions in 
developing a modern infrastructure.42 During World War II the Thai prime 
minister had sympathy for the German Reich and supported Japan and the 
Axis in order to regain land taken by France and Great Britain in 1919. 
However, the following Thai Seri movement joined the Allies in 1944. 
During the Bloc confrontation Germany’s policy towards the Southeast 
Asian countries was first characterised by winning back its political ability 
to act and, until the early 1970s, by the Hallstein doctrine.43 With the end of 
the Cold War, normative principles became increasingly important in 
German and other Western foreign policies, leading to conflicts in the EU-
ASEAN dialogues of the 1990s.44 In its Southeast Asia concept of 2002 the 
AA stressed democracy, rule of law and human rights as preconditions for 
internal and external stability and development and as central objectives. 
Instruments of the German government in the region were consulting and 
supporting institutions, civil society organisations and the security sector. 
According to the AA, the government was directly active through public 
relations and development policy, and indirectly via support for German 
NGOs and the Stiftungen.45 Furthermore, the AA emphasised peace and 
regional stability. It showed interest in convincing the ASEAN states of the 
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importance of regional confidence building and collective conflict 
prevention referring to a broad notion of security, with Thailand and 
Singapore playing leading roles.46 As instruments the AA suggested 
imparting German experiences in dialogue, civil and military training 
programmes, conferences for conflict prevention, and institutional 
consulting for the civil control of armed forces, as well as the support of 
structural reforms. Further key objectives in the strategy were advancing 
environmental cooperation and continuing development assistance although 
financial aid to Thailand had already been stopped due to Thai economic 
development. Finally, the AA stressed cultural and academic relations, 
mentioning in particular the awakening of interest in Germany and 
conveying an up-to-date image of Germany. In this context, it highlighted 
the support of the Stiftungen and other organisations. The strategy also 
emphasised the development of regional security structures, the Stiftungen’s 
consulting assistance, political dialogue and development cooperation.47 The 
German government’s political concept of 2012 on partnership with new 
players mentioned further confidence-building measures in regional security 
organisations such as ASEAN.48 This increased focal point on regional 
security also corresponds with the ambitions of the EU in Southeast Asia. 
While in the 1990s the EU’s political focus was on trade, security political 
aspects increasingly came on the agenda from 2000 onwards. Since then, 
cooperation between the EU and ASEAN on this matter has improved.49  
Between 2005 and 2015 some cooperation between Germany and Thailand 
existed in terms of military and police training as regards the role of the 
military in a democracy.50 The German government withdrew from the 
cooperation in 2006 and resumed activities in 2008.51 Diplomatic contacts 
were also restricted during the time of the military coup; high-level political 
and economic dialogue was continued when Thailand returned to 
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democracy.52 In 2009, German-Thai relations were considered to be very 
good.53 According to the German government, along with its EU partners it 
kept an eye on democratic deficits and the political situation and broached 
the issue of political participation at a higher political level. It also referred 
to the Stiftungen for the long-term accompanying and furthering of the 
democratic process.54 In 2012 both countries celebrated the 150th 
anniversary of their bilateral relations, leading to further intensification of 
contacts, cooperation, academic exchanges and cultural events.55   
With the Thai economic upswing, foreign trade with German grew steadily 
from the 1980s onwards.56 The Southeast Asia strategy of 2002 highlighted 
German foreign economic interest in the region although it was less 
dominantly articulated than in the preceding Asia concept of 1993.57 The 
German economic interest in Southeast Asia declined after the financial 
crisis and shifted to East Asia. Culture relations between the two countries 
are based on an agreement signed in 1984. The main organisations active in 
Thailand are the Goethe Institute, the German Academic Exchange Service 
(DAAD) and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. The development 
cooperation between Germany and Thailand started in the 1960s.58 In 2004 
the BMZ considered Thailand as an “anchor country”, a term referring to 
states with a special regional impact in terms of economy and politics and 
increasing importance in the management of global challenges and 
international processes. The assistance approach combined elements of 
development cooperation and foreign policy.59 Although Thailand 
increasingly transformed itself from a recipient into a donor and German 
development assistance ended in 2011, Germany still finances technical 
cooperation projects in Thailand focusing on climate change and energy, 
sustainable consumption and production, regional integration in Southeast 
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Asia, and joint development cooperation for third countries.60 Still, Thailand 
is not among the 57 partner countries of German development assistance 
and therefore lacks the opportunity for intensive cooperation.61 In 2011 the 
BMZ’s fields of cooperation in Asia were economic and ecological 
development, education, good governance and health.62 It planned to further 
integrate German civil society organisations as dialogue partners and critical 
catalysts. In this context, it stressed the particular role of the Stiftungen and 
their consulting and dialogue instruments on the political level to further 
democratic and rule-of-law-based institution-building.63  
8.1.4. Landscape of the German political foundations  
In 2009, the FES, the KAS, the FNS and the HBS maintained offices in 
Thailand and determined the political landscape of the Stiftungen.64 In 
addition to their offices in Thailand, most of them maintained regional 
offices in Southeast Asia concentrating on regional issues and organisations 
such as ASEAN. Activities of both offices usually did not overlap.65 In the 
case of the HBS and the FNS, the location of the regional offices and their 
Thai offices coincided. The landscape of the Stiftungen was therefore 
considered as more significant compared to other countries.66 The Hans-
Seidel-Stiftung (HSS) and the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung (RLS) either 
worked from an office in Singapore in the Thai rural areas (HSS) or had no 
declared activities in Thailand (RLS). All of the German foundations held 
workshops and seminars and issued publications. Some of the Stiftungen 
intensified their activities in the field of organising conferences and training 
sessions. They all implemented measures mainly in collaboration with local 
partners. 
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Activities in Thailand of the FES dated back to the early 1970s, coinciding 
with the start of its international activity. In the very beginning, the FES did 
not have an office on site. As was the case in other Southeast Asian 
countries, its activities started with the support of newly formed trade 
unions and in the field of employment and social policy. In the 1980s the 
main emphasis was on gender issues and Thailand became one of the FES’s 
offices working with gender issues. Furthermore, so-called “WISO-
projects”, grassroots-oriented advisory projects in the field of economy and 
social policy, took place. From 1992 onwards and parallel to Thailand’s 
democratisation process, activities increased concerning the democratisation 
of institutions. They remained the focus until the time of the interviews. In 
2009, the FES was active in three main areas: (1) The promotion of 
democratic institutions and processes based on social and progressive 
democracy with social elites taking a key role in shaping it. Within this 
working area one project line supported the access of women and young 
people to politics, and another project line dealt with the role of the media in 
democracy; (2) the contribution of instruments and methods to conflict 
transformation and the promoting of knowledge on the Southern conflict 
and its parties; and (3) the implementation of economic and social human 
rights. This area included the promotion of trade unions and also addressed 
the interests of employees and economic migrants from Burma. As regards 
the second focal point of conflict management, the FES had implemented an 
extensive EU-funded project in addition to its regular activities. In 2009, the 
FES office regularly consisted of seven people (six Thai, one German), with 
four working on content-related matters. In addition, three persons were 
working on the EU project. One of them was an external German 
consultant.67 
The KAS had been active in Thailand for almost as long as the FES. In 
2009, one of the KAS’s areas of interest was the promotion of the people’s 
political participation. In collaboration with the secretary of the national 
assembly and the senate, local political leaders were trained to improve their 
exchange with voters. Furthermore, the KAS promoted the rule of law by 
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encouraging the Thai administration and constitutional court. Both courts 
were still relatively new achievements. Study programmes were offered to 
Thai administrative law judges in Germany and German lawyers offered 
short-term training courses. The German administration court served as a 
model. In the case of the constitutional court, consulting took place on the 
constitutional complaint and decisions were translated into English. 
Moreover, the topics of regulatory policy and security policy had become 
focal points for the KAS in 2009. In addition to public bodies, partners of 
the KAS were civil society organisations and Thai universities. In the 
absence of Thai think tanks, the KAS supported academic projects. Around 
200 measures were implemented annually. The Bangkok office and its 
partners decided annually which measures to carry out. The plan was then 
adjusted quarterly. The KAS’s headquarters in Berlin had to approve 
measures. However, a rejection had not occurred in recent years. In earlier 
times, programmes were tailored to people in rural areas and Bangkok’s 
elite. In 2009, the KAS focused on the Thai middle class and political 
development was given priority over rural development. In addition to a 
German representative, the KAS’s office employed six Thai staff 
members.68 
The FNS’s activities in Thailand began in 1975. In 1999 the office moved 
from Singapore to Bangkok. In 2009, it was one of seven regional offices 
that the FNS maintained worldwide and covered the region of Southeast and 
East Asia including Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, South Korea and North Korea. Moreover, projects in China and 
Burma were managed from there. For a period of three to five years liberal 
political principles were formulated by the FNS’s headquarters in Berlin. 
From 2008 to 2011, the FNS’s work focused on “freedom and property”, 
“freedom and civil society” and “freedom and the rule of law”. In Thailand, 
the main fields of interest were democracy, rule of law and economic 
freedom, with democracy as the key topic. It concerned mainly cooperation 
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with political parties, e.g. the Thai Democrat party.69 It also covered 
activities with the Thai electoral commission, the council of civic education, 
the municipality of Bangkok and civil society organisations. As for rule of 
law and economic freedom, the FNS undertook activities with the Thai legal 
reform commission and cooperated with local think tanks. Conflict 
management in Southern Thailand was also a topic. Over the years, the 
activities of the FNS in Thailand changed. In the beginning, projects were 
more driven by “classic” development policy. The first project of the FNS in 
Thailand, for instance, involved water buffalo banks in Chiang Mai. 
Political dialogue, though part of the FNS’s prior activities, was further 
developed and a “strategy for the promotion of organised liberalism and 
liberal thought” was adopted in the early 1990s. The desire to stand out 
from activities that could also be undertaken by the GTZ was one of the 
reasons for changing the portfolio. From then on, technical assistance was 
only given when there was a political context or when it was the only 
possibility to be active at all. In 2009 the FNS’s activities in border regions 
between Thailand and Burma, for example, concerned ethnic minorities. 
They were considered as very basic, including the fight against poverty, 
infrastructure development and the organisation of village communities. In 
earlier times, political assistance had included more institutional assistance 
and financial backing for partners. At the time of the interviews, the 
emphasis was on collaboration with networks and action groups. In their 
partner choice, the FNS attached importance to ideological affiliations. 
Measures were planned annually with partners. Cooperation also took place 
with other organisations, such as the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), the European Union, the GTZ, and the British 
embassy. In 2009, the FNS’s office had between 20 and 25 staff members.70 
In 2009 the HBS worked from Chiang Mai, a city in the north of Thailand. 
The regional office was founded in 2000 to implement projects in Thailand 
and Burma. At the time of the interview, it was about to move to Bangkok. 
The idea for the office in Chiang Mai was derived from the HBS’s wish for 
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decentralisation as the other Stiftungen were active in Bangkok. Moreover, 
Chiang Mai was considered an intellectual centre. However, the HBS 
remained very isolated, which prompted the decision to move to Bangkok. 
Regional cooperation with partner organisations had already started in the 
1990s. In 2009, the main areas of interest were democratisation, climate, 
ecology and sustainable development. As regards democratisation, the HBS 
supported information democracy, media, and people’s opportunity to select 
from a diverse range of non-monopolised information services. Concerning 
climate, ecology and sustainable development, the HBS furthered reform 
efforts that aimed at overcoming institutional problems and providing 
greater transparency. A special focal point was nuclear energy, which was 
partly introduced in Thailand as clean energy, whereas the HBS tried to 
counteract this trend. At the time of the interview, the area of climate was 
expanded while democracy was hardly emphasised. The HBS did not work 
directly with Thai political partners and did not support a political party. 
There was no Green political party counterpart. The HBS mainly worked 
with civil society organisations and cooperated with the GTZ. Similar to the 
FNS, the HBS had started more as a sponsor and had focused on basic 
development cooperation. It was also considered part of the Green ideology 
to give money and let partners decide what to do with it. This had changed 
due to imposed conditions by the BMZ and the work had become more 
political. The interview partner used “cross-linker” and “bridge-builder” to 
describe the role of the HBS at that time. Methodologically, the HBS 
conducted more meetings, events and publications and less capacity 
building measures like trainings and seminars. In 2009, the office had 12 
staff members of whom two were German/Austrian.71 
In sum, the German political foundation in Thailand had very different focal 
points, which mainly was a result of different political backgrounds. Some 
overlaps existed as regards activities in the Southern conflict. We also saw 
that activities focused less on institutional funding and had become more 
political over the time, although affiliated political parties were mostly 
missing. Technical development assistance and direct financing remained an 
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area of retreat when other activities were not possible. Apart from the HBS, 
all foundations worked with political actors in Thailand. 
8.2. The practice of public diplomacy through conflict management? 
The following sections apply the integrated model of public diplomacy to 
the FES’s ambitions to further peace in the conflict in Southern Thailand.72 
It will shed light on whether the FES’s was a generator of public diplomacy. 
Moreover, it will identify the instruments used and targets addressed. It then 
takes a close look at the network environment, including resources and 
sharing values and interests. Subsequently, we connect the activities to 
collaborative and catalytic public diplomacy practised as conflict 
management. Finally, we consider the impact of the FES as regards these 
activities. 
8.2.1. Generator 
In the context of the activities concerning the Southern conflict in Thailand 
the FES appeared as a generator of public diplomacy as it implemented its 
projects autonomously and independent of the German ministries and the 
affiliated SPD. 
The FES had been active in Southern Thailand since 1990. In the beginning, 
the focus of its undertakings was on democratic development and political 
education. Cooperation took place with an informal network of Muslim 
opinion leaders. Activities in the form of seminars were not too intense and 
did not concern the conflict. The established contacts were helpful when the 
conflict flared up in 2004. The FES first focused on the protection of human 
rights. Depending on the approval of TICA the FES organised some human 
rights activities in the following time. After an interruption of the work, FES 
resumed the activities in 2005. At that time, the Southern activities of the 
FES were not very systematic. Thereafter, the FES arranged seminars with 
women and youth organisations as well as the university. These groups were 
selected in order to avoid political sensitivity and to reach civil society 
beyond the Muslim and male-dominated partner network. In 2006 the 
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conflict was systematically analysed using the Peace and Conflict Impact 
Assessment (PCIA) methodology. The analysis took the methodological 
guidelines for socio-political cooperation programmes in the context of 
conflicts developed by the FriEnt Group at the BMZ as a starting point.73 
From 2007 onwards, several of the identified topics and measures were 
chosen to work on the conflict. In 2008, the FES and the FNS were selected 
to implement an EU-funded project in the Southern region lasting 18 
months. The FES had been invited by an EU office/delegation in Bangkok 
to submit a proposal for the project. The funds were part of the EU 
instrument for stability (ifs) launched in 2007, which aimed at reacting to 
political crisis in third countries in the short-term and warding off global 
threats in the long run.74 For the FES, the office in Thailand was the first to 
apply for ifs funds. By the end of 2009, the project was nearly complete. In 
addition to the EU project, the FES kept up its former activities funded by 
the BMZ, which had, in part, already concerned the conflict.75 The funding 
period for the BMZ project lasted three years. In this timeframe, particular 
objectives had to be achieved. According to the BMZ’s guidelines, the 
foundation’s activities had to be monitored and evaluated. Although some 
financing for activities in Thailand can generally come from the AA, in 
2009 those funds were not issued to the Stiftungen.76  
In contrast to other German organisations in Thailand, the Stiftungen did not 
operate under the auspices of the embassy. Meetings and coordination 
between the German embassy and the Stiftungen took place but the 
Stiftungen were not accountable to the embassy regarding project details. 
The relationship between the foundations and the German embassy was 
considered to be good.77 According to the interview partner, the FES also 
operated independently of the affiliated SPD. The main areas or overall 
objectives were suggested by the office in Thailand and discussed with the 
specific country section at the FES’s headquarters in Berlin. These 
objectives were further substantiated by specific targets that were defined 
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annually. The regional office was not involved in this process, concentrating 
instead on regional issues.78 The national office was autonomous although 
synergy effects between the regional work and the national work were 
supposed to be enabled. In 2009, the FES had departed from the procedure 
of having partners hand in annual activities since several years. It consulted 
with partners and defined measures itself. The main motivation behind the 
shift was to improve the overall quality of projects, for instance considering 
conflict sensitivity and gender integration. The measures were conducted as 
Eigenmaßnahmen and involved contributions of the FES.79  
According to the interview partner, the organisations on site did not 
consider the FES as a governmental instrument but rather as an academic 
organisation. Its public funding was not concealed. The activities of the FES 
were associated with civil diplomacy and track two diplomacy. According 
to the interview partner, civil diplomacy concerned the activities which had 
a foreign political dimension, such as consulting and official visits from 
Germany. Track two was understood as an informal track used parallel to 
official diplomacy that targeted decision makers and those having an impact 
on them.80  
8.2.2. Addressees and instruments 
The FES’s activities were characterised by a broad approach and were 
focused on all three target groups of public diplomacy: the general public, 
the media and specific disseminators. The main groups were civil society 
organisations, individuals with a key social role, academics, journalists and 
members of trade unions. Civil society in Thailand was assumed to be weak 
and state-controlled. Its organisations did not have enough resources to 
work independently, and so the FES often undertook tasks which in other 
countries were conducted by partners. In the Southern regions, the FES 
could hardly fall back on existing partners when it started the activities 
based on the conflict analysis. Furthermore, the FES addressed public 
actors, such as personnel from the Thai ministries and parliamentarians as 
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well as stakeholders from the military and security sector. The FES 
considered the latter two to be crucial for a conflict solution. In the Southern 
region the FES also worked with women, young people and journalists. 
Methodologically the FES used trainings, seminars, workshops, events and 
publications. In 2009, the FES conducted 60-70 measures annually in the 
context of the BMZ project. As regards the EU project it implemented 
around 20 measures, including small training sessions of 15-20 people and 
large events with up to 300 participants.81  
The FES’s activities concerning the conflict consisted of several broad areas 
which could be mainly subsumed under public diplomacy’s political 
dialogue and media instruments. Firstly, the FES created dialogue forums, 
mainly between the Southern partner network and decision makers in 
Bangkok. This interchange concerned the Thai government’s Southern 
policy and conflict resolution strategies. Often the FES established first 
contacts. This component was funded by the BMZ. The second field of 
activities concerned woman and young people from the South and their role 
in conflict transformation. Organised female communities, their leaders and 
other interested women participated in meetings and programme 
development where their role as de-escalators was taken into account. These 
activities also had some capacity building and educational elements and 
included study tours where women from the South could engage in 
exchange with other women leaders and organisations and experience 
multicultural environments.82 Young persons were important addressees for 
the FES as their potential for radicalisation was high because of trauma, 
frustration and unemployment. Through youth camps, the FES intended to 
further community involvement, life skills, confidence building and 
mutuality. Networking was also enabled, bringing youth groups of different 
backgrounds together.83 The third field of the FES’s activities was the 
application of participatory dialogue methods. Thai institutions and 
organisations focused on programmes in the South, such as the King 
Prajadhipok’s Institute (KPI) and the Peace Academy, were trained by the 
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FES and an external consultant in participatory dialogue methods such as 
“Open-space”, “Worldcafé” and “Future Search”. These measures were 
supposed to enhance capacity for dialogue and further the focus on common 
issues and mutual understanding, as well as to find a consensus.84 In 2009 
these measures were the unique feature of the FES and differentiated them 
from the other Stiftungen and organisations in Thailand.85 The second and 
the third activity components were part of the EU-funded project. In all 
three fields of activities the FES operated as a dialogue facilitator between 
different social and political groups in Thailand. Dialogue was often 
combined with capacity building. Another component, which can be 
considered political dialogue but had points of contact with consulting, was 
about to be developed by the FES in 2009. It was part of the FES’s 
democracy assistance working line and concerned dialogue forums on 
security sector governance amongst the Thai military, the police, civil 
society, the Thai National Security Council, the senate and stakeholders 
from the South. Activities were organised with the Geneva Centre for the 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). The FES offered political 
assessments and contacts while DCAF provided the expertise on the matter. 
As regards the public diplomacy instruments, media activity could be 
identified. The FES’s activities had a strong focus on objective media 
coverage and the de-escalating role of the media. The FES cooperated with 
both the mass media in Bangkok and with local reporters in the South. The 
activities consisted of trainings for journalists and study trips where 
journalists were sent abroad. One group, for instance, was sent to India in 
order to experience a diversified multilingual media landscape free from 
control and mostly uncensored. Cultural diplomacy as well as think tank 
activities could not be identified in the context of the FES’s conflict 
management. Few monologue instruments could be found in the form of 
publications, such as a handbook with guidelines on conflict-sensitive 
journalism published in Thai.86  
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8.2.3. Dimensions: Propaganda and network 
Propagandistic or strategic communication in terms of advertising or 
campaigning in the activities of the FES could not be identified. However, 
the case showed how the assessment of interference depended on the 
perception of the host country. In 2009, the FES enjoyed relatively wide-
ranging trust of decision makers at all political levels in Bangkok. It was the 
first organisation to be officially permitted to work in the South. In former 
times, the Thai government had been more suspicious, as already outlined. 
For decades, the FES had also worked with trade unions, which were 
perceived as subversive by the Thai authorities. Furthermore, there was no 
interest in international supporting measures and foreign activities in the 
Southern regions had always been mistrusted. The Thai government was 
mostly displeased that foreigners interfered in internal problems. This was 
also reflected in development cooperation: topics such as gender, HIV and 
technology were welcomed, while politically sensitive issues like statehood, 
democracy, sovereignty, internal political processes and the role of the 
monarchy were very difficult to address.87 This also included the Southern 
conflict. After having won the trust of the authorities, the FES had tried to 
be active without much publicity. According to the interview partner, it was 
not the intention of the FES to tell Thai society how to resolve the conflict 
but instead to enable dialogue. In other areas, the FES was sometimes asked 
to “postpone” seminars, although measures were not vetoed. The FES also 
knew that it was under constant observation by the authorities. In 2009 the 
political situation was very tense and insecure.88 As outlined by an interview 
partner, foundations’ political activities were viewed as relatively 
undesirable by the Thai authorities, and so the word “political” of “political 
foundation” often remained silent.89  
In contrast to the propaganda dimension, the networking dimension in the 
activities of the FES could be recognised. However, it was limited to actors 
from Thailand. Actors in Germany were hardly included.  
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8.2.3.1. Relationships, resources, values and interests 
In 2009, various stable and independent relationships existed between the 
FES and local and foreign actors on site that were mainly characterised by 
cooperation and coordination. As already outlined, the FES interacted 
strongly with various Thai public bodies and higher political strata. The 
relationship between TICA and the FES in 2009 was described as friendly 
and cooperative. TICA regularly arranged information events for the 
accredited organisation. Organisations generally had to notify of their work 
in advance and to report afterwards. The weak civil society and political 
party landscape made it difficult for the FES to establish partnerships and 
develop relationships. Civil society organisations had no clear vision about 
their issues and aims. It was difficult to find partners with capacities at the 
average European or international level. Smaller organisations in particular 
were missing. The interview partner explained this state of affairs by citing 
a lack of financial resources and complicated approval procedures. 
Particularly in 2009, partners practiced increasingly strong self-censorship. 
During the measures FES’s staff members were generally present, thus 
contributing to the stability of the relationships on site.90 
In 2009 the FES also had relationships with German actors on site. All of 
the German foundations participated in regular coordination meetings 
organised by the GTZ; the atmosphere was described as very good and 
strong information exchange existed. A representative of the German 
embassy also attended those meetings.91 Although the KAS and the FNS 
were also active around the Southern conflict, the topics of interest and 
activities were different from each other. However, when partners 
overlapped, coordination took place. Cooperation among the foundations 
hardly ever occurred.92 According to one interview partner, the raison d’être 
for each of several different foundations was otherwise not justified.93 The 
relationship between the FES and the German embassy was considered to be 
good.94 In the years before the interview, the embassy seemed to have 
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reduced its prejudices against the Stiftungen.95 In the past, German 
ambassadors had interfered in stronger ways. The interviewee traced this 
development back to the work of several high-ranking German politicians 
who had emphasised the role of the Stiftungen abroad, and several studies 
which focused the attention to the Stiftungen and their importance as 
instruments of foreign affairs. However, contacts with the embassy often 
depend on the political position of the ambassador.96  
German politicians and members of the government rarely came to the 
FES’s office in Thailand. Contacts between 2004 and 2009 were limited to 
several committees of the German Bundestag and a state secretary. The 
conflict was not in the focus of the visits. According to the interview 
partner, it had not found its way into their general consciousness. At the 
time of the interviews, the first official visit to the region had been initiated 
by the Thai foreign ministry for the ambassadors of the EU.97 Other 
interview partners reported a lack of interest from the German side. 
Although German officials and institutions requested information about 
Thailand from the Stiftungen, inquiries to the offices were not numerous.98 
In many cases, they concerned the whole Southeast Asian region. One 
interview partner assumed that the lack of interest was related to the 
German government’s Asia strategy, which focused on China.99 However, 
the interest of other German actors in the activities and assessments of the 
FES was relatively strong. Visits and enquiries came from academics, other 
organisations active in development cooperation, policy consultants, and 
educational institutions. German media showed increased interest when the 
political situation changed. The interview partner estimated that there were 
about 50 to 60 annual visits to the office. The FES did not foster business 
contacts. At times, interchange occurred in the context of the trade union 
activities. Strong relationships also existed between the FES’s office in 
Thailand and other FES offices and divisions working in fields where 
Thailand was affected. This included global issues, EU politics, the 
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international trade union activity of the FES and bilateral measures which 
concerned Thailand and other countries. Here the FES in Thailand 
cooperated with the respective country offices. 
The aforementioned relationships were mainly cooperative or, in case of the 
other foundations, coordinative, at least. However, the situation for aid 
organisations in the Southern regions was characterised by strong 
competition. An interview partner even mentioned an overload of measures 
for the local population.100 At the end of 2009, USAID announced that it 
planned to invest 36 million US dollars for conflict resolution activities in 
the Southern regions in the following years. It was suspected that trust 
which existed towards the FES and other foreign actors would diminish and 
the large US investment would be considered as interference by the 
authorities. On the other hand, it was feared that FES’s partners were 
poached with higher remuneration.101  
In the context of the relationships various resources were exchanged. The 
findings did not deviate significantly from the general findings on the 
foundations’ resource exchange.102 The FES obtained financial resources 
from the BMZ and the EU, which were used for the measures on site. The 
guidelines were strict and the foundations were not allowed to conduct 
institution building. The FES received a wide range of information 
resources from civil society and political partners. As regards the conflict, 
the FES was able to maintain contact to the local population in the Southern 
regions as well as to Thai stakeholders of the military and the police. Both 
groups were unreachable for the German embassy, as it had to be selective 
in its cultivation of contacts.103 In 2009, the German embassy was not active 
in the Southern regions but planned small-scale projects for 2010.104 The 
German embassy had asked the FES for its advisory skills to help with these 
activities. Moreover, the FES also monitored its activities and information 
was fed back into the FES’s headquarters. Furthermore, the networking 
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resources of the FES were enormous. As already outlined, various 
communication channels were established horizontally and vertically within 
Thai society. The FES’s contacts depended in part on partners establishing 
contacts with other actors or securing the audience of the seminars. Political 
players and members of the executive were brought together with civil 
society actors. Similar groups were connected with the intention to bridge 
ethical and religious divides. Some interview partners assumed that the 
political foundations were better networked than the German embassy.105 
However, in the context of the activities in the Southern provinces, the FES 
did not connect German actors with Thai counterparts. The FES did not 
bring other actors, such as journalists or academics (German or foreign), to 
the Southern regions. As explained by the interview partner, the people in 
the South are often sceptical towards foreigners. It was hard to win their 
trust and they often feared being politically exploited.106 Even some of the 
foundations’ representatives had never been to the Southern regions.107 
Apart from the networking resources, the FES’s moral authority resources 
were perceived as very strong. In 2009, the FES received support from the 
Thai government for their conflict management activities in the South. In 
the time that followed, even Thai public authorities like the Thai foreign 
ministry had asked the FES for training in the new dialogue methods of 
communication. Training took place with the Southern Border Province 
Administrative Centre (SBPAC) in Krabi, for example. The interview 
partner also felt that the FES benefited from the long-standing and firm 
relations between Thailand and Germany. The Stiftungen could generally 
organise activities and address ideas which other organisations were not 
allowed to do. Germany was considered neutral in contrast to the USA and 
the EU. Along with those of the Nordic countries, Germany’s basic model 
was in demand in Thailand due to its culture of political education and the 
welfare state. Although participants of the programmes in Southern 
Thailand were not very much interested in Germany, for them it was 
important that the FES was a German organisation. The USA, in contrast, 
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was viewed with deep distrust from the Muslim side.108 More radical and 
fundamentalist Muslims often connected the activities of American 
organisations with the CIA and the “war on terror”. The FES’s credibility 
also profited from the long tradition of its activities in the Southern regions. 
The interview partner had experienced that in the interchange with the 
Stiftungen, members of the Thai political level often felt freer than in 
official communication since it had less formal consequences.109  
The network environment in which the FES operated was partly 
characterised by shared values and policy interests. This was not surprising 
as the FES mainly connected conflicting parties in the context of the studied 
activities. The FES generally chose its activities and focal points against the 
background of social democratic values but also considered the situation in 
the specific country. Social democracy highlights the political participation 
of socially weaker population. The political background of the Thai partners 
in terms of social democracy did not play a role for the FES, as political 
parties were not significant. Political parties were mostly oligarchic and 
characterised by vested interest and charismatic leaders. It was therefore not 
possible for the FES to define which Thai political parties could be either 
connected to the values supported by the SPD. Consequently, the specific 
political affiliation of the partner receded into the background, although the 
political attitude remained important. The FES felt bound to work with 
democratic, progressive and reform-oriented partners.110 Its peace activities 
in the Southern region as well as its security political dialogues fit largely 
with the German government’s Asia strategy and its emphasis on peace and 
regional stability.111 In this context, the AA not only referred to the 
democracy assistance activities of the Stiftungen but also to their dialogues, 
consulting, and training measures in conflict prevention. The EU’s security 
political focus in Southeast Europe is also visible in the FES’s conflict 
management activities. The German political foundations have been 
mentioned as giving their constructive support as non-state actors in this 
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context.112 The activities of the FES also corresponded with the SPD’s pleas 
for strong cooperation between German foreign, security and development 
policy and the Asian countries as well as the overall political objective to 
prevent conflict and create peace in the international arena.113 
8.2.3.2. Types of transnational policy networks 
The network in which the FES operated in the context of its conflict 
management activities was mixed. The observations are fairly similar to 
those made previously.114 The common issue that the activities circled 
around was the conflict in the Southern region but a lack of campaigning 
meant that the network could not qualify as a transnational advocacy 
network (TAN). Thai civil servants were connected to the network but the 
FES was not a ministerial staff member, and so a transnational executive 
network was also out of the question. Although knowledge generation 
played an important role in the activities of the FES, the majority of actors 
were neither experts nor professionals, thereby disqualifying the network for 
global knowledge network (KNET) status. The network was trisectoral, 
including public sector officials, civil servants and civil society 
professionals; however, large groups of individuals—such as members of 
the general public—which were included in the activities of the FES are 
missing in the Global Public Policy Network (GPPN) typology. As already 
outlined, the network members were mainly national actors and did not 
operate on the international level, which speaks against the GPPN. 
Furthermore, in 2009 the regional conflict was not a shared problem that 
existed across borders, making it even more difficult to speak of a GPPN.  
The case largely confirmed the suggested forms of interaction between 
public and private actors as regards loose couplings and issue networks.115 
The number of non-state actors in the network was relatively high and it can 
be expected that actors had different opinions on policy objectives. 
Furthermore, the permeability of the network in terms of new actors’ 
inclusion was high as the FES generally integrated interested individuals. 
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An assessment of the network’s integration into the policy making progress 
in Thailand was not possible. As outlined, the political situation in Thailand 
was fragile and characterised by a constant change of decision makers. We 
do not know if ideas from the activities of the FES were translated into the 
policy making process. In turn, we saw that the FES actively implemented 
parts of the AA’s Asia strategy and of the EU’s security policy. In this 
respect the network resembled a policy community actor. 
8.2.4. Managing conflicts? 
The FES’s activities in the context of the conflict in Southern Thailand 
corresponded to all general tasks of transnational conflict management as 
outlined in the systematisation.116 They addressed trust-based 
communicative activities, dialogue on the security policy level, conflict 
analysis, knowledge generation on the conflict, and capacity building. 
Furthermore, several concrete conflict management instruments were visible 
in the FES’s activities. The instruments were not clearly applied according 
to the conflict management cycle. This is not surprising as the smouldering 
conflict did not fit to the defined typical conflict phases. We could identify 
FES’s ambitions in the field of Security Sector Reforms (SSR) when 
dialogues on security sector governance between the military, police forces 
and the political level were furthered together with the DCAF. Moreover, 
conflict resolution and track two were applied by the FES. Since we do not 
know how structured the dialogues between the decision makers in Bangkok 
and the community leaders from the South had been and whether the FES 
provided mainly logistical prerequisites for the direct talks, either mediation 
or good offices were applied. The commitment to several international 
principles was visible in FES activities. It supported local ownership by 
integrating local actors in the conflict to ensure the sustainability of the 
conflict management process. It also paid tribute to do-no-harm by being 
aware of the sensitivity of the activities. Finally, it furthered the principle 
outlined in UN resolution 1325 on the involvement of women in conflict 
management and their protection in conflicts. We furthermore noticed that 
the elements of conflict management and democracy assistance were linked 
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in the approach of the FES. Conflict management activities in the South, for 
example, started under the premise of political development and education 
and became proper, more systematic conflict management later on.  
8.2.5. Impact of the FES 
The impact of the FES as regards the management of conflict is difficult to 
estimate. Similar to the prior findings,117 the impact of the FES on the policy 
process in Thailand in terms of influence on peace furthering policies was 
neither found nor measurable. The same applies to measuring the FES’s 
contribution to a conflict solution. According to the interview partner, it had 
not been the objective of the FES to resolve the conflict but rather to 
improve the framework conditions and further the motivation for a political 
solution of the conflict. In terms of success, the FES had been able to 
identify target groups which were working closely together with the FES 
and which had previously been uninvolved. Moreover, it had opened 
channels of communication between stakeholders that were necessary for a 
solution to the conflict. One concrete example of success was given by the 
interview partner. A delegation from the South had held talks in Bangkok 
with the university, the human rights commission and other institutions. It 
had criticised the fact that 170 young men had been released from an 
education camp but had not been allowed to return to their villages as they 
were considered a “security risk”. Before the delegation went back to the 
Southern region, the grant permission was given for the return to the young 
men.118 However, it does not lead to results if the FES’s impact is 
considered in terms of policy results and improvement of the conflict 
situation. On the other hand, we saw that the FES was involved in 
implementing German and European policy in Thailand. Moreover, the 
activities fit with the German civilian power concept in preferring non-
military solutions to conflicts and in applying a broad notion of security.119 
We also saw that the activities largely went beyond the broad policy 
formulations and that official reliance on the Stiftungen was already 
announced. German official activities through the embassy, for instance, 
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had never been possible in the form of the FES’s activities since the risk 
was already very high that activities would be viewed as interference.         
Estimating the impact of the FES in terms of communication, network 
operation and resources we saw the confirmation of prior findings.120 The 
FES had a central position within the network and was mainly involved in 
its establishment. It often built a bridge between actors who were otherwise 
not connected. The target group, which included Thai public and private 
actors, was broad, although it did not include political party members. The 
desire of the German political foundations to also work with political and 
public levels121 was beneficial for the conflict management activities as it 
allowed the establishment of respective communication channels. We also 
saw that the FES adapted flexibly to a dearth of political partners by 
choosing members of the executive instead. It was also able to conduct 
activities with less political content, such as study trips for women and 
youth camps, if required. German politicians, members of the government, 
and ministerial staff members, on the contrary, were not included in the 
network. From the conflict management perspective concerning dialogues 
between conflictive parties, this was consistent. FES’s contribution to the 
relations between Thailand and Germany through the intensification of 
social-political links could therefore not be noted.  
In 2009, at the end of the EU-funded project, the FES wanted to keep 
contact to the stakeholders in the South and did not want to set them adrift. 
Intensive work on the conflict, however, was not planned due to a lack of 
resources. Most of the interview partners were pessimistic about the 
development of the conflict.122 They claimed that political solutions and 
concepts barely existed. The conflict was completely left to the military. As 
long as Thailand faced inner political problems and the conflict remained 
limited to the Southern regions, politicians would not care for solutions.123 
There was hardly international attention for the conflict since Thailand was 
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“far away” and violence did not concern tourist areas.124 In 2015 the conflict 
in the Southern provinces still smouldered and had not transformed into 
peace, and the political situation had become more unstable. In follow-up 
interviews, the FES outlined that activities in the Southern region had not 
taken place in the last couple of years.125 In 2015, the FES office focused on 
political transformation (e.g. the facilitation of dialogue on the political 
basic order), media, and political education in schools and with teachers as 
well as on socio-economic transformation in terms of progressive economic 
and social policy. Security sector related activities had been suspended due 
to the tense political situation. The situation in the Southern regions had 
neither changed nor improved. Some contacts existed to the former partners 
in the Southern regions and some Thai organisations were still active, such 
as the academic institute of human rights and peace studies in the region. In 
2015, the FES did not plan to take up activities in the Southern region due to 
the complexity of the conflict and respective missing resources.126   
Conclusion  
The case of the FES’s activities in the context of the conflict in the Southern 
region of Thailand exemplified the public diplomacy ambitions of the 
German political foundations. It illustrated how the activities were 
connected to the catalytic and collaborative form of transnational conflict 
management. The current case substantiated the autonomy of the FES from 
the funder BMZ, the German embassy and the affiliated SPD in their 
activities on site. Presumably the funds from the EU had further enhanced 
its independence. The ambitions showed the primary use of dialogue 
instruments and the operation in a widely branched and mixed network 
environment which, however, mainly included relationships in Thailand. In 
this context, the FES operated as a gatekeeper and dialogue facilitator, 
encouraging different types of actors to address their ideas on the conflict 
solution. The absence of partners from affiliated political parties and 
political decision makers was overcome by the integration of ministerial 
staff members and those from other authorities into the network. Partners of 
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the FES were supposed to have a progressive political background. Social 
democracy, though important for the FES in its decision on which 
objectives to pursue, did not play a role in partner selection. German actors 
participated only in part in the network environment. Interest of German 
politicians was minor, the conflict was too dangerous and the confidence 
environment too fragile to promote visits in the Southern regions. Still, high 
ideational correspondence was found with regards to German and EU 
policies for which the FES acted as a translator. Funding for the 
foundation’s activities in Thailand had even been kept up when 
development assistance declined and although there was no specific 
economic interest. 
The activities of the FES as regards the conflict largely confirmed the 
general tasks of transnational conflict management and the support of the 
underlying international principles, such as do-no-harm, local ownership 
and the UN resolution 1325. Moreover, the specific tasks of SSR and 
conflict resolution were identified. We also observed the ability of the FES 
to connect its democracy assistance activities with conflict management.  
The FES had several advantages compared to other international actors, 
such as the ability to work with actors from the social and political levels in 
Thailand as well as its moral authority. However, we also saw that such 
advantages are time-bound. They depend on a window of opportunity which 
had obviously been open in 2009 but was closed in 2015. 
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Chapter 9 - The role of the German political 
foundations in international relations 
In this final chapter we summarise the evidence of this study regarding the 
transnational interaction of the German political foundations, as far as we 
have not yet done so in the conclusions of each chapter. We then connect 
these findings to the main research question on the role of the German 
political foundations in international relations by returning to the 
constructivist and rationalist assumptions on transnational actors. Finally, an 
explanation on the public funding of the German political foundations will 
be given.  
The German political foundations are involved in transnational relations. 
We studied these relations in terms of transboundary interaction processes 
with the help of a public diplomacy model. While scholars generally 
observed increased transnational activities with the end of the Cold War, the 
international activities of the German political foundations date back to the 
1960s. We identified the German political foundations as non-profit and 
public-interest-oriented transnational actors and more specifically as 
Governmental-non-governmental-orgnisations (GONGOs). They are non-
state actors since they are not active on behalf of the German government. 
They are not, as their public funding and their party political affiliation 
might have originally indicated, tools of state power used to influence or 
manipulate foreign politics and civil society. The inability of the German 
government to control the foundations’ international activities became 
particularly clear through the chapters.  
In the context of these transnational interactions, the Stiftungen operated as 
public diplomats. At the same time, they targeted foreign populations, 
among others. Hocking’s distinction between public diplomacy conducted 
by the public and public diplomacy targeting the public could therefore not 
be found.1 The Stiftungen neither declared public diplomacy as an objective 
nor did they practice it intentionally. Public diplomacy was considered more 
as a side effect. Furthermore, the foundations’ public diplomacy was not 
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presentational. Its main intention or objective was not to present a positive 
image of Germany abroad. Consequentially, we did not identify public 
relation or national branding components in the foundations’ activities. For 
East Asia the German foreign office had announced that the German 
political foundations would actively assist the German image cultivation but 
we did not find such “indirect” public diplomacy.2 Certainly, the 
foundations helped mediate German culture. However, they were not 
comparable to other German organisations active in German foreign and 
cultural policy. Although the foundations’ public diplomacy approach 
included elements of mutual understanding in terms of two-way symmetric 
communication, such as cultural diplomacy and exchanges, their ambitions 
utilized persuasive asymmetric two-way communication practiced mainly 
with the help of consulting and a value-based political dialogue. The 
foundations’ main objective was to convince the target audiences of their 
underlying values and norms. In the case of the KAS’s RLP in Southeast 
Europe, this was democracy and more specifically rule of law, while in the 
case of the FES’s program in Thailand it concerned the creation of a 
peaceful situation and the sensitisation of the parties in conflict. The 
Stiftungen followed their independent agenda. Thus, their activities 
resembled diplomacy in its original understanding in terms of information 
gathering, policy advice and communication. Whether the public diplomacy 
of the German political foundations diminished the role of traditional 
diplomacy is not known. We saw that the foundations largely operated in 
network environments and were provided with various resources. These 
resources can be considered as soft power since they were not possessed by 
the other actors in the network who needed these resources. The German 
political foundations had generally more ideational and social resources than 
members of the German government, the parliament, personnel from the 
German ministries and other institutions. In comparison to foreign actors in 
the network the Stiftungen possessed more material resources and partly 
more ideational and social resources. Moreover, we saw that the foundations 
had a high number of relationships and great centrality within the network. 
They had access to foreign political and civil society levels which could not 
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be reached either by personnel from German ministries, embassies or other 
institutions or by German government officials or parliamentarians. With 
regards to its program in Southeast Europe, the KAS established relations 
between foreign members of the network and those in Germany. In case of 
the FES, it connected actors in Thailand. The networking resources were 
hence employed differently by the foundations. While networking was 
something the foundations were very aware of, they did not consider 
themselves as part of the network and their considerations did not include 
(possible) relationships with German actors. As transnational actors with a 
hybrid status, the Stiftungen were able to establish horizontal links to 
political actors and vertical connections to other non-state actors. In most 
cases the foundations did not differentiate between collaboration with an 
international partner and a contact person in the network which is why we 
can assume that the contact was nearly as important as the partnership. In 
both cases it was a unique characteristic of the foundations that they are able 
to establish these connections and to maintain mostly direct links to 
members of the network giving them a “bridging function” and a particular 
control of communication channels. This can be termed as communicative 
power or structural autonomy power.3 On the other hand, German public 
funding, i.e. material resources, made the foundations’ activities possible in 
the first place. The environment between the political foundations and the 
German government was not characterised by a conflict-stereotype and 
public and private actors in the network generally needed each other. The 
network therefore embodied cooperation and absolute gains as members had 
mutual advantages. This derived from labour division and specific actor 
advantages which stemmed from the public or private characteristic of the 
specific actor. Although the foundations relied on public funding, their 
relative autonomy did not support the assumption of a states’ primacy over 
transnational actors stated by the rationalist approaches. It instead 
substantiated our initial claim and the premise of constructivist thought of 
considering state actors and transnational actors as equally important. 
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In considering the network environment we could observe that the 
typologies of transnational networks mostly did not fit to the foundations’ 
undertakings. Although we could observe mixed networks including public 
and private actors in both case studies, the global issue was missing to 
qualify as a Global public policy network (GPPN). The subjects treated in 
the networks were national or regional problems. Certainly, they also 
appeared more broadly on the international agendas in terms of political 
development and peace. However, in this way almost every issue can be 
interpreted as a global problem. Furthermore, we did not see the 
involvement of international actors in the network, which goes against being 
described as GPPN. Although the Stiftungen might build such networks in 
global contexts, for example through the involvement of regional offices 
and those in industrialised countries, we have not studied these activities. 
Moreover, we have not analysed how the German political foundations 
interacted more structurally in international negotiation processes or within 
international organisations or institutions. Although we do not deny the 
foundations’ participation in these environments, we observed that 
structured interactions neither took place regularly nor did they represent the 
foundations’ every day practice. Moreover, not all of the Stiftungen were 
members in international organisations. Finally, the building of regimes or 
interaction within them could be observed neither for the KAS in Southeast 
Europe nor for the FES in Thailand. In contrast, multi-stakeholder 
diplomacy which Hocking considered a wise version of how governmental 
and non-governmental public diplomacy could be practiced,4 was already 
employed in Germany with the help of the German political foundations as 
long as we do not assume that these activities only concern diplomatic 
negotiations only. Moreover, the activities of the Stiftungen did not support 
the assumption that “the advent of new actors has also given rise to new, 
unconventional modes of diplomacy.”5 Their international practices have 
existed for several decades and the current public diplomacy instruments 
were largely those of 1973.6 
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The German Stiftungen acted as democracy assistants and conflict 
managers. In both cases they primarily made use of dialogue public 
diplomacy instruments to undertake these activities and operated in similar 
public diplomacy dimensions. They were therefore largely involved in 
collaborative and catalytic public diplomacy. The catalytic form of public 
diplomacy in terms of agenda-setting by transnational actors has only been 
touched upon.7 In this context, it would have been necessary to study a 
certain foundation’s activity and its objective over a longer period of time 
and analyse the development of the issue on the foreign and German 
political agendas. We cannot therefore take a final position on these aspects. 
However, we saw that the foundations’ transferred information and 
knowledge resources to German parliamentarians, the committees of the 
German Bundestag and the ministries on foreign and development political 
issues which then became part of the policy making process. Moreover, we 
noticed that the foundations were involved in implementing German foreign 
and development policy abroad.  
Social interaction, values and norms accented by constructivists became 
particular important for explaining how the foundations worked and what 
distinguished them from other actors. In their transnational interaction with 
foreign governments and civil society they tried to diffuse values and acted 
as norm entrepreneurs towards foreign societies. Also the building of 
networks by the German political foundations was norm and value driven. 
Moreover, in both cases the concrete party political background was 
substituted by an emphasis on a larger framework of Western political 
values, such as democracy and freedom. In both cases the political 
foundations shared the political ideas of the German government as towards 
the two regions but also, more generally, as towards democracy assistance 
and conflict management. The implementation of German policies was the 
most likely reason that German politicians thought the Stiftungen were 
effective and reliable instruments of German foreign policy despite their 
contradicting relative autonomy. In both case studies the foundations tried to 
target specific social or political disseminators that could support their 
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cause. It caused difficulties when partners who shared these principled ideas 
were missing. In turn, the missing cooperation with politically affiliated 
partners was mostly substituted by working with members of the public 
administration. It was therefore not surprising that according to one 
interview partner, the partners of the foundations in one country seemed to 
be interchangeable.8 Moreover, the involvement of the German political 
foundations in German policy implementation and the fact that several 
German ministries pursued different types of policies in the same region and 
toward the same subject showed the German foreign policy fragmentation. 
It also spoke against the unitary actor hypothesis of rationalist thought. 
Although this positively led to a pluralisation of policy, others criticised that 
the fragmented nature followed several interests to the detriment of the 
community.9 Contrary to the rationalist approaches, questions of high level 
politics in terms of peace and security were handled by transnational actors, 
i.e. the FES in Southern Thailand. Finally, a German economic interest in 
the region was only stated for Southeast European and Stiftungen’ activities 
promoting the economy could not be noted. To simply rationalise the 
continuous financial support of the foundations’ international activities with 
German economic interests was therefore insufficient. Economic interest 
also could not explain the comprehensive network of foreign offices the 
foundations built up over decades. The support of these activities showed 
instead that the German state sought to spread Western values and peace 
even in areas where concrete interests were missing. In contrast to the 
assumptions of the rationalist approaches, we saw that in the international 
activities of the Stiftungen - public and private - were not two separate 
spheres as the rationalist approaches assume. What Stone observed with 
regards to networks of think tanks is a rather “mythical separation” of public 
and private diplomacy which is maintained because it is useful to 
governments to make believe seemingly independent expertise and 
legitimacy of knowledge “outside” the state.10 This resembles the 
incorporation of NGOs by states and their “perpetuation” due to official 
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funding.11 Read from a Gramsci perspective, the foundations’ democratic 
assistance activities could particularly be part of the states’ ambition to 
diffuse Western values and norms by pretending that the foundations as 
“civil society organisations” are norm entrepreneurs whereas they are 
indeed a state’s extension. Neo-Gramscian historical materialism criticises 
constructivism by focussing on the usefulness or good nature of 
transnational actors and stresses the connectivity between the ideational and 
material dimension. Wigger outlines that behind the “allegedly independent 
expert knowledge lurk important political questions that pertain to the 
distribution and concentration of power and economic wealth in society”.12 
This is connected to the question of why a particular set of ideas became 
dominant instead of asking how these ideas became important as 
constructivism does.13 In the current case this means looking at why the 
Federal Republic found it more important to spread these values with the 
help of the foundations instead of following material interests. We have 
tried to shed light on these aspects by looking in the respective chapters at 
the historical development of German public diplomacy, its development 
assistance and conflict management. The recurring focal point was the 
German civilian power identity which particularly emphasises values 
instead of hard material interests. Since military power was not an option for 
post-War Germany it prioritised soft power in particular and focused from 
the 1960s onwards on economic and technological competence, social 
stability and other aspects of “peaceful” foreign policy. It included cultural 
and political charisma as well as a foreign policy that is based to a large 
extent on civil society components and non-governmental actors.14 The 
conscious turn towards the Western democratic and liberal values system 
which found its normative ground in German Basic Law was important for 
Germany to win back credibility and to be able to develop politically and 
economically.15 Identity needs recognition i.e. a socially constructed 
category that others acknowledge as a certain kind worthy of respect16 and 
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which depends on the consistency of words and actions in the process of 
interaction.17 In this context, the German political foundations have been 
mentioned as contributing to the socialisation of German foreign policy.18 
The German political foundations helped Germany to maintain its civilian 
power identity. Through the support of German political foundations the 
characteristic of “value drivenness” was expressed to the outside and 
manifested the Federal Republic’s focus on soft power. It reproduced the 
perception of being a civilian power in terms of social practice and created 
predictability and diminished uncertainty especially for those countries in 
and outside Europe carefully watching German foreign ambitions. With the 
continuous support of the Stiftungen, even when the possibility for hard 
power politics became increasingly possible after reunification, Germany 
practiced the logic of appropriateness as it followed the values, norms and 
social role of its civilian power identity. This led to a blurred distinction 
between foreign and domestic policy and the projection of the domestic 
environment into the international environment. The assumption that the 
German state identity is conditioned by historical, cultural, political and 
social contexts19 is the only thing that can explain why the German 
parliament and government constantly furthered the German political 
foundations international activities even into regions where material 
interests were absent and why it did not turn self-interested and egotistically 
to hard power instead. In summary, the role of the German political 
foundations can therefore be best described as functional providers of 
ideational and social resources, as transnational value and norm diffusers as 
well as German identity reproducers.  
A point of critique toward the constructivist framework is that it does not 
pose the question of cui bono, for whom activities take place.20 
Consequentially, we need to look at who benefits from the undertakings of 
the German political foundations. Chapter 5 and 6 have outlined the 
advantages for the German government which lie in the foundations’ 
democracy assistance and conflict management activities. This included an 
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extended room for manoeuvre though the foundations work with various 
types of actors, their economic efficiency and their protection of 
international relations on a long-term basis. The historical overview on the 
motivation of equipping the German foundations with significant funds 
produced a mixed situation: While the outsourcing of activities to the 
Stiftungen had happened purposefully the foundations were on the other 
hand provided with great autonomy. The activities of the foundations today 
do not exclusively benefit the German government. However, as the 
network model showed, political actors, civil society organisations and 
individuals abroad and in Germany gained from these undertakings as well. 
Especially the Thailand case showed that the activities of the FES were 
largely designed to further the peacefulness of foreign societies while 
German actors were mostly not involved. The activities of the Stiftungen 
largely created a win-win situation for the foreign and German network 
members. The impulse of where and how to be active was taken by the 
foundations alone and concepts were independently developed.  
What we did not analyse in this study is whether the spreading of values and 
norms by the foundations was successful and whether it indeed caused 
social change over a longer period of time. Likewise, we cannot take a final 
position as regards the soft power of the German political foundations in 
terms of ideational persuasion power, preferences’ shaping, setting the 
political agenda and “getting others to want what you want”.21 As already 
outlined, it is difficult, to measure norm or value diffusion effects or how 
they impact on public attitudes and policy results.22 The interview partners 
found it particularly difficult to estimate the success of the Stiftungen. They 
either had a mixed impression on the success or outlined that they were not 
working towards an overall successful result. In Thailand we witnessed that 
the FES’s could not and did not want to continue its conflict management 
although the conflict was not resolved. Returning to Cross’s explanation we 
could try to draw the conclusion that the ideas the FES and their partners 
transmitted were not appealing to the audience that could react to it with 
respective policies (at the official levels) or to those unknown actors who 
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are fuelling the conflict. Alternatively, the narrative used was not 
understood by those actors.23 However, we do not know whether the FES’s 
narratives even reached both groups. In the words of Scott-Smith 
“constructivism offers useful insights into the diffusion of ideas and helps to 
investigate when, why, and how ideas travel and change occurs. Admittedly, 
countless other channels besides public diplomacy exist through which ideas 
travel.”24 We also observed that the existence of soft power resources did 
not necessarily translate into actual soft power in terms of a desired result. 
Moreover, we should not confuse links to policy makers with influence on 
the political agenda. Finally, we have not systematically analysed how the 
network environment of transnational interaction developed over time and 
we cannot say whether the network became denser eventually. The Thailand 
case did not support the assumption. It showed instead that explanations, as 
constructivism highlights, were time bound25 and depended largely on 
political circumstances.  
This study was a first step to generate knowledge on the transnational 
interactions of the German political foundations. Still, to study profoundly 
every single aspect of the integrated public diplomacy model was 
impossible due to its complexity of many different thoughts and ideas. 
Rather the intention was to do preliminary inventory on this neglected 
subject. Particularly, in-depth knowledge still needs to be produced on the 
moral authority resource of the Stiftungen as well as their perceived 
credibility abroad. Data from the foundations’ partner organisations was not 
available and we had to fall back on opinions of other actors on these 
perceptions which obviously cannot substitute the original view. As regards 
the credibility of the German political foundations abroad we could observe 
that the Stiftungen had some flexibility as to how they presented themselves 
towards their partners and audience. If they thought that a proximity to the 
German government was helpful, they put this characteristic to the fore. If 
they wanted to keep their distance from public bodies or even the affiliated 
political party, they were able to emphasise their “non-governmentalness” 
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implied by the use of “foundation” in their name. Future research should 
include interviews with the partner organisations of the German political 
foundations abroad. For the data collection it should be considered that the 
foundations are partly reluctant about their contacts and access to partners is 
often not possible. Researchers therefore should proceed with patience and 
allow some time for it to be accepted and trusted by the foundation. Finally, 
we have not discussed the legitimacy of public diplomacy and whether the 
foundations’ activities undermine political accountability or open up the 
political process to the public. According to Jönsson, representation in terms 
of “acting on behalf of” is “a key function of diplomacy and is recognised 
by most observers, regardless of theoretical background”.26 The question 
remains whom the foundations represent. In their eyes they might embody 
the common good. However, they largely diffuse Western values and 
implement German foreign policy. Therefore they are not, as some authors 
assume, only active in the “pre-political” sphere.27 Problems can occur 
when contacts are maintained with autocratic regimes, such as the HSS 
sponsoring Gnassingbé Eyadéma in Togo.28 During his military dictatorship 
between 1967 and 2005 several violations of human rights were committed. 
Future research needs to consider these representational issues.    
Around the turn of the Millennium, Mair identified three threats for the 
German political foundations’ international activities: Firstly, the growing 
competition in the field of the promotion of democracy; secondly, the 
reduction of public funding; and thirdly, the new focus on conflict 
prevention in which the foundations were not active.29 Nowadays, the 
situation is different. After a decrease of public funding in the 1990s, the 
state subsidies for the foundations have been significantly increased in the 
last years. As we have seen, the foundations also managed to largely 
integrate conflict management into their activities and to even connect it to 
their undertakings in democracy assistance. The competition with other 
actors is still visible. Both case studies showed a strong competition with 
U.S. government sponsored aiding organisations on site. However, we 
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observed that the German political foundations encountered this situation 
with an excess of moral authority. The only current threat for the German 
political foundations’ international activities might be the turn away from 
Germany’s civilian power concept. 
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